ARAB/AMERICAN RELATIONS AND HUMAN SECURITY, POST-9/11:
A POLITICAL NARRATIVE INQUIRY

CHARLOTTE MOATS-GALLAGHER

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prepared by

Charlotte Moats-Gallagher

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Leadership & Change.

Approved by:

_____
Philomena Essed, Ph.D., Chair   date

_____
Laurien Alexandre, Ph.D., Committee Member   date

_____
Elizabeth Holloway, Ph.D., Committee Member   date

_____
Nadine Naber, Ph.D., External Reader   date

Dedication

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to:

Those men, women and children of Iraq, Afghanistan, the United States and beyond who have lost (and will lose) their lives due to the events of 9/11 and the subsequent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The writers of prose, poetry, and non-academic nonfiction who toil to make sense of these times in which we live.

And to:

My grandfather, Newton E. Moats, whose work with Japanese-American communities during the World War II era has been a familial and unexpected source of inspiration for this project.

Abstract

This study explored eighteen women's views and experiences in the arena of Arab/American relations, post-9/11. The study engaged three groups of women: Arab women in Qatar, Arab American women in the U.S., and non-Arab women in the U.S. Qualitative narrative inquiry methodology was used complemented by an innovative use of freewriting to help prepare participants for interviews. Clarke's (2005a) situational analysis was used to open up and analyze the data. Findings surfaced around the interconnected themes of identity, racism, discrimination and Othering[1], the role of the media, and how these ultimately influence a collective sense of and experience of human security. The study adds to the knowledge on East/West understanding and the literature concerning the role of political narratives in meaning-making during times of turmoil. This work explored women's sense of belonging in the political world and women's (political) voices during the post-9/11 period and helps to determine the readiness for dialogue that exists on Arab/American relations. The electronic version of this dissertation is at OhioLink ETD Center, www.ohiolink.edu/etd.

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[1] The terms *Othering* and *Other* are typically capitalized and this is consistent throughout this document.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

"There is a profound sense in which the personal is political and the political is personal" (Andrews, 2007b, p. 2).

Overview of the Study

This study explored women's views and experiences in the arena of Arab/American relations within this post-9/11 space we all inhabit. I use Arab/American relations in this shortened way throughout the study to refer to relations between non-Arab Americans and (a) Arab Americans—meaning people of Arab background living in the U.S. and (b) Arab peoples living outside of the U.S. The post-9/11 timeframe is identified as being influenced by three wars: the global war on terror, the war in Afghanistan, and the Iraq war.

Tension between Arab and non-Arab peoples, a result of the sustained and acute political and military crisis, is troubling. This study surfaced and examined the nature of Arab/American relations, post-9/11, from the perspectives of three groups of women: (a) Arab women living in Doha, Qatar; (b) Arab American women living in the U.S.; and (c) non-Arab women also living in the U.S. This work probed women's sense of belonging in the political world and shined light on the shape and nature of women's (political) voices during a time of protracted war. The study adds to the body of knowledge on relations between the East and the West and to the literature concerning the role of political narratives in meaning-making during times of turmoil, and it probes our tendencies, as humans, toward Othering. Andrews, Squire, and Tamboukou (2008) described narrative as a universal form of human sensemaking. By extension, political narrative, as I see it in this study, is sensemaking on topics of political and social consequence. While the seeds of the current conflict were planted long ago, it is certain that September 11, 2001, and the subsequent global war on terror present a new and shared

disorienting dilemma (Mezirow, 1995) for the world. I see the disorienting nature of 9/11 as having direct impact on our collective sense of human security. The events of 9/11 and the subsequent aftermath led to new perceptions and ways the women in this study each interpret and internalize current day foreign policy. In this study, I aimed to explore whether the personal reflection and connection inherent in this research can, on a small scale, both reveal and perhaps help shift the human, but often static and closely held, frames of reference and worldviews.

Ramadan (2007) believed that the U.S. has been operating within a diplomacy deficit and, I would argue, there is evidence of this deficit[2] abounding both anecdotally, in the main streams of our culture, and empirically, in the academic literature. Kohut and Stokes[3] (2006) illustrated the growing trend of anti-Americanism in the aftermath of 9/11. Our attempts at diplomacy have been inadequate, and nowhere is this more obvious than in the Arab and Muslim world. America has not excelled in the struggle of ideas in the Arab and Muslim world. Kohut found that attitudes toward the U.S. "have gone from bad to worse, in fact, hostility toward America has reached shocking levels . . . the bottom has fallen out of Arab and Muslim support for the United States" (as cited in Djerejian, 2003, p. 15). Further, waning support for the U.S. is not limited to Arab and Muslim populations, but is rather part of a broader global phenomenon. As major world conflicts of this decade, the war in Iraq, the related war in Afghanistan, as well as the war on terror provide us with a compelling case and context for new constructions of diplomacy and human security work.

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[2] Although President Obama has, thus far, managed to elicit more international goodwill than his predecessor, it is too early to judge the impact on anti-Americanism.
[3] Kohut and Stokes comprehensively capture evidence that illustrates the scope of anti-Americanism via the Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Preview of the Theoretical Framework for this Dissertation

A study that aims to illuminate a facet of Arab and American relations and add

something to current East/West understanding requires theoretical and philosophical

underpinning at a number of levels. In the simplest of terms, this study is fundamentally an

exploration of women's views and experiences in the arena of Arab/American relations within

this post-9/11 space we all inhabit. Hence, all threads lead back to this hub. The literature

review frames and helps interpret this study beginning with a discussion of the continuum of

scholarship and history of Arab/American relations. This helps ground the study in the range of

historical facts and ambiguities that are part of the political narratives within which we all

interact. The literature review then provides framing literature in the critical and complex areas

of who we are, how we treat each other, the role of the media and human security.

I believe that 9/11 and the aftermath skewed our collective sense of human security on a

global level. American post-9/11 trends point to a focus on protecting the nation-state

(homeland security), and I argue the needs of individuals and communities have become muted.

Human security is a highly relevant lens for this study as people interpret the continuum of

borders and boundaries between themselves and others, and, as this study provides, the

opportunity to reflect together on movement from this traditional focus on securing nations[4]

toward a focus on securing people and their communities. As Campbell (1998) argued:

> Ironically . . . the inability of the state project of [ensuring] security to succeed is the
> guarantor of the state's continued success as a compelling identity. The constant
> articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to the state's identity or
> existence; it is its condition of possibility. (pp. 12-13)

McAlister (2005) furthered this thinking with her reasoning that the continuing sense of

threat provides support for the power of the state, but it also provides the groundwork for

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[4] i.e., *Homeland Security*, a term in wide use, which has been appropriated by the U.S. of late. It holds a layered set
of meanings in a post-9/11 world.

securing the nation as a cultural and social entity. The imagined community of the nation finds continuing rearticulation in the rhetoric of danger. This study unravels how groups of women are responding to, representing, and living within these realities.

Given the post-9/11 realities exacerbated by the history of events relating to the Arab-Israeli problems, the non-Arab American people find themselves as an imagined community deeply and collectively involved in (knowingly or unknowingly) *Othering* both Arab and American Arabs descending from the Arab world. The practice of Othering is also initiated by Arabs toward non-Arabs. Hatem (2005) spoke about the:

> Serious national and international challenges that September 11 produces and to the urgent need to openly articulate, discuss, and theorize the internal religious, political gender and national differences that distinguish segments of Arab and Arab American communities from others with the goal of building bridges across them. (p. 48)

This study investigates the realities of political racism, exclusion, the tugs of nationalism, and tangled with the subsequent range of emotions such as fear, anger, shame, and mistrust. Kelman (2007) noted how international conflict appears driven by collective needs and fears, particularly to threats to security, identity, recognition, autonomy, self-esteem, and sense of justice. He argued that attempts to reduce or manage conflict must address these needs in order to influence the possibility of establishing coalitions across lines of a conflict. He also suggested collective moods influence the readiness with which a public accepts the initiatives of leadership. "Emotional climate influences public opinion and, hence, what war and peace initiatives appear politically possible" (de Rivera & Paez, 2007, p. 248). The literature on Arab Americans post-9/11 corroborates these sentiments. Ultimately, this study is forward looking and explores what a new, respectful approach could look like through the eyes of groups of Arab, non-Arab, and Arab American women.

Women have an interesting understanding of and resonance with notions of human security. Connecting women and elucidating voice in the form of narratives on the foreign policy issues of our time is the objective of this work. Around the globe, women have struggled to achieve impact on policies and political processes (Ballington & Karam, 2007). Fritsche (2002) argued:

> We need women's voices influencing an agenda for human security and peace. If we are to find long-term and sustainable solutions to violence, all the key stakeholders must be involved. Women's perspectives will make a difference in the desperate need to craft a vision of human security, to build a global dialogue on peace, and to generate alternatives to war and violence. (p. 5)

The literature review in chapter 2 highlights contributions that women have made to the scholarly and practitioner literature in a number of the key research threads, including nationalism and transversal politics. Bunch (2004) provided further rationale for the focus of this study being on women as she noted having different life experiences than men means women bring different issues to the table and bring awareness of different needs and different possible solutions to the process. A number of studies have begun to document the specific ways in which women generally have a more cooperative and less hierarchical approach to solving problems, and are more inclusive in bringing others into the process—which can lead to giving more people a stake in the peace agreements and compromises reached (see Anderlini, 2000; Boulding, 1995; Cockburn, 1998; Enloe, 2000; Moser & Clark, 2001; Riley, Mohanty, & Pratt, 2008). This passage from a recent International Women's Day speech places this study and its desire to bring forth the voices of women on important foreign policy matters at the front and center, at least rhetorically speaking. What matters most is how rhetoric translates to action and change over time.

> Women are still the majority of the world's poor, unhealthy, underfed, and uneducated. They rarely cause violent conflicts but too often bear their consequences. Women are

absent from negotiations about peace and security to end those conflicts. Their voices are simply not being heard. The United States is making women a cornerstone of foreign policy because we think it is the right thing to do, but we also believe it's the smart thing to do as well. Investing in the potential of the world's women and girls is one of the surest ways to achieve global economic progress, political stability and greater prosperity for women—and men—the world over. (Clinton, 2010, p. 1)

The concepts of restitution and forgiveness provide an overarching moral and philosophical framework for this inquiry. Historically, restitution—comprehensively defined by Barkan (2000) as "the full spectrum of attempts to rectify historical injustices in its many forms [restitution, reparations, and apology]" (p. xix)—has been viewed as coming decades after a serious time of conflict between peoples. Reflection about restitution and forgiveness is, in part, borne out of a desire not to repeat past mistakes. Many Arab Americans have come to feel unsafe and under siege since 9/11. It is important to understand historical events. For example, in the U.S. context, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II is part of the collective consciousness. It is important to note current spirals of mistrust between peoples are, to an extent, based on actions of the past. Contemplate, for example, the force and influence on history that the personalities of leaders, formal and informal, have on war and peace. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford[5] (1950) demonstrated there is a close connection between a number of deep-rooted personality traits and overt prejudice. They looked at how war experience may strengthen personality traits predisposed to group hatred. Adorno et al. (1950) stated, "the present writers believe that it is up to the people to decide whether or not this country goes fascist" (p. 10). This statement, though more than half a centaury old, is striking and still relevant. It causes one to contemplate the notion that the U.S.

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[5] Adorno et al.'s (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality* captures a body of empirical work about social discrimination. The work was done by a team of social scientists and initially focused on anti-Semitism, but evolved into a study of issues of prejudice more broadly. Their work received criticism and was followed by other research that focused on social cognition and social identity, some of which will be drawn into this study in later sections.

may have moved to a place regarding Arab/American relations from which it may be difficult to return. Wolf (2007) picked up historical echoes of Adorno et al.'s sentiments. Her work is part of the continuum of viewpoints about the emotional climate of the U.S. as a nation. Wolf documented what she calls a "fascist shift"[6] (p. 21) in America. She added her voice to the concerns raised about the rise of Islamofacism, the advent of the Patriot Act, the institutionalization of torture, and the practices at Guantanamo—all wedges being driven between Arab and Arab Americans. Wolf maintained "free citizens will not give up freedom for very many reasons, but it is human nature to be willing to trade freedom for security. People fear chaos and violence above all" (p. 36).

Political rhetoric on Arab/American relations is shifting at the highest levels (Obama, 2009), but history has a weight of its own and events and their internalizations cannot be overturned instantaneously. In his inaugural address in January of 2009, President Obama described a notion of mutual interest and mutual respect between the U.S. and the Arab world and peoples. Part of the current study has been to ponder what a new, respectful approach might look like according to a group of Arab, non-Arab, and Arab American women. Hatem (2005) spoke about the:

> Serious national and international challenges that September 11 produces and to the urgent need to openly articulate, discuss, and theorize the internal religious, political, gender, and national differences that distinguish segments of Arab and Arab American communities from others with the goal of building bridges across them. (p. 48)

The Study

This study explored women's perspectives on intercultural relations (Arab, Arab American, and non-Arab) during a time of sustained conflict. A key premise of this study was

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[6] Wolf (2007) defined the fascist shift "as an antidemocratic ideology that uses the threat of violence against the individual to subdue the institutions of civil liberty so that they in turn can be subordinated to the power of the state" (p. 21).

the voices of women are important to the topics of the study and there may be promise in the use of dialogue as a mode for building mutual understanding between peoples. The study culminated with the gathering of women's narratives and perspectives on Arab/American relations in the aftermath of 9/11 and an examination of their readiness for dialogue.

A Note on Dialogue

It is important to note the term dialogue can have negative connotations based on its use as a tool historically. For example, Arabs and Israelis are often called on to dialogue. Yet, such dialogues can obscure power relations and actually create asymmetry in power relations between groups. At worst, dialogues are used strategically as a cover for talking about occupation and colonization. While a detailed assessment of power structures between Arabs and Israelis is beyond the scope of this present study, it should be noted dialogue work that has integrity will contemplate real changes and assess issues that block equality and justice (N. Naber, personal communication, June 21, 2010).

Research Questions

1. What are the narratives of Arab women (in the U.S. and in the Arab world) and non-Arab women in the U.S. about Arab/American relations, particularly in this time since 9/11? What are, in their views, inclusive ways toward human security? (RQ1)

2. How can dialogue be used to surface narratives and improve mutual understandings? (RQ2)

Synopsis of Approach and Methodology

This study was conducted in the tradition of narrative inquiry and is inspired, in part, by the thinking of Paulo Freire (2003) on the importance of dialogue and Molly Andrews' (2007a, 2007b) work in the area of political narrative and cross-cultural inquiries. Data gathering was

done in two main ways. The research participants used freewriting[7] techniques and/or small

focus groups. Narratives (texts) generated by the freewrites became the basis for in-depth

interviews with the Arab American, Arab, and the non-Arab women. As mentioned, one group

of women was Arab-American living in the U.S., one group was Arab women from a variety of

countries but currently living in Qatar, and the third group was non-Arab women living in the

U.S. I conducted interviews with each woman to explore themes raised through the freewriting

process and to encourage new themes to emerge. The compilation of this data was analyzed

using Clarke's (2005a) situational analysis categories to reveal and contextualize the findings.

In conducting processes of discovery with these groups of women, I gathered an understanding

of the women's sense of belonging in our current political world. There are separate pools of

data from the fieldwork in Qatar and the U.S., which I integrated around themes in my analysis.

I wanted to represent a range of life experiences and views in this study. The groups

interviewed in the U.S. are non-Arabs of different ethnic backgrounds and Arab Americans

(Arabs living in the U.S.) of a variety of national backgrounds. This diverse range of

participants was also applied in the fieldwork outside of the U.S. A pragmatic way to reach a

diverse group was to work in the small Persian Gulf nation of Qatar, where the majority of

people hail from other Arab nations and, as such, held a corresponding mix of opinions and

worldviews. There are several other reasons why Qatar was an interesting place to do a portion

of this research. First, the central location of Qatar in the Gulf region and the country's relation

to the U.S.[8] made it a geopolitically relevant and strategic site for this research. Second, the

wide demographic mix of people found in Qatar made an interesting backdrop for this study.

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[7] Freewrites are a free-form way of writing thoughts quickly and smoothly . . . mind to pen without analysis, censorship.

[8] Qatar has opened its door to the U.S. military and hosts the central command center for the Iraq war, know as CENTCOM.

Lastly and importantly, Qatar, as a nation, desires to work its way out of research isolation and to be more globally engaged and is actively pursuing this involvement in a variety of ways. Yuval-Davis (1997) highlighted the practices of what she terms *rooting* and *shifting*. Her idea is that each participant brings with her the rooting in her own membership and identity, but, at the same time, tries to shift in order to put herself in a situation of exchange with women who have different membership and identity. It is exactly this climate of rooting and shifting that I tried to cultivate along with the shared learning and new knowledge that arises.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter 2 reviews the literature beginning with some historical context and then focuses on theories that frame who we are, how we treat each other, the role of the media and human security. Chapter 3 describes the theoretical framework for the inquiry, invokes the literature that supports the methodologies, outlines the research design, and illuminates my rationale and my position as author. Chapter 4 elaborates and interprets findings from fieldwork in Qatar and the U.S. Chapter 5 provides a discussion and further interpretation of the findings. Chapter 6 explores the implications of this study for leadership and change.

Chapter II: Literature Review

This review of literature builds the theoretical framework for the current study. Internal and external constructs around who we are (identity) help deepen our understanding of Arab/American relations at this point in history. The literature reveals evidence regarding how we treat each other from the perspectives of both Arabs and non-Arabs. The media plays a role in exacerbating situations and ultimately influencing human security, the culminating theme of this review. The discussion of the literature is around the following main themes: history and context, who we are, how we treat each other, the role of the media, and human security. I begin by framing Arab and U.S. relations using a historical lens.

History and Context: Framing Arab and U.S. Relations[9]

"Human beings fight over history because they conceive their pasts to be an essential part of who they are. And they are right" (Dienstag, 1997, p. 206).

Israeli, Arab, and American relations. A study dealing with Arab/American relations cannot ignore the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the larger dynamic between peoples. The political alignments between the U.S., Israel, and Palestine are also central. The contested nature of both the relationships between these parties and the history have yielded embedded perceptions and opinions that are part of the overarching context of this study. The voices of scholars and other opinion-makers on Arab/American relations are, by their nature, also entwined with the topic of Arab-Israeli relations. The political narratives woven from these voices may ultimately influence the political frameworks for readers and others exposed to their views. This study relies on some understanding of the complexity and degrees of nuance

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[9] For this section on the global context, I will refer to Arab/U.S. relations. In the following section (and throughout the remainder of the document) that reflects more on people, I will refer to Arab/American relations.

surrounding the history[10] of Arab-Israeli relations, including the role of the U.S. in this

history over time. By extension, this section of the review explores how this history relates to

the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and influences Arab/U.S. relations. The work of

Andrews (2007b) in narrative and political change is helpful in framing political narratives.

Some of the questions she wrestled with also apply to this study:

> What is it that makes us interpret the events of our time in one way and not another? Who do we perceive ourselves as being in relation to those events? How actively are we engaged in trying to shape our political environment? What do we identify as being primary forces for change in our lives? To what group or groups do we belong, and how, if at all, does this contribute to our understanding of the political universe? (p. 2)

While the current study explores different frameworks of meaning surrounding the

events of 9/11 and the aftermath, it is important to also hold the broader political and

historical context as an active lens. My aim with this section is to highlight a range of

scholars and opinion-makers whose work has helped me contextualize the study. The

women involved in this study have their own unique pallet of facts and histories, and their

own continuums of understandings and emotions on which they situate.

Regarding the root of the tensions between Arabs and Israelis, there is a paucity of

facts[11] on which full agreement can be reached. Within political science, there are separate

historical schools various scholars of the region either choose to evoke, refute, or ignore. As

articulated by Isacoff (2005), many scholars who work on the Arab-Israeli conflict learn a

difficult lesson early on—the answer to the question of what caused the Arab-Israeli conflict

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[10] It is beyond the scope of this work to elaborate on details of pivotal historical events, but I list contributing events here for context: 1947 United Nations General Assembly partitioned Palestine, 1948 Israeli state came into being, 1967 Israeli-Arab War, 1978-1989 Soviet-Afghan War, Persian Gulf Wars: 1) 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, 2) 1990-1991 Gulf War, and 3) 2003-present Second Gulf War Invasion of Iraq by U.S.and British. 1987 Ist intifada/Palestinian resistance movement in territories, 2000 2nd intifada and the 2002 construction of the Defense Fence, also known as the Separation Wall.

[11] Cockburn (2007) struggled with the same issue when she tried to identify facts both parties can live with.

depends on whom you ask and when you ask it. It depends not only on the perspective and espoused historical school of thought, but also on the particular point in time that the question is asked. Isacoff urged that we must assume multiple competing historical schools in seeking answers to important questions. This may seem obvious in some senses and applicable to all disciplines, but I believe the Arab-Israeli conflict is particularly fraught and extreme care must be taken to understand as much as possible about the origin and perspective of the texts one reads.

Pressman (2005) made observations relevant to this proposed study of political narratives and voice in his consideration of issues of access of various groups of scholars:

1. Most Arab countries are not democratic and have tightly guarded archival material and other information on major events since Israel's founding in 1948.
2. The Palestinians, in particular, do not have an established state apparatus with efficient record-keeping institutions and resources to facilitate historical scholarship.
3. The Israeli academic establishment is more deeply enmeshed in English-language academic discourse in the United States and Europe. (p. 579)

Israeli political scientists have good access to publication in top journals, and are frequent speakers at American conferences (Pressman, 2005). Taken in total, one can come to appreciate there are real influences on the pathways for access, depending on who you are.

While I, as an American scholar, have wide access to sources (in English), in the larger view, Pressman (2005) brought up disturbing questions about what scholarly information on Arab-Israeli topics does and does not get exposure to wider or global audiences. The terms of the debate surrounding Arab-Israeli (and ultimately Arab/U.S. relations) may be influenced by the factors Pressman raised above. In fields of study where passions run deeply, it is important to question the available scholarship and try to comprehend observed gaps. This ties back to the study at hand, particularly the relevance of voice and the nature of what the research participants have (as women and as citizens) at their fingertips to use as building blocks for their

own political education. If there is a gap in academic discourse coming from Palestinian

scholars, does it also follow that there are fewer Palestinian opinion-makers influencing the

wider, more public discourse? If this gap exists, how has this filtered to the political

worldviews of the women in this study?

In examining facts and scholarship to help contextualize the underpinnings of Arab-

Israeli and Arab/U.S. relations, I recognize the selection of history and facts I provide below

could, no doubt, be contested. However, it remains my intent to provide a very brief,

historical reference point. Anthony[12] (2003) pointed out "as late as mid-autumn, 1947, the

U.S. had no enemies in the Arab and Islamic world" (p. 2). What characterized the

Arab/U.S. relationship at that time was an "extraordinary reservoir of multifaceted and

mutual good will" (p. 2). Anthony evoked three core concepts, which are enshrined in UN

charters—the right of nations to their sovereignty, political independence, and territorial

integrity. He maintained these three rights are among the most fundamental rights and

reflect the legitimate aspirations of all countries and found the breaching of these rights is

linked directly to the diminishing degree of Arab and Islamic goodwill toward the U.S.:

> The reason is that, in many ways as a direct result of United States policies, all three of
> these basic national rights and legitimate aspirations are presently and indeed have long
> been, absent in the case of the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people. . . . At
> the core of the matter are the details of the land partition. . . . Moreover, in the eyes of
> many Arabs, there is something that is worse. It is that, however differently Americans
> may understandably view the situation, an additional reason is that, as if to add insult to
> injury, the U.S. has recently been at the forefront of actions regarding which, as a result,
> the same three rights and aspirations are now absent in the case of another proud Arab
> people, the Iraqis, as well. (pp. 4-5)

As a person who works full-time on U.S./Arab relations, Anthony compellingly linked the Arab

Israeli context to the ongoing war in Iraq.

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[12] John Duke Anthony is the CEO of the National Council on U.S. Arab Relations, a Washington, D.C.–based non-
profit, non-governmental educational organization dedicated to improving American knowledge and understanding
of the Arab world.

I now step lightly into schools of thought espoused by Arab and Israeli scholars.
Again, I do not aspire to be complete. For the purpose of this study, a review of a select number
of scholarly experts and public intellectuals, or, if you will, opinion-makers, will suffice to
illuminate some key boundaries and areas of contested truths. Beginning with two prominent
Arab scholars working on issues related to Arab-U.S. relations, there is a natural continuum of
viewpoints. Kramer (1998) described Said (about whom I will say something later) and Ajami
as two Arab American interpreters, who divided American public opinion between them for
decades. The difference in viewpoints between these two public intellectuals exemplifies the
existing gulf on these sensitive topics and yet, they are two scholars who each, respectively, had
an overwhelming influence on perceptions about foreign policies. Considered by some to be
entirely a creature of the American establishment, Ajami[13] is a man:

> Almost entirely deserted by his people, he has become, as he himself has confessed,
> "a stranger in the Arab world" . . . supporter of U.S. foreign policies . . . pro-Israel
> intellectual circles groomed him as a rival to Edward Said, holding up his work as a
> corrective to Orientalism, Said's classic study of how the West imagined the East in the
> age of empire. (Shatz, 2003, pp. 1-3)

For all the critique, the conservative Ajami (a native of Lebanon) has weathered for
being too pro-Western, he, perhaps like many scholars, is a paradox and is influenced by time
and events, as are we all. Ajami (2003) wrote:

> There should be no illusions about the sort of Arab landscape that America is destined to
> find if, or when, it embarks on a war against the Iraqi regime. There would be no
> "hearts and minds" to be won in the Arab world, no public diplomacy that would
> convince the overwhelming majority of Arabs that this war would be a just war. An
> American expedition in the wake of thwarted UN inspections would be seen by the vast
> majority of Arabs as an imperial reach into their world, a favor to Israel, or a way for the
> United States to secure control over Iraq's oil. (p. 1)

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[13] Fouad Ajami (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) is called the most politically influential
Arab intellectual of his generation, often summoned to the White House by Condoleeza Rice, with frequent
appearances on CBS News, Charlie Rose, and the News Hour with Jim Lehrer, and also acts as a frequent editorial
page contributor.

This was published in the 2003 January/February issue of *Foreign Affairs*, just two months before the invasion of Iraq and it creates a clear and critical assessment of the result of a U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, now that the U.S. is engaged in the war, Ajami (2003) is a prominent supporter and argued, "no great apologies ought to be made for America's 'unilateralism,'" (p. 11) and he described the Arab world as "victims of their own brand of Arab victimology" (p. 11). Coury (2005) described Lewis, another scholar who has found an audience among neo-conservatives:

> Lewis has played a significant role in all of the major crises (the 1973 war and oil embargo, the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Gulf War of 1991, and now September 11) that have been seized upon to project the Arabs and Islam as a threat to "western values" and the world's peace and security and one that must be countered largely by force. (p. 13)

> Speaking on NBC's *Meet the Press* just before the attack upon Iraq, Cheney declared:

> I firmly believe, along with men like Bernard Lewis, who is one of the great students of that part of the world, that strong, firm U.S. response to terror would go a long way, frankly, toward calming things in that part of the world. (Coury, 2005, pp. 13-14)

As Waldman (2004) wrote, the "Lewis Doctrine" had, in fact, become U.S. policy.

Israeli scholar Reinhart (2006) critiqued Israel's Palestine policy from within. She tracked the history of the Israeli occupation of Palestine since 1999. Reinhart was an outspoken critic of Israel's policies in the occupied territories of 1967 and is another interesting voice because her work crosses borders—critiquing Israel's policies from a university within Israel, she espoused an allegiance to justice as she sees it, rather than to a particular nation-state. Her work provides us with another important data point in the continuum of scholarly work in the arena of Arab American relations. In a very practical manner, McAlister (2005) illustrated four overarching concerns that have helped to shape U.S. involvements in the Middle East (since 1945):

- military and strategic concerns,
- a general sense of religious attachment whereby Christianity, Judaism, and Islam all take the Middle East as their point of origin,
- U.S. support for Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
- the U.S. policy focus on oil. (pp. 32-33)

These ideas are familiar in the U.S., and have become part of our cultural context and the prevailing narrative. It is, in part, through these types of highly specific involvements (and their portrayal) that Arab/U.S. relations are both created and tested.

It is also useful to seek out scholars who do not work through formal academic channels such as Foukara, the Washington Bureau chief for Al Jazeera International, in part due to limitations on academic freedom discussed previously. Foukara illuminated an understanding of Arab and American perspectives in light of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq at an Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference in 2007. The simplicity and coherence of his assessment is moving:

> Six years after 9/11, I continue to puzzle over the extent to which Arabs, and perhaps non-Arabs too, living outside the United States have failed to fathom what the 9/11 attacks have done to America's collective psyche. I have heard many Americans say that the attacks not only violated their sovereignty and sense of security but they also shook the very foundation on which their Americanness was erected. Whether Arabs can relate to that or not, it certainly deserves to be food for thought. . . . But I also continue to puzzle over the extent to which Americans have failed to grasp what the invasion of Iraq signified to millions of Arabs, particularly those who had never been directly exposed to the authority of the Iraqi state. Iraq in the Arab psyche has a resonance all its own. Iraq, in the eyes of Arabs, has always represented the jewel in the crown. Americans may or may not be willing to relate to that perception, but no attempt to understand the contemporary Arab psyche would be complete without listening to the ring of Iraq in that psyche. (p. 5)

The above discussion is evidence of a tension within the academic community on events and history surrounding the Arab-Israeli situation—which subsequently extends to Arab/U.S. relations. The inextricable links between politics and scholarship are illustrated. I circle back to Andrews (2007a), who asked, where, exactly, do people (the women in this study in particular) locate themselves within these political narratives?

Orientalism and occidentalism. Moving from the broad discussion of the role and

voices of scholarly opinion-makers, I now hone in on two areas of theory that have been part of

the historic framing of East/West relations. The representation of *Arabs* in the Western mind

and of *Westerners* in the Arab mind can be revealed, to an extent, with the theories of

occidentalism and orientalism, which have their place in the scholarly discourse and continue to

play a part in the conceptualization of East/West relations. Aspects of our collective tendencies

toward Othering were revealed and demystified during the course of this study and early roots

and rationales for Othering may be found within the more static aspects of occidentalist and

orientalist theories. This discussion also speaks to the theme of identity as the constructions of

orientalism and occidentalism in practice speak to the collective respresentation of identity.

Said (1979) identified orientalism in his foundational work as the political, cultural, and

intellectual system by which the West has, for centuries, managed its relationship with the

Islamic world. Said is well-known for his descriptions of colonialism and contemporary power

relationships with places, peoples, and communities designated as the Other or the Orient. He

further articulated orientalism as:

> The systematic attempt to create the categories of the "West" and the "Orient," pivoting
> on an absolute and systematic difference between the West, which is rational,
> developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior.
> From the point of view of the "West," abstractions about the Orient . . . are always
> preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. (p. 300)

Said's (1979) work gives an important theoretical lens that provides historical context

and helps to interpret the phenomenon of Othering currently seen between Arab and non-Arab

peoples. Said's original conceptualization of orientalism is being extended and critiqued within

the literature. Nayak (2006) found "the internal dimension of orientalism now includes Arab

Americans, Muslim Americans, and other homogenized groups marked a priori by their cultural

and religious histories or dissenting politics as 'Other' within U.S. society" (p. 45). The

Patriot Act implored citizens to refrain from hatred and violence against these marked

Americans, but stipulated expression of patriotism as "a necessary condition for their safety

because political agency cannot be allowed to threaten the U.S. narrative of its identity" (U.S.

Patriot Act, 2001, p. 102). Nayak[14] (2006) maintained:

> The 9/11 attacks radically destabilized the U.S. sense of self and thus necessitated a
> particular reassertion of state identity that pivots violently on gender and race. The U.S.
> state project to "save" its identity, which intertwines religion, ideology, and conflict so
> as to permanently etch within the American psyche a fear/loathing/paternalism regarding
> the "Orient," abroad and within. (p. 42)

Nayak (2006) provided us with a post-9/11 view of the dynamics of orientalism. This

Othering is produced and reflected through popular media outlets both in the U.S. and the Arab

world, and colors our collective experiences in daily life within this post-9/11 space. Nayak

made the point that orientalism "in effect reflects insecurity about the Other becoming an actor

rather than object in the international hierarchy" (p. 45). In other words, "the potential agency

of the other is always at stake (as a threat) in orientalist framings" (Youngs, 2006, p. 10). Ning

(1997) added her voice to the evolution of the tenants of orientalism, which she described as

shifting, more and more, as western people discover the Orient in this evolving age of

information.

It is generally understood orientalism and occidentalism are not mirror images (Jervis,

2005) and occidentalism is a much younger and less developed area of inquiry. Buruma and

Margalit (2004) used the term *occidentalism* to describe "the dehumanizing picture of the West

painted by its enemies" (p. 5). Their critique included:

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[14] Nayak's work proposes a feminist theoretical framework for empirically understanding and recognizing
orientalism's logic in U.S. state identity making.

Hostility to the City, with its images of rootless, arrogant, greedy, decadent frivolous cosmopolitanism; to the mind of the West manifested in science and reason; to the settled bourgeois, whose existence is the antithesis of the self-sacrificing hero; and to the infidel, who must be crushed to make way for a world of pure faith. (p. 11)

Buruma and Margalit (2004) continued to include "a general depiction of the West as worshiping money, materialism, and individualism. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are one form of impetus for an increase in occidentalism thinking" (p. 143).

According to Jervis (2005), those hoping to moderate orientalist and occidentalist thinking are doing so in a very difficult period, because such attitudes are becoming more prevalent. Said (as cited in Jervis, 2005) found:

Ever since the demise of the Soviet Union there has been a rush by some scholars and journalists . . . to find in an Orientalized Islam a new empire of evil . . . both the electronic and print media have been awash with demeaning stereotypes that lump together Islam and terrorism or Arabs and violence, or the Orient and tyranny. (p. 297)

American policy toward Iraq, something Little (2002) referred to as part of an "Orientalist crusade," (p. 318) provides yet another example of the persistence of orientalist thinking. Freund (2001) added intrigue to the dialogue about orientalism with his belief that practitioners of the orientalist political critique have spent a quarter-century sifting through the sins committed by the West against the East and "the critique's point has never been to clarify and improve relations and mutual perceptions" (p. 5). Furthering this line of thinking, Freund highlighted the work of Al-Ali, which posits that the phenomenon of occidentalism is "part of a political ploy . . . [in that] it uses available cultural categories to gain symbolic advantages for 'the self,' and to handicap 'the other'" (p. 7). It resulted in what she called the construction of "an imperialist, corrupting, decadent, and alienating West" (Freund, 2001, p. 7). Ning (1997) agreed that "occidentalism sometimes plays a role of intensifying the East-West opposition

rather than establishing communication and dialogue" (p. 4). Again, there is the use of

theory and scholarship to bolster political positions and general Othering.

An elaborate critique of these theories is beyond the scope of this study. In some

respects, the theories of orientalism and occidentalism may do more to constrain and categorize,

or polarize, rather than enlighten. While it is important to understand their role as meta-

narratives in shaping debates, we also must question them and evaluate their usefulness for the

current day. Perhaps it is an open question as to just how useful the veins of scholarship in

orientalism, and more recently occidentalism, are in creating a framework for understanding

East/West relations. Answers and new questions may lie within the critiques of these theories.

Who We Are

> If you don't know the kind of person I am
> and I don't know the kind of person you are
> a pattern that others made may prevail in the world
> and following the wrong god home we may miss our star. (Stafford, 1960, p. 51)

Identity is a cross-cutting theme and is explored through the following key sub themes:

adaptation, belonging, and representation; nationalism; globalization; gender; and emotion.

There are huge dividends to be had through developing empathy and understanding around the

identities of others. Consider the things you hold most closely—a place or some aspect of your

heritage or upbringing. Then think about this being in jeopardy as a result of someone you do

not understand and who does not understand you. Identity is intensely personal and political, as

it is about belonging. Cultural understanding during a time of conflict is predicated on knowing

and appreciating the identity of those with whom we are in conflict. Saunders (1999) supported

and extended this notion urging us to also recognize the critical importance of human

experience to identity. Times of conflict, however do not always afford us the freedom of

thought and the emotional wherewithal to investigate the realities of others. Rather, events and

their attached emotion can have a tendency to eclipse our ability to see and know people.

How one feels about and reveals one's place (physical place, historical place, and psychological

place) is a building block of cultural understanding.

It is also crucial to interrogate what underlies identity:

> Clashes that appear on the surface to stem from identity in fact often originate in skewed access to political power or wealth, in a lack of channels for representative political participation, and in suppression of cultural and linguistic diversity. (UNDP, 2009, p. 5)

As such, social identity theory is an important framing theory for this study. Tajfel (1981) and

Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987) suggested individuals naturally strive for

positive self-image and social identity and this is enhanced by the process of categorizing

people into in-groups and out-groups. The main hypothesis of social identity theory is group

members of an in-group will seek to find negative aspects of an out-group, thus enhancing their

own self-image. In this sense, the need for social identity supports the formation of prejudice.

As this dissertation unfolds, readers will see both positive and more negative manifestations of

identity dynamics evidenced in the findings.

Adaptation, belonging, and representation. The literature reviewed here explores

three aspects of identity that have particular relevance for this study. The first is adaptation,

referring to the cultivation of shifting and multiple identities within the context of

Arab/American relations. Closely linked to this is the important notion of belonging.

Adaptations are often made by people to increase a sense of belonging. Lastly, there are

important considerations in the area of representation—or the feelings people have about being

represented by mainstream culture, the media and/or the government—and how this reflects on

identity.

In the case of each of the three groups of women in this study, there is a reality of multiple identities being held by individuals. Bahr and Sweat (2006) argued that within constructionist theories of identity in recent decades there has been a:

> Dramatic and sustained shift away from fixed, stable self-concepts and toward more fluid, fragmented ones. These theories argue that flexible identities are better adapted to the institutional instability, the rapid social change and the evolving nature of social relations that characterize contemporary society. (p. 1)

Arab Americans are classified in the U.S. census as White.[15] As such, Arab Americans have a choice to make: do they adopt the label of White and possibly give up some aspects of their status or identity? Or, do they reject the label of White and, along with this, accept whatever loses or gains may come with revoking the designation? While this may or may not surface as an issue in the day-to-day life of Arab Americans, it is a political issue in Arab American advocacy circles and remains an area with a wide continuum of viewpoints. Roediger (2002) reminded us "the social fiction of race defies rigorous definition" (p. 325) and the "precise relationships among Americanization, Whiteness, and loss of specific ethnicity are extremely complex" (p. 333). Roediger's work documented the phenomena of immigrants arriving at the U.S. from all over and their quest to be seen as White in order to blend in, to not be foreign—which they feel gives them a more secure claim to citizenship (or belonging) in America. He described a "pan-ethnic [ideology that] did not emphasize cultural distinction but the shared values of a White immigrant heritage" (p. 328). Arab Americans are caught in this maelstrom, along with many ethnic groups in the U.S.

Ethnic groups that immigrate to America have unique trajectories for how they assimilate (e.g., how quickly, how completely, and how easily). These trajectories are influenced by historical, social, political contexts. Each group of immigrants coming to the

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[15] In the U.S. Census (2000), the vast majority of Arabs reported their race as White and no other (80%).

U.S. over the course of history has had its own unique struggles and developmental path. Each group must collectively navigate shifts in identity politics as time passes and the climate and culture itself as it evolves. Nagel's (as cited in Nagel & Staeheli, 2005) study demonstrated while immigrants often do assert a politics of identity (a politics in which the rights to maintain markers of culture and to assert an identity as different from than the host society are reserved), they also enact a politics of sameness—of blending with the host society in some ways or in some circumstances. These two politics are not contradictory, but rather, form the basis of an identity politics that is fluid rather than fixed, and multiple rather than singular. "In the case of Arab immigrants to the U.S., identities might be expressed at different times—or even at the same time—as Arab, as American, as Muslim, as Christian, as woman, or even as being like the Irish" (p. 489). Arab Americans as a group (irrespective of the more recent, post-9/11 era) share a typical trajectory of assimilation with other groups.

Nagel and Staeheli (2005) examined the narratives of assimilation and belonging of Arab American activists. Key aspects of the narratives of the Arab American activists are of interest to the current study as they help to further characterize the general pathway that Arab Americans travel. The activists interviewed argued (a) Arabs have assimilated in political, economic, and social terms to a remarkable degree, (b) the negotiation of similarity and difference has been a key element of an American identity and society, (c) negative associations and seeming incompatibility of some ethnic and cultural identifiers can be overcome and acceptance can be gained without stripping oneself of identities associated with heritage, culture, and places of birth, and (d) in demonstrating the enduring attachment to identities as Arabs, activists are not claiming special rights that differentiate Arabs from other Americans—

rather, they are claiming rights to maintain their Arab identity as Americans (Nagel &

Staeheli, 2005).

> Like other immigrants who were initially viewed as incapable of assuming the rights, responsibilities, and values of American citizenship, these activists argued that Arab-Americans would be seen as belonging, as American, and as full members of the polity. It was a matter of time, educating the public, and hard work. (Nagel & Staeheli, 2005, p. 486)

Nagel and Staeheli (2005) drew parallels with other subordinate groups to argue both for

the ability of Arabs to assimilate into the American citizenry and for the historical basis for

struggles to maintain cultural difference. In this sense, the invocation of the Irish experience in

the U.S. was an attempt to normalize Arabs (Roediger, 2002). Baligh (2003) questioned the

U.S. and its tolerance and acceptance of immigrants into its national polity. She questioned her

sense of security about the parameters of American national identity and the complex forces that

can intervene and locate certain groups outside the boundaries of the national polity, and create

what she termed *sites of extreme alienation*. This discussion illuminates the layers of obstacles

and related discriminations for Arab Americans. The body of experience and scholarship that

deals with the assimilation of various groups of people within the U.S. stands as important

background to the study at hand.

Questions of representation in the U.S. can be addressed in a reductionist mindset:

concerning America, "You either like us or you can leave us" is familiar rhetoric in our recent

past. This contrasts with an expansionist mindset exemplified in the phrase "We are many and

we welcome all"—a competing and common refrain. The ways one person identifies with

America may well be completely different than the ways of the next person. While this is good

in many ways (the term *American* serves many interests and compels many peoples) it is

difficult when unity is called for—in times such as 9/11 and the aftermath when it can be seen

in the many Americas there are many viewpoints and no single right path for representation, and subsequently, for action. Who has the right to use the phrase "we Americans"? Huddy (2001) found we need to look at the subjective meaning of identities. For example, as noted above and as the research on patriotism demonstrates, American identity does not mean the same thing to all Americans. It is the meaning of American identity, not its existence that determines its political consequences. Oswald's (2005) work examined social psychological processes associated with anti-Arab reactions (prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination) following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and, interestingly, found that self-categorization and personal ideologies account for anti-Arab reactions more than perceived threats. In other words, respondents who supported clear group distinctions and who identified with "being American" were more likely to report anti-Arab sentiments.

A poignant example can be seen when examining America's newfound concern for Afghan women. Hatem (2005) described the discourse on the war on terrorism "as objectifying women as victims that needed the U.S. to liberate them degraded representations of Arab societies, Islam, and women using gender agendas to give their projects political legitimacy" (p. 39). Hatem's work speaks of *projected representations* for political aims.

Ta's (2007) work also speaks to issues of representation. She argued:

From the Patriot Act, to the war in Iraq, to the holding facilities in GTMO, the extension of executive power has consolidated itself around the rhetoric of morality and has gained momentum through a culture of fear; for Arab, South Asian, and Muslim Americans, this has meant harassment, a loss of civil liberties, and social and cultural exclusions. Their plight in the post-9/11 world is illustrative of the contradictory narrative that celebrates "patriotic Arab Americans" under the discourse of national unity, at the same time that it attacks and alienates that very difference as the source of national dissent and subversion. (p. 144)

She raised the questions of how much people are willing to adapt and when does

belonging extract too high of a price? Ta (2007) continued with a description of the

negotiation of identity after 9/11, a process that includes the exercise of what she called

"*compulsory patriotism*—the need to defend one's identity by foregrounding a meta-American

status" (p. 139). Her study documented instances of this compulsory patriotic "need or even the

demand, to prove one's Americanness at the expense of one's customary ethnic-religious

identifications" (p. 147).

    Arab Americans seem to be in a very precarious position at this point in history.

Cockburn (2007) explained it this way:

> The post-9/11 world has reminded us that the wars Western countries wage overseas
> they simultaneously wage at home. There are always people of (or presumed to be of)
> the "enemy" ethnic group or nation residing in the metropolis. Some have been there for
> generations, others are the flotsam and jetsam of current or recent wars. (p. 200)

There is a growing body of scholarship that depicts the post-9/11 Arab-American

experience. This review of literature was bound by time, focusing mainly on post-9/11 studies,

but also included some work from the period from 1997 through 2001. It is important to have a

sense of the streams of this literature both before and after the events of 9/11 and the resulting

period of war. The current review provides another layer of groundwork for understanding the

data gathered in this study.

It should be noted that the events of 9/11 have had some unintended good outcomes

in the sense there is increased awareness and expanded strategies in educational systems to

do a better job of multicultural and cross-cultural work. Orfalea (2006) took time to gather

stories about reaching out with compassion to the Arab American community. For example,

in Chicago, Mayor Daley declared November to be Arab-American Heritage Month; a

project in Chicago was sponsored called the "Campaign for Collateral Compassion," and

asked major 9/11 charities to include victims of hate crimes backlash as beneficiaries; and

the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services conducted a listening session to get a sense of Arab-American mental health needs during this difficult time. Questions that came up during this listening session were: How American am I? And what does it mean to be an Arab? (Orfalea, 2006). These are merely illustrative examples that show not everything happening post-9/11 regarding Arab/American relations is difficult or negative.

What I found within the various segments of literature on these topics sensitizes us to layers of findings about the stress on (and resilience of) the Arab American community in this country during the post-9/11 period. The literature begins to tell the story of how it is to live in the U.S. as an Arab American in the aftermath of 9/11. In the social psychology field alone, there is evidence of both the incredible stress on (and resilience of) the Arab American community during this time of war (e.g., Ahmed, 2004; Ali, Milstein, & Marzuk, 2005; Beitin & Allen, 2005; Hendricks, 2007; Jamil et al., 2002; Moradi & Hansen, 2004; Oswald, 2005). The great resilience of the Arab American community and the difficult realities being faced by many echoes through the literature. The scholarship addresses a range of phenomena that can be seen to undermine relations between Arab Americans and non-Arab Americans, as findings on stereotyping, racism, discrimination, comfort and incivility, and the politics of identity show. The works below were selected to depict the range of insights and concepts, which, when taken collectively, paint a composite picture of what life is like for Arab Americans. This body of knowledge and understanding is of critical importance to the status of Arab/American relations, and to the realities of human security and, hence, the current study.

Sweis's (2005) work explored the concept of *selving* in a study meant to serve as a bridge between the Arab American and mainstream American communities and to locate some of the divergent discourses between the Arab American and mainstream American

communities. Sweis said "perhaps these divergences were present before, but with the bombings in New York and a war in Iraq, backlash against the Arab American community also widened that gap" (p. 135). She found gender is a crucial dimension of perceptions and experiences of Arab Americans. The four key themes that surfaced from Sweis's work (which was based on interviews with 10 Arab-American women) were (a) ethnic identity was strengthened by negative experiences with mainstream Americans, (b) participants rejected their official racial designation as White, (c) womanhood was defined by the ability to resist tradition while upholding respect, and (d) true identity was an outgrowth of being able to embrace both the Arab and the American cultures. Sweis's findings show evidence of Arab American's not feeling represented in the U.S. post-9/11 and, interestingly, rejecting aspects of adaptation by holding to their ethnic identity and preferring not to be designated as White. One of Sweis's interview question sets has direct relevance for my work:

> How do you feel about being an Arab American right now? Is that different from how you've felt about it in the past? Why or why not? Have American foreign policies, the Arab/Israeli conflict, or the occupation of Iraq impacted your life? Your sense of self? How? Are there any significant experiences you've had in society relating to the issues that have made you confront your identity? If so, what happened? How did you respond? What did it mean to you? (p. 148)

The work of Witteborn (2007) and Mango (2008) elucidated coping strategies related to identity undertaken by Arab Americans. Witteborn explored how self-identified Arabs living in the U.S. expressed their collective identities in talk since the impact of 9/11. Witteborn found 9/11 changed the importance and meaning of identity expression for the participants in this study. The expression of Arab identity was either made more salient after 9/11 or suppressed altogether. Hence, collective identity expression can be an answer to changing public perceptions, public pressures, and sociopolitical circumstances. Witteborn's work has very

practical relevance to this study, prompting me to ask, how did women in the study negotiate these very issues? How did they choose to situate themselves and what parts of their identities were emphasized and shared, and for what reasons?

To an extent, Mango's (2008) work picked up where Witteborn's (2007) left off. Mango explored how a group of Arab American women positioned themselves and coped when faced with stereotypes and difficult situations related to their Arab ethnicity. Analysis of the women's narratives indicated that Arab American women in this study were aware of two types of images of Arabs (and related groups)—first, the image of Arabs as enemy, and second, the image of Arabs as Other. According to their comments, they were aware of them because of the mainstream discourse toward these groups, as well as through firsthand experience. Similar to Witteborn, as Mango's participants reported on their own past or imagined experiences in difficult situations, they reported positions and identities while simultaneously enacting the positions and identities they reported. Mango's work, then, looked at these questions:

> How did these women position themselves? What were the linguistic strategies they used in their talk to express who they were? What kind of affiliations did they express and perform? What stances did they take toward their talk and toward others' talk? What kind of interactional roles did they tale within the interaction. (pp. 8-9)

These theories help build our understanding of the complex layers of forces at work in relations between Arab and non-Arab peoples.

Nationalism and identity. Nationalism exists in various ways within us all. I would argue some of what constitutes nationalism is as unencumbered as understanding and cultivating one's sense of place, taking comfort from aspects of one's home place, and appreciating a collective, bioregional identity. It was important for the current study to consider American nationalism—how is it viewed by the Arab world (and Arab Americans) and what are its varied interpretations and aims? The overt expression of love for the nation is, perhaps,

something particular to America—a country characterized by exceptional nationalism (Lieven, 2004). Subsequently, Arab nationalism will be discussed.

Balibar (1991) argued that nationalism is always supported by an ideology that constructs those outside the nation as racial others. Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) distinguished *patriotism* (a love for one's country, a respect for its people, and a commitment to serve it) from what they termed *nationalism* (feelings that one's country is superior to others and should be emulated, powerful, and dominant). Nationalism is a key concept in understanding more about the women in this study—their deep ties to their country of origin and, in some instances, the nature of their ties to a new country of choice. Everyday lives happen amidst influences from the nation-state (Rosenberger, 2001) and the nation-state consists not only of the state (a political entity with institutions, bureaucracies, and policies), but also a nation, an "imagined political community" (Anderson, 2006, pp. 5-6).

Bhabha (1990) articulated tensions inherent in nationalism, referring to:

> The narratives and discourses that signify a sense of "nationess": the *heimlich* pleasures of the hearth, the *unheimlich* terror of the space or race of the Other; the comfort of social belonging, the hidden injuries of class; the customs of taste, the powers of political affiliation; the sense of social insight of institutions; the quality of justice, the common sense of injustice; the *langue* of the law and the *parole* of the people. (p. 2)

There is a continuum of perceptions and experiences around nationalism and national projects. Bystydzienski (1992) pointed out while national projects in the West are rarely a site for women's liberation (in fact, most Western feminists are alienated from nationalism), globally, women are more often mobilized by national projects than any other form of politics.

Cockburn (2007) helped to further frame the continuum of interpretations surrounding nationalism. In her study on women's activism against war, focusing on a range of countries, she linked nationalism to gender systems. Cockbun addressed questions such as "is nationalism by definition a bad thing, are nation states necessary evils? Or is national identity and belonging a legitimate need, and a national homeland something to which everyone has a basic entitlement?" (p. 11) Some of the women in her recent study condemned nationalism as a cause of war, while others saw it as a legitimate source of identity. Cockburn found "some women experience nationalism as something fundamentalist, aggressive, and patriarchal" (p. 193). "Some see their nationalism as being about 'self determination'. . . . Nationalism is a matter of different locations, positionalities, and political conjunctures throwing up different perceptions, 'situated' knowledges" (p. 204). The problems arise with the use of nationalist rhetoric that paves the way for public campaigns that can ultimately justify war or ethnic strife.

A deeper look at some of the origins and (gender) implications of U.S. nationalism is found in Nelson's (1998) narrative of national manhood. Nelson employed a historical approach to help us understand how the interarticulation of race, gender, and nation produced a particular kind of civic and cultural logic in the early U.S. (one that lingers with us today). While Nelson's work was an attempt to see the diverse humanity of actors within the institution of White manhood, Nelson's approach was highly critical of the effects the institution and practices of White manhood produce for women and people of color. Nelson maintained White manhood's identification with national unity worked, historically, to restrict others from achieving full entitlement in the U.S., while, at the same time, it worked powerfully to naturalize White men as essentially unified subjects. Her work questioned how and under what conditions White manhood came to stand for nation, and how it came to be idealized as a

representative identity in the U.S. Nelson's analysis described national manhood as an

"imagined fraternity" (p. 204). Perhaps it is the unspoken challenge of her work to recognize

the depth of the context and history that forms the cauldron of race and gender relations in the

U.S., but perhaps it is also a call to recognize women's own imagined fellowship. Her work

painstakingly accounted for the different history and trajectory women have had with the

nation-state and clearly outlined one of the sources of Western feminists' alienation from

nationalism. We are left to conclude that women have a critical, and yet historically

underheard, voice on matters of the nation-state.

Among the strands of research on women and nation, Yuval-Davis's (1997) work on

theorizing gender and nation is prominent. Her stance was "women reproduce the nation

biologically, culturally, and symbolically" (p. 334). Further, Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler

(2002) stated:

> There is a paradoxical positioning of women as both symbols and "others" of the
> collectivity: women symbolize the nation's identity while at the same time they are a
> non-identical element within the nation. For example, the well-known paradox that
> nationalism at the same time looks back on traditions and forward to its particular
> political project usually comes in a gendered form: while men usually are active
> agents in the national project (and its future), women tend to represent its tradition
> (and the past). (p. 335)

To more fully understand the context for women from the Arab world, it is necessary to

also gain some perspective on the unique aspects of Arab nationalism and the role it played (and

continues to play) in Arab/U.S. relations. Arab nationalism is a nationalist ideology with

central premise that the peoples and countries of the Arab world, from the Atlantic Ocean to the

Arabian Sea, constitute one nation and are bound together by their common linguistic, cultural,

and historical heritage. One of the primary goals of Arab nationalism is the end, or at least the

minimization, of direct Western influence in the Arab world, and the removal of those Arab

governments considered to be dependent upon acquiescence to Western interests to the

detriment of their Arab people. Pan-Arabism is a related concept, which not only asserts the

singularity of the Arab nation, but calls for the creation of a single Arab state.

Arab nationalism is a broad ideological construct. Consider the continuum of scholarly

opinion about the virtues of pan-Arab nationalism. Coury (2005) argued there is a

"demonization of pan-Arab nationalism consisting of two themes—that this nationalism has

been inherently totalitarian and racist and that it has been a dismal failure" (p. 2). He argued

"these scholars who demonize treat pan-Arab nationalism highly ideologically which lends fuel

to the fire of the neo-conservatives and their liberal neo-imperialist allies" (p. 10). Further,

Coury believed:

> The effort to demonize serves several functions: it provides a vulgar intellectual version
> of the Bush administration's argument that "they hate us for who we are rather for
> anything we have done;" it conveys the impression that Arab hostility towards Zionism
> is grounded in racism and not in resistance to settler colonialism; and it lends support to
> the [former] administration's "Greater Middle East Initiative" which under the guise of
> promoting democracy . . . seeks to devise new forms of economic and political control.
> Arab unity is inherently dangerous. (p. 10)

The other end of this continuum is represented by those who espouse liberal pan-Arab

nationalism, as represented by Zurayq,[16] which has undergone a revival since the 1970s in the

form of a neo-Arabism that posits a necessary connection between democracy and Arab unity.

This type of nationalism focuses on common cultural identity, economic and geopolitical needs,

common interests, and values. Whether one has a positive or negative sense of the concept of

pan-Arab nationalism or neo-Arabism depends entirely on where one sits, politically and

socially. There are forces for and against Arab unity just as there are forces for and against

American unity. Nationalism must be taken in context and carefully analyzed for its ultimate

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[16] Christian Constantine Zurayq was the intellectual father of this liberal national tradition (Coury, 2005).

purpose. Tactics matter a great deal. It is important to identify who is represented by the

national project and who is not.

Globalization and identity. Moving from nationalism and its varying interpretations,

globalization also has direct relevance to and impact on intercultural relations. Globalization

has to do with how we connect as peoples—and the phenomena of globalization presents us

with a new age of crossing borders and boundaries. According to Livesey (2005):

> The problem associated with globalization whereby it has hampered our ability to
> comment critically on cultural practices while remaining respectful of difference.
> There are more complexities to issues of cross-cultural work within the global
> context where migrations and hybriditites are now more common. How can we
> research and report on issues affecting social groups from our own locatedness while
> still respecting the differences among women remains a challenge. One of the
> paradoxes of globalization—besides having the power to exploit, globalization has
> the power to enhance women's lives. (p. 152)

In part, it is this potential to enhance women's lives that makes it important to take

note of how specific globalization outcomes can enhance the work on this study. A simple,

but profound example is our ever-expanding use of information technology (IT) to initiate

and maintain connection over the course of this study. By extension, IT plays an important

role in bringing women together worldwide for peace building networking.

Resistance to globalization can combine with resistance to our own internal and

national colonizations. Livesey (2005) asked us to remember the role of resistance in our

own situations, as well as globally. She reminded us colonization is never just an external

process (the powerful colonizing the less powerful), but must always also be an internal

process (people believing in the underpinning myth of colonization and being subject to the

myriad forces of colonization in our own lives). This highlights a central challenge for

feminism, namely, the question of whether our recent focus on globalization is a way of

avoiding responding to challenges within our own nationalities and locations. Livesey

considered this from her own United Kingdom perspective, which made her question her own (and the generalized) response to the invasion of Iraq. Livesy raised important points when she critiqued the U.S. democracy (and less directly, Americans as citizens) for allowing the Iraq invasion to go forward. People are not always successful in being agents of change or stoppers of war in local, or national, or global contexts. The fact that people are not always successful does not mean they should not engage. In Livesy's thinking:

> The challenge is not to contest globalization but to exert control over its ideological and ethical presence. In contesting globalization, then, we are seeking to imprint it with an ethical framework, which redistributes power from the relative few to the many. (p. 154)

Livesey (2005) challenged her readers to not accept powerlessness in the face of globalization forces that they may feel they cannot control. Rather, she suggested people should engage in and be analytical and thoughtful about the roots and forces of globalization as they affect lives—positively, negatively, and in some cases, in ways not readily comprehendible.

The interrelatedness of globalization and foreign policy can be seen with the continued blossoming of the internet including blogs, Twitter, YouTube, and all the varied ways political information is received from around the globe in near-real time. The rapid distribution of the Abu Gharib photos, the use of new media by Osama bin Laden to get his message across, and the advent of embedded, real-time war reporting are all examples of the nexus of globalization and foreign policy. These elements help shape individual political narratives. (See the work of Nsamenang (2002), Stevenson and Zusho (2002), and Welti (2002) on the intrusive nature of Western values through globalization.)

Arnett's (2002) work on the psychology of globalization is particularly useful to understanding the links between fear and anxiety about loss of identity—resulting from globalization and westernization. Arnett found:

> As a consequence of globalization, most people in the world now develop a *bicultural identity,* in which part of their identity is rooted in their local culture while another part stems from an awareness of their relation to the global culture. (p. 777)

He further found "the pervasiveness of *identity confusion* may be increasing among young people in non-Western cultures. As local cultures change in response to globalization, some young people find themselves at home in neither the local culture nor the global culture" (Arnett, 2002, p. 777). According to Arnett:

> Some young people may have trouble finding meaning in the worldview that is the basis of the global culture, with its values of individualism and consumerism. This new worldview is not indigenous to their culture and, in fact, may directly contradict their cultural traditions. (p. 778)

Arnett (2002) ultimately found most people embrace the opportunity to make decisions about identity for themselves. It could be that, after a period of confusion and sorting out, people will find ways to embrace the new diverse choices available to them as a result of globalization. (See also the work of Berry, 1993, 1997, 1998; and Segall, Lonner, & Berry, 1998 on these themes.)

Gender and identity. While feminist identity is not called out explicitly in this study, it nonetheless warrants some discussion as it is important to recognize the contested nature of representations around various feminisms.[17] The following section discusses feminism as well as the potential of transversal politics as a model for honoring individual identity while also reaching out to others. In "Islamophobia and the 'Privileging' of Arab American Women," Elia (2006) described a new opening of various U.S. circles to Arab American women as being a

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[17] Feminism will be discussed further as a contested construct in chapter 3.

"contemporary manifestation of colonialist, patriarchal racism which views other women as powerless victims of their own culture" (p. 1). Elia discussed Western feminism retaining its highly exploitative approach to other women, and the exocitizing of Arab American and Arab women. On reflection, Elia's work seems to be evidence of the widening divide and sharp focus on the high potential for misunderstanding between Arab American and non-Arab American women, which is, in fact, one reason for my own work. Shakir (1997) illustrated the competing narratives of Arabness and Americanness as she explored the divergences between American feminists and Arab American women like herself. Some of her sentiments and research echoed those of Elia. Shakir (1997) found American feminists:

> Sometimes seemed to have a vested interest in broadcasting stories of savage Arab men and perpetuating the stereotype of the passive, pathetic Arab woman, needing to be aroused from her moral, intellectual, and political stupor. Such depictions may be well meaning, intended to denounce patriarchy in its starkest forms. But they become pernicious when, as often happens, they turn into sweeping statements about some generic "Arab woman." (p. 3)

Further, Shakir (1997) described the complaints of Palestinian feminists saying:

> They have not only had to battle against foreign occupation and against reactionary forces within their own community but also have had to mount a third front against Western feminists who claim to speak on their behalf but wind up, in effect, lampooning them. . . . Humiliated and on the defensive, Arab women—especially in this country [the U. S.], where denigration of Arabs is still the rule—have sometimes responded by muting their own criticism of Arab society. (p. 3)

Shakir described conflict facing daughters and granddaughters as a:

> Tug of war between attachment to the lad of their birth (the United States) and anger or frustration at American policies in the Middle East. Though men face these conflicts, they take on special meaning for women; female and Arab, they may feel doubly victimized. (p. 10)

Her work provided personal testimony of what it has meant and what it means today to be an Arab or Arab American woman. These testimonies underscored the great importance of

being sensitive to the history of and the imperative to resist generalizing Arab or Arab

American women in any way.

Feminism is also at the root of transversal politics which is a significant vein of

theory and practice for this study. This concept was first used by Italian feminists and then

developed by Yuval-Davis (1994, 1997) into a framework of dialogical politics across

difference. Cockburn and Hunter (1999) found:

> Transversal politics is a democratic process of a particular kind, a process that can
> on the one hand look for commonalities without being arrogantly universalist, and
> on the other affirm difference without being transfixed by it. Transversal politics is
> the practice of creatively crossing (and redrawing) the borders that mark significant
> politicized differences. It means empathy without sameness, shifting without tearing
> up your roots. (p. 88)

Cockburn (2007) and others used transversal politics to analyze "complex trans-

border moves between 'doubly different' women, located in different conflicts and

positioned on different sides of them" (pp. 204-205). The development of transversal

politics "was a conceptual move to get around and above the immobilizing contradiction in

which we often find ourselves: between a dangerous belief in universal sisterhood and a

relativist stress on difference that dooms us to division and fragmentation" (Cockburn, 1998,

p. 8). It should be clear by now that, in this study, I do not adopt a stance or philosophy of

universal sisterhood. On some levels, this notion certainly has its appeal, but I find it

unrealistic and otherwise problematic. Nor do I subscribe to a focus on difference that

dooms us to fragmentation. What does resonate with me is the notion of transversal politics

as furthered by Yuval-Davis (1997) who highlighted its component practices of rooting and

shifting:

> The idea is that each participant in the dialogue brings with her the rooting in her
> own membership and identity, but at the same time tries to shift in order to put
> herself in a situation of exchange with women who have different membership and

identity. The process of shifting should not involve self-decentering, abandoning one's political and other sources of belonging. But neither should rooting render us incapable of movement, of looking for connection with those, among "the others," with whom we might find compatible values and goals: in "transversal politics," *perceived unity and homogeneity are replaced by dialogues which give recognition to the specific positioning of those who participate in them as well as to the "unfinished knowledge" that each such situated positioning can offer* [emphasis added]. . . . The boundaries, if a transversal dialogue, are determined by the message rather than the messenger. (pp. 130-131)

The tone and temperament of transversal politics is the balance this study sought to emulate. I sought out the individuality within each group of women (non-Arab, Arab, and Arab American). While the pragmatically created labels (NA, A, and AA) could be thought of as homogeneous, on the contrary, each of the women in this study was and is uniquely situated and came with her own set of partial or unfinished areas of knowledge. Cockburn (1998) found the two key components involved in structuring the space between us (i.e., doing transversal politics) are democratic process and what she came to think of as identity work. This study benefited from her perceptive ideas about identity work. She found the women she worked with were suffering a lot of what she came to think of as identity hurt:

The pain occurred where there was friction and disjuncture between a woman's sense of self and the identities with which she was labeled, that she was held to account for, or felt seduced by. The women were assailed by identities that contradicted their politics, that seemed to position them uncomfortably, and they were bereft of identities they would have liked to have. A good deal of the knitting, unraveling, texturing and tearing of the space between them therefore I interpret as identity work. (p. 10)

These same sensibilities came to the fore during the current study, as did the practice of rooting and shifting.

Emotion and identity. Emotion intersects with our most intimate aspects of identity—the things we care about, the things that concern us. When the setting is crosscultural and there are sensitive issues emerging, emotion will naturally come to the fore. Issues of risk, fear, and

trust carry emotion. In recognition of this, I called out emotion as an element of this work and, in other words, created a space for emotion in my study. Coming to understand our own internal borders and boundaries was vital to this inquiry. Moving beyond the individual, the development of our national identity also causes us to contemplate emotion—to consider the emotional status of nations and the trends therein. As fear recedes, trust increases, as does our sense of human security, and the converse is also true. Emotion is at the core of relations between peoples. In the context of Arab/American relations in these times, I feel that we are globally trying to find our cultural footing—what are the appropriate emotions? Emotions highly pertinent to this work are shame, pride, anger, and fear, but also empathy, among others. Naples (2003) contended, "attending to the role of emotions in the conduct and analysis of fieldwork is an important and undertheorized aspect of reflective practice" (p. 199). Greenhalgh (2001) went on to argue emotions are "necessary features of all knowledge, influencing the values, observations and thoughts that make up the process of intellectual inquiry" (p. 55).

Shame is one of the emotions that I expected would surface in this study— shame and the related emotion of guilt. There is much complexity and entanglement surrounding this concept. There is shame as a nation (group shame), misplaced blame and shame (i.e., blaming all Arabs, or all Saudi Arabians for the events of 9/11), shame of U.S. leadership, and shame about the numbers of dead as a result of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror led by the U.S. One of the interesting ways Kaufman (1992) delineated shame is as an innate emotional experience with positive attributes and necessary for the "development of identity, conscience, and to a sense of dignity" (p. xii), as well as self esteem and intimacy. Admitting shame can provide relief and begin to help restore a sense dignity. Kaufman talked about two different kinds of shame: "shame as an innate affect that

functions simply to amplify awareness, and shame that has become internalized and

magnified to the point that it now progressively captures and dominates the self" (p. xii).

Kaufman acknowledged shame is significant in national identity development and

international relations, among other things.

Ahmed (2004) explored what it means to claim an identity through shame. In

reading her work, these questions surfaced as being pertinent:

> How does national shame work to acknowledge past wrong doings, whilst absolving individuals of guilt? Is the role of shame crucial to the process of reconciliation or the healing of past wounds? What can we learn from the topic of national shame, whereby the nation may bring shame on "itself" by its treatment of others? What will it take for restoration of an identity of which we can be proud? Is witnessing the government's lack of shame in itself shaming? . . . The shame at the lack of shame is linked to the desire "to be truly proud of our country," that is the desire to be able to identify with a national ideal. (pp. 101-121)

Kaufman (1992) and Ahmed's (2004) work makes us realize that admitting shame can be a

powerful and positive thing—it can help strengthen identity and restore pride.

Orfalea (2006) talked about the response of Arab Americans to 9/11, about the "fear

of being mistaken" (p. 299), and he said, "there were two more emotions that other

Americans did not share on 9/11: a kind of shame and sense of betrayal" (p. 299). I

expected some of this to come up in the dialogue and interviews, including shame by non-

Arabs regarding what the U.S. did and is doing in response to 9/11. Orfalea discussed the

formal Arab-American response from a myriad of Muslim and Arab organizations to the

9/11 slaughter as immediate and principled. Shihab Nye (as cited in Orfalea, 2006) gave an

impassioned piece on National Public Radio directly addressing young people in the Arab

world who might be thinking of doing the same thing. Nye appeared torn as she addressed

these young people as "would-be terrorists" out of lack of another way to identify them.

Barken (2000) found contemporary international discourse underscores the growing role of

guilt, mourning, and atonement in national revival and in recognizing the identity of a

historically victimized group. Barken posed (but did not answer) useful questions: "Can

restitution turn a traumatic experience into a constructive national narrative and identity?

How does a new insight of guilt [shame] change the interaction between two nations or

between a government and its minority?" (p. xli). Or, in the micro-context of this study, I

would add between a researcher and participants; or among participants?

Ahmed (2004) reminded us shame is an emotion that "requires a witness" (p. 109).

Expressing one's shame in some public sense, in Ahmed's worldview, "makes possible a

return to pride" (p. 109). Her work described the global politics of fear, where the language

of fear involves the intensification of threats, which works to create a distinction between

those who are under threat and those who threaten. "September 11 has generalized a sense

of insecurity that transcends the American state" (Agathangelou & Ling, 2004, p. 517).

American citizens enjoyed a natural security, ensured by the country's continental size and

prosperous economy, until 9/11 (with the Pearl Harbor attacks of December 7, 1941 as the

sole exception).

Other key areas of emotion that, in part, define this study are those aspects of emotion

and identity related to belonging. Issues of emotion and identity are related to belonging.

Crowley (1999) defined the politics of belonging as the dirty work of boundary maintenance.

The boundaries the politics of belonging is concerned with are the boundaries of the political

community of belonging, the boundaries that separate the world population into us and them.

Belonging, as Crowley argued, is a thicker concept than that of citizenship. Yuval-Davis (2006)

extended her work on identity politics and found:

> The politics of belonging is not just about membership, rights and duties, but also about
> the emotions that such memberships evoke. Neither citizenship nor identity can

encapsulate the notion of belonging. Belonging is where the sociology of emotions interfaces with the sociology of power, where identification and participation collude, or are at least aspired to or yearned for. It is only when ones safe and stable connection to the collectivity, the homeland, the state, becomes threatened, that it becomes articulated and reflexive rather than just performative. It is then that the individual, collective and institutional narratives of belonging become politicized. (p. 4)

While the concept of emotion is culturally constructed and different cultures cultivate different emotional relationships, de Rivera and Paez (2007) maintained the importance of not shying away from emotion in our work. While it cannot be argued there are basic emotions expressed in the same way in all people, it can be argued there are emotional processes and emotional relationships fundamental to humans. De Rivera and Paez lead us to believe "such processes may be used to describe dimensions of the emotional climate that exist in different societies and are important for the development of a culture of peace" (p. 235). De Rivera and Paez suggested several ways of assessing collective emotions:

1. Consider the perception of how people in a group or society seem to relate to one another (afraid, trusting, apathetic, angry, etc).
2. Consider that people in the society are to an extent primed to feel particular emotions so that their "choice" as to how to interpret a situation is based toward fear, trust, anger, compassion, and so on.
3. Consider climate to be composed of social norms about how people feel or ought to feel . . . how people should feel or speak about emotions, rather than the perception or presence of felt emotions. (p. 236)

An understanding of the way different cultures have varied ways of conceptualizing the relation between thinking and feeling is important to consider in the current study.

This identity literature, taken collectively, was of direct use in understanding and interpreting findings of the current study. The interlocking concepts of adaptation, belonging, and representation provide a frame from which to further examine areas of nationalism, globalization, gender, and emotion. The identity themes collectively provide a strong basis for the remainder of this literature review. Identity is a key building block for the next theme,

racism, discrimination, and Othering; as well as media, and ultimately, to human security. These links will become increasingly more transparent as the review continues.

How We Treat Each Other

Arab and American[18] **relations in the aftermath of September 11, 2001**. In reviewing the literature with considerations of both human security and the global context of Arab/U.S. relations in mind, the phenomena of political racism, moral exclusion, and just-world theories came into focus. These phenomena, I argue, are in evidence and are inextricably linked to our day-to-day security in this post-9/11 age. As such, they will help to shed light on some of the social psychological aspects of relations between Arab and non-Arab people during these times.

The subsequent sections of the review will move from the exploration of the phenomena of political racism, moral exclusion, and just-world views to the review of empirical studies that further illustrate the specific influences 9/11 has had on Arab America. The review highlights the context for Arab Americans as they have a foot in each world—living in America, while also connected in various ways to the Arab countries from which they are descended. Arab Americans live at the flashpoint. Their experience is at the heart of this study as they are arguably impacted most directly and intensely by 9/11 and the aftermath. I follow this with a discussion that illuminates racism, discrimination, and Othering as a multidirectional phenomenon, examining the rise of anti-Americanism.

Two baseline trends substantiated by research are important to note by way of introduction. These trends are: first, evidence of increased anti-Americanism; and, second, evidence of increasing racism against Arab Americans. Regarding the first trend, findings

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[18] As previously mentioned, phrasing now shifts to Arab/American as the focus is scaled from the global to the individual.

coalesce around the fact the war in Iraq is a continuing drag on opinions about the U.S., not only in predominantly Muslim countries, but in Europe and Asia as well (Pew, 2006). Regarding the second trend, the evidence of increasing racism against Arab Americans, the literature shows the growing extent to which Arab Americans are impacted by the post-traumatic time since 9/11 (Haddad, 2004; Salaita, 2006). Naber (2002) aptly reminded us "while the U.S. media highlighted September 11 as the moment that provoked hate crimes against persons who were assumed to be Arab or Muslim, the racialization of Arabs and Muslims has been 'decades in the making'" (p. 1). While the decades in the making point is well taken, there is evidence that incidence is on the upswing. The events of 9/11 were mystified, demystified, and certainly magnified by the media. September 11, 2001 is considered, by many, to be one of those rare, transformative events—a memory fault-line, an historical rupture, "the day the frame froze" (Willis, 2002, p. 219). For many Americans, both Arab and non-Arab, their sense of both national identity and of human security has been fundamentally altered by 9/11 and the subsequent aftermath.

Political racism. While we may wish it were not so, the post-9/11 climate in the U.S. is ripe for manifestations of political racism and moral exclusion. Samhan (1987) discussed *political racism* as that "in which anti-Arab attitudes and behaviors have their roots, not in the traditional motives of structurally excluding a group perceived as inferior, but in politics" (p. 11). Naber (2002) extended this notion contending "political racism marks members of a group as racially inferior, not only due to their phenotype, but due to the political meanings associated with that group in relation to U.S. foreign and domestic policies" (p. 4). The continuous conflating of Arabs and Muslims with terrorism in the media and our various cultural products is an ongoing area of political racism.

Some actions and events that can be considered political racism are extremely overt

and have received public attention, such as the Abu Ghraib prison situation, the existence and

use of the Guantanamo Bay facility, and inhuman interrogation techniques. There is no

question that these actions negatively influence and directly contribute to the undermining of

relations between Arab and American peoples. Of equally great concern are smaller-scale, but

insidious acts occurring day-to-day, person-to-person—well-documented acts of what could be

also called "everyday racism"[19] (Essed, 1991, p. 3). I would argue this is not a one-way

phenomenon, but such forms of identity hurt (Cockburn, 1998), as previously mentioned, may

also have negative effects on non-Arab people. Negative judgments made by Arabs on the U.S.

as a whole, or on specific people, while perhaps not nearly as threatening, damaging, or intense,

may play a part in the overall phenomena of Othering and distancing between peoples.

Cockburn (2007) found:

> The post-9/11 world has reminded us that the wars Western countries wage overseas
> they simultaneously wage at home. There are always people of (or presumed to be of)
> the "enemy" ethnic group or nation residing in the metropolis. Some have been there for
> generations, others are the flotsam and jetsam of current or recent wars. (p. 200)

The U.S. has a history of political racism and important parallels can be drawn from the

situation Japanese Americans found themselves in during World War II. Barken (2000)

described the context of the apology by the U.S. government for the internment of the Japanese

Americans and related legislation and detailed the case as a "significant marker in legitimizing

restitution demands around the globe" (p. 30). He talked about the misfortune of the Japanese

Americans in that they served as a "convenient target for xenophobia masked as national

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[19] The concept of everyday racism qualifies how ordinary situations become racist situations (Essed, 2002).
Everyday racism includes practices with which people are socialized to manage within the system (systematic,
recurrent, familiar practices). Practices are not just acts, but also include complex relations of acts and (attributed)
attitudes (Essed, 1991).

security" (p. 360). He reminded us the policies that allowed for this to happen, which are currently considered wrong, immoral, and racist, were widely accepted by their contemporaries. Barken went on to note "the rational for the restitution was not that the internment was the worst injustice suffered during the war but that it was inflicted because of racism, because of the victims' group identity" (p. 39).

Jamal and Naber (2008) focused on the multiple, shifting, and contradictory lenses through which Arabs and Arab Americans have been regarded in the U.S. before and after 9/11—which have sparked debate about the importance of race to Arab Americans and the place of Arab Americans within racial justice movements. The issues Jamal and Naber raised concerning the relationship between U.S. imperialism in Arab homelands and anti-Arab racism in the U.S.; how the axes of nation, religion, class, and gender intersected with Arab American racial formations; and the relationship between Islamaphobia and race and racism are relevant for understanding the voices of Arab American women in this project.

Cainkar (2008) contended "the social and political exclusion of Arabs in the United States is an objectively verifiable racial project with global goals" (p. 80). She argued "Arab inferiority has been constructed and sold to the American public using essentialist constructions of human difference in order to manufacture public consent for global policies" (p. 80). Cainkar's analysis was based on ethnographic research on the impact of 9/11 on Arabs and Muslims in Chicago. Ta (2007) further argued that what is being witnessed domestically is a:

> Revisionist recycling of the same rhetoric and practice of racial otherization, demonization and exclusion thereby ushering in a new phase of racialization in the U.S.—one that repackages old forms of discrimination to re-inject into a new generation and one that manipulates the blurred legibility of identity. (p. 166)

Ta (2007) asked for vigilance about these updated forms of racism that mask themselves as serving the interest of national security and argued we must promote ways of understanding

difference that do not erode personal freedoms. For McAlister (2005), it was the Abu Ghraib

incidents in particular that hearkened back to U.S. racial violence and politics. "The damage

done by the Abu Ghraib photographs to the reputation of the United States in the Arab world

was incalculable" (McAlister, 2005, p. 299). McAlister maintained the culture that tied the

levels of people involved in the Abu Gharaib scandal together was an imperial one and

"through categories of culture that worked like race, a confused but powerful mapping fused

Islam, the Middle East, and terrorism and marked entire groups of people as immutably and

intangibly inferior" (p. 302). As such, the construction of political racism is a highly relevant

lens that helped contextualize the status of relations between Arab and non-Arab peoples and

helped to further sensitize this researcher.

> Moral exclusion is a form of political racism and was first proposed by (Staub, 1987).

> [It] occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in which
> moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. Those who are morally
> excluded are perceived as nonentities, expendable or undeserving; consequently,
> harming them appears acceptable, appropriate or just. (Opotow, 1990, p. 1)

> Nagata[20] (1990) described the moral exclusion of American citizens of Japanese descent

during World War II. Opotow (1990) found:

> While her work describes moral exclusion that occurred five decades ago, its focus is on
> the subsequent trajectory of moral exclusion in the lives of American citizens of
> Japanese descent. It offers an account of the far-reaching effects of institutionalized
> injustice—on individuals, their progeny, and on society. (p. 17)

It is profound to think about the likelihood of the lasting nature of damages occurring against

our Arab American citizens (and by extension, Arab peoples everywhere) during this particular

post-9/11 period in history.

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[20] What is striking about Nagata's work is her focus on how the moral exclusion enacted upon Japanese Americans during WWII has permeated and stayed with their lives. Recently, in my own university in the Pacific Northwest there was a ceremony held to recognize the wrongs against the Japanese Americans who were students at the time of the internments. These students were enrolled in college one day and gone the next, many never to return to the campus until the time of the ceremony, more than 60 years later.

Coryn and Borshuk (2006) explored the underlying group categorization processes involved in a contemporary example of moral exclusion—justice considerations toward Muslim Americans in the U.S., particularly in the context of the aftermath of 9/11. Opotow's (1990) theory of moral exclusion states that causing or allowing harm to those outside of one's moral community is justified and rationalized on the premise they are viewed as expendable, undeserving, exploitable, and irrelevant. Three themes emerged from Opotow's study—threat and revenge, human rights, and ambivalence. These qualitative themes mirrored Opotow's original (1987, 1993) three types of expected responses to the scope of justice/moral exclusion scale—moral exclusion, moral inclusion, and conditional moral exclusion. Opotow's (1987, 1993) work is important for contemplating how the non-Arab American women in the study tended to fall along the moral continuum outlined above.

America has become a different and more difficult place for Arab Americans since 9/11. The research tells a story about the sense of comfort and incivility that Arabs are facing in the U.S. after 9/11. The Pew Research Center led the way with comprehensive polling regarding post-9/11 pulse of Muslims in America.[21] A recent survey covering the views of 1,050 Muslims from an initial sample of 55,000 people was the most comprehensive of its kind. The study found, among other things, a majority of Muslims believe their identity is under siege, at least in part. Fifty-three percent of those polled said it has been more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. since the 9/11 attacks because of anti-Muslim discriminatory attitudes. The survey was conducted from January 24, 2007 through April 30, 2007 (PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2006). While many, but not all, Arab Americans are of Muslim background, these findings are significant. Orfalea (2006) separately reported that 87% of U.S. Muslims experienced bias or

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[21] The Pew (2006) study focuses on Muslims, not Arab peoples, whom are a subset of all Muslims.

discrimination after 9/11 (and 48% said their lives had changed for the worse); 79% also said they were the recipients of special kindness from friends and colleagues.

The widespread nature of the trends in discrimination against people of Arab descent and the depth of the impacts on people resulting from the global war on terror are disturbing. Naber (2002) discussed the conflated categories of Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern, as enemy Other, and the racialization of Arab Americans in the U.S. Arab and Muslim Americans used to be ambiguous insiders and invisibles until 9/11 suddenly thrust them into the center of public discourse. Baligh's (2003) helped to place the position of Arab American women within the broader racial and ethnic landscape of the U.S. based on an analysis of the narratives of 40 Arab American women. Baligh explored the impact of 9/11 on Arab America and found that most disturbing has been the questioning of their loyalty to the nation and widespread sentiments that view Arab Americans as collectively guilty for the actions of a small number of radical fundamentalists.

The racialization of Arab minorities is phenomenon found not only in the U.S. Nobel (2005) painted a chilling portrait of racism in Australia against Arab Australians. His work on experiences of racial vilification amongst Australians of Arab-speaking and Muslim background since 9/11 showed a very parallel set of racist sensibilities have evolved in Australia since 9/11, leaving people of Arab descent with a deeply shaken sense of security and identity. Nobel probed interviewees' sense of comfort and found the themes which underlay their sense of comfort are the same as the key elements of what Giddens (1990) talked about as *ontological security*, or the confidence or trust we have in the world around us—both in terms of the things and the people with which we share our lives, and which therefore provide stability and a continuity to our identity. In Nobel's (2005) view, such a sense of security was fundamental to

the fashioning of identity, relationships, and belonging; and this sense of security was, in turn, fundamental to our capacity for social agency. Nobel found experiences of racism, especially since 2001, however, undermine the ability of migrants to feel at home and impact their capacity to exist as citizens. Nobel found the pervasive landscape of fear and incivility altered the social opportunities for Australian Arabs and Muslims to function as citizens. If, as Hage (1998) argued, racist practices must also be understood primarily as attempts to control the national space, then these experiences are fundamentally processes of social exclusion. Through the work of researchers depicted above, an appreciation is gained for perspectives beyond the confines of the U.S., along with useful theoretical constructs that speak to connections between identity and security.

Naber (2006) looked at the impact of the aftermath of 9/11 on Arab immigrant communities in San Francisco, California from September, 2002 through September, 2003 and found:

1. The post-9/11 backlash is not a historical anomaly, but represents a recurring process of the construction of the Other within liberal polities in which long-term trends of racial exclusion become intensified within moments of crisis within the body politic.

2. Class, gender, sexuality, religion, and citizenship simultaneously operated intersectionally to produce a variety of engagements with anti-Arab/anti-Muslim racism.

3. Together state policies and everyday forms of harassment have produced an "internment of the psyche" or an emotive form of internment that engenders multiple forms of power and control in the realm of the psyche. (p. 235)

Naber's (2006) conceptualization of what she called the *internment of the psyche* stemmed from "community leaders and mental health practitioners who participated in my research who repeated over and over that for Arab and Muslim communities post-9/11 the intensified sense that one is always under the scrutiny of others'' (p. 254) and internment of the

psyche meant people were "confident that the possibility of being targeted existed and they had an image of the perpetrator in their mind but never quite saw him/her commit the act" (p. 255). Naber (2006) hoped her work had opened up possibilities for understanding (a) anti-Arab racism within a U.S. context; (b) the intersecting axes of oppression through which anti-Arab racism is structured (i.e., class, gender, sexuality, religion, and citizenship); (c) the connections between state policies, everyday acts of violence, and the realm of the psyche; and (d) the connections between anti-Arab racism and other histories of racial exclusion in the U.S.

Anti-Americanism in the aftermath of 9/11. "The gap between the self-image of America on a white horse and the dim view of America from abroad has never been greater" (Kohut & Stokes, 2006, p. 42). In part due to the handling of the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a changing perception of the world toward the U.S. There is a growing body of scholarly work documenting the slippery slope on which the U.S. finds itself in terms of world opinion. By far, the most comprehensive body of work on this topic comes from the work of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which has been tracking global public opinion intensively since 2001. In particular, Kohut and Stokes (2006), drew heavily on data from the Pew Project and gave in-depth insights into America's image problem, which they gained by conducting 91,999 interviews in 50 nations and the Palestinian Authority from 2002 through 2005. Kohut and Stokes found anti-Americanism runs deeper and is qualitatively different than in the past. Several factors were identified. First, America's image had declined around the globe, not merely in Europe and among Muslim publics, where opposition to the invasion of Iraq and criticism of the Bush administration were the strongest. Second, attitudes toward the American people, in addition to the U.S. government, were adversely affected. Third, the U.S. was being criticized for its ideals, as well as its policies. Forth, citizens around the world feared

America's unrivaled power and opposed not only what Washington did, but also what it was capable of doing. And, possibly most troubling, this newfound anti-Americanism was proving itself to be quite robust and long-lived (Kohut & Stokes, 2006). While this work presents the strongest empirical case, these findings are echoed and elaborated on by a host of researchers (Gibson, 2005; Rubin & Rubin, 2004; Snow, 2006, 2007).

In a study of 11 nations, Glick et al. (2006) found perceptions of America as a powerful, but malevolent nation decrease its security. Five thousand college students in 11 nations indicated their perceptions of the personality traits of, intentions of, and emotional reactions to the U.S., as well as their reaction to relevant world events (e.g., 9/11). The U.S. was generally seen as competent, but cold and arrogant. Although participants distinguished between the U.S.'s government and its citizens, differences were small. The use of only college students may be a limitation, but results were consistent with the Pew surveys which were random (Glick et al., 2006). The striking finding was the degree of cross-national similarity in how America is characterized. Researchers found it is easy to construct psychological justifications for attacking powerful groups that are perceived as intentionally seeking to exploit or harm others (e.g., Glick, 2005).

Snow's (2006) work linked anti-Americanism and the rise of civic diplomacy. Snow (2007) defined anti-Americanism simply as "negative attitudes toward the people, culture, and/or government of the United States" (p. 13). She maintained the axis of evil used in Bush's 2002 State of the Union address has been replaced by a more expansive axis of anti-Americanism. Snow (2007) pointed out:

> Most scholarly studies are discussions of anti-Americanism in the context of foreign attitudes toward the United States and that very few studies address the phenomenon of home-cooked anti-Americanism that is used to silence dissent and disagreement with the bandwagon point of view. (p. 7)

Most studies showed attitudes toward one's own nation and other nations are acquired often very early in life and then get reinforced throughout one's life, with little alteration shaped by new information. Snow (2007) found, while the research points to face-to-face international exchanges as among the best remedies, the U.S. government "continues to push mass media approaches shown to have much less effect on attitudes" (p. 16). Snow suggested our understanding of anti-Americanism and negative attitudes and opinions toward the U.S. is a necessity if we want to better inform, influence, and engage each other. In other words, anti-Americanism may be good for democracy (Snow, 2007). Taken together, these areas of theory provide a strong contextual frame to assist in interpreting data for the three populations of women in this study.

The Role of the Media

The ever present dynamic of the media is a key crosscutting theme and, as such, exacerbates trends in racism, discrimination, and Othering between Arab and non-Arab peoples. According to media expert Shaheen (as cited in Abraham, 2007), for the past 50 years, American media have projected negative stereotypes of Arabs, leading to a general public misunderstanding of Arab Americans. A number of recent media studies looking at aspects of comparative media treatment of Arab people have substantiated this empirically (Alsultany, 2007; Daniela, 2007; Dimitrova & Connolly-Ahern, 2002; Jaramillo, 2009; Joseph, D'Harlingue, & Wong, 2008; Lewis, 2004; McAlister, 2005; Monje, 2007). I align myself with McAlister's (2005) work that explored the cultural and political encounters that have made the Middle East matter to Americans. Her ideas about encounters included those that happen across wide geographic spaces, among people who will never meet except through the medium of culture. McAlister framed foreign policy as a meaning–making

activity that helps us coalesce our ideas of nationhood and national interest—and she artfully

extended this to the interplay between foreign policy and other kinds of representations,

such as news and television accounts of current events, novels, films, museum exhibits, and

advertising—in other words, the connection between foreign policy and culture.

McAlister's work is of significance to this study because, while the three participant

groupings in the study have not (and will likely not) meet—they live across wide geographic

spaces—they do connect indirectly, but with regularity through the medium of culture (TV,

radio, internet, movies, print media, etc.). Hence, there exist (albeit highly mediated and

often skewed) images, impressions, opinions, and knowledge of each other. The media is

already an influential force in our relationships and, therefore, in the current study.

The media plays an important part in the reproduction of images about Arabs and

Arab American gender relations. In a study of articles in the New York Times and the

Washington Post, during pre- and post-9/11 periods, Goode (2005) showed how ordinary

reporting practices produced particular meanings of Arabness and gender. One of her main

findings has particular relevance for this work. Goode found:

> Women's authority is produced as restricted to realms such as personal opinion and
> feelings, family and close community, all spheres traditionally referred to as
> feminine. By producing these separate and unequal realms of authority, these news
> articles reproduced notions of a gendered world separated into public and private
> spheres where men articulate authority over public and private domains while
> women's authority only extends so far as their own home and communities. (p. 30)

The key issue with Goode's work is the ways in which the media shapes perceptions, which

ultimately has an influence on reality in that much of intercultural relations are based on

perceptions and not necessarily on firsthand experience.

Sweis's (2005) study of Arab American women echoed Goode's findings about the

influence of the media:

Interestingly, most of the women reported that they often were the only Arab American whenever they found themselves among mainstream Americans. Many of the mainstream Americans in the women's lives reported not being familiar with any other Arabs. The fact that such messages were relayed to these women indicates that mainstream Americans continue to receive their information about Arabs through the media. This media appears to be continuously recycling depictions of Arabs in a highly Orientalist fashion. This suggests an on-going marginalization by mainstream communities, which has impacted the psychological development of Arab American women. (p. 124)

Another window into the influence of the media on Arab/American relations was opened by McAlister (2005) who provided an analysis of the contested meanings and compressed history made visible in five well-known images[22] from the period beginning September 2001 and ending in the summer 2004 (i.e., from 9/11 through the Abu Ghraib scandal). McAlister's aim was to insist on reading the emotions evoked by these highly charged photographs as historically constituted feeling. Her focus was on the ways diverse groups of people in the U.S. perceived the Middle East at a time of unprecedented crisis and violence. She found the shape of U.S. responses to 9/11 emerged not only from rational debates about policy, but also through the cultural work done by media accounts, popular culture, and television images. The images she selected are poignant examples of cultural products that have become part of the narrative that directly effects the relations between Arabs and non-Arabs. My present study also surfaced discussions of shared cultural products, and helps to further our understanding of the influence media such as these examples have done.

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[22] The five imagies are: 1) fireman raising the American flag at the site of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 (images of the firemen became a potent symbol of American resilience and bravery after the 9/11 attacks and crystallized our self-conscious search for heroes); 2) Osama bin Laden in video released October 7, 2001 (still photo taken from video symbolically shows his militancy (there is a rifle by his side), his conservatism and piety (per his headdress), and his self-aware modernity (he was being transmitted around the world via the video); 3) Afghan women in Burqas (this image eventually helped to justify the U.S. war against Afghanistan); 4) Saddam Hussein's statue comes down in Baghdad; and 5) a prisoner at Abu Ghraib (image of the hooded man—resonance with the politics of race in the United States) (McAlister, 2005).

It is concerning, for example, that the media is in the position to deliver the world a shock and awe campaign when a particular new military action is initiated. I refer the reader to Helmus, Paul, and Glenn (2007) for evidence of just how blurred the lines have become between public relations, media, and journalism and the military complex. Further, the U.S. essentially controls the entertainment media agenda and the repercussions of this are felt far and wide. There is a deep body of scholarship centered around the role of media in creating and reinforcing prejudice. Van Dijk (1991, 1993) found "it has been frequently documented that ethnicism and racism are exacerbated by at least some of the media, as well as by political and social elites that control them or have preferential access to them" (p. 28). (See also Hartman & Husband, 1974).

Human Security and Arab/American Relations

Many of the threads established thus far in the areas of historical context, and concerning who we are, how we treat each other, and the role of the media connect to the sense of security both perceived and experienced. Security concerns run palpably through the literature reviewed. This section reviews relevant human security literature and makes a case for human security providing a new conceptualization and useful frame for interrogating Arab/American relations. Before entering into the human security literature, it is important to show the evolution of human security from international relations (IR) theory. The following section reviews IR theory and transitions into discussion of an evolving conceptual framework for human security.

Moving from international relations theory toward human security. A discussion of IR theory will be helpful to examine international relations more broadly for application to the Arab/U.S. case. Upon reviewing the available conceptual models that can be used to analyze

international relations, IR theory provides food for thought. While mainstream IR theory

provides a useful starting point, the critique of IR theory is conceptually more meaningful to

this study as it organically leads to the more useful construct of human security as a present day

paradigm for international relations. This study examines women's perspectives on issues of

Arab/American relations, and the work envisioning human security and a more peaceful world.

Mainstream IR theory does not fit these needs well. Weber (2001) found "mainstream IR

theory makes sense of the world by focusing on states, anarchy, and diplomatic practice in ways

that draw upon a particularly biased thinking about place, race, class, and sex" (p. 129). Smith

(1999) furthered this and identified 10 major assumptions[23] of mainstream international

relations (IR) that perpetuate, even if unintentionally, the dichotomized world of self versus

other that incited events like the attacks of 9/11. Agathangelou and Ling (2004) extended this

debate to suggest "these assumptions uphold an elite privilege in IR pedagogies. It denies,

marginalizes, or exiles alternative voices and identities that challenge established boundaries of

community, self. and security" (p. 535).

It is from the tradition of mainstream IR theory that Huntington's (1993) widely

referenced article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" flows. His theory generated an element of

popular opinion espousing the centrality of a clash between Islam and the West, thereby

elevating and giving a certain degree of traction to this notion. The purpose of his article, later

developed into a book,[24] was intended to supply Americans with an original thesis about "a new

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[23] Smith's assumptions are [emphasis added in following list for items of particular relevance to the current study]: 1) *the state as a unit of analysis, rather than either humanity as a whole or the individual*, 2) distinction between the inside and the outside of the state, 3) distinction between economics and politics, 4) the notion of a common progression of humanity towards one end-state as exemplified in most accounts of globalization, 5) *absence of considerations of gender and ethnicity fro the main theories,* 6) definition of violence as war, 7) stress on structure over agency, 8) *the idea of one universal rationality,* 9) *underplaying of the importance of issues of identity in theories of international relations*, and 10) *the search for the explanation rather than understanding.*

[24] Huntington (1998), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

phase in world politics after the end of the cold war" (Said, 2001, p. 1). As Huntington

(1993) infamously stated:

> It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world
> will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions
> among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.
> Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the
> principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of
> different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.
> (p. 22)

Said (2001) provided a useful perspective with his critique of Huntington's premise,

highlighting the inadequacies of the labels, generalizations, and cultural assertions. Said

reminded us there are closer ties between apparently warring civilizations than most of us would

like to believe, and prompted recognition that Islam is no longer on the fringes of the West, but

at its center. Said concluded by saying "the 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis is a gimmick like

'the War of the Worlds'. . . . better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical

understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time" (pp. 1-3). Weber (2001) agreed,

calling Huntington's approach, "one of the very rigid ways of thinking about culture that

continue to be circulated in IR theory" (p. 10). Al-Khater (2002) looked at the impact of

Huntington on the Arab world. He suggested many Arab intellectuals have taken, out of all of

the many theories developed regarding the present situation, Huntington's theory of the clash of

civilizations and upgraded it to a prophecy. "They have accepted it, believe in it, and work hard

to convince their people to see the West through it" (Al-Khater, 2002, p. 9). McAlister (2005)

described Huntington as a media star:

> After 9/11 and the reissuing of *Clash of Civilizations* became a national bestseller. . . .
> Huntington's idea of the clash of civilization suddenly became media shorthand, a coded
> way of "explaining the origins of terrorism and the nature of Islam." (p. 283)

American evangelical Christians appropriated the language of the clash and, in no time, Huntington could not anymore control the ways in which the notion of a clash of civilizations became meaningful shorthand for different groups of people. Ultimately, McAlister (2005) maintained that Huntington's argument was taken up by the Bush administration in its push for war against Iraq. Huntington's (1993) essay is useful to the current study in that it helps to clarify some of the edges between theorists and opinion-makers who concern themselves with Arab/U.S. relations. Both Huntington and Said represent high profile examples of how scholarship can (a) create and contribute to political narrative, and (b) be transformed and appropriated for a variety of aims.

Turning to the nexus of IR theory and issues of gender sheds further light and has had lasting implications for women's agency in border crossing and peace building arenas. Zalewski (as cited in Braig & Wolte, 2002) contended "IR and feminist theories are working toward different ends and using radically different epistemologies, ontologies, and politics" (p. 24). Others such as Tickner (as cited in Braig & Wolte, 2002) believed "IR scholars, including feminists, are all working towards a common end—that is, trying to understand the roots of war in order to prevent future wars" (p. 25). In my search of the IR relations literature that might be pertinent to this study, I, like Zalewski (as cited in Braig & Wolte, 2002), noticed "an absence of women in both the academic world of IR and in the public arena of world politics" (p. 26). To consider more deeply how women fit into the scholarship and practice of IR, we find the scholarship of war falls within the discipline of IR and also sits within the discipline of history. Cockburn (2007) found this placement has ultimately had a negative effect from a woman's point of view: "the thinking of IR analysts and of statesmen, diplomats, and national security specialists has been mutually influential. Up there, in the rarefied atmosphere among the

political and military elite, white and male, gender theory was hardly likely to thrive" (p.

232). While feminist critiques of IR have not resulted in a shift in mainstream IR research

culture, small inroads are being made.[25] That said, Cockburn (2007) found:

> In the ten years since feminists first launched their critique of IR, the world has borne
> out their arguments. Since the Twin Towers were brought down on 11 September 2001,
> the rigid framework of realist thinking may be in free fall with them. States perpetrate
> "terror" not only within but also outside their borders. Those they designate "terrorists,"
> too, are everywhere and nowhere. (p. 233)

> According to Enloe (1989), you see women included in and admitted into the IR arena

and their significance only when IR is interpreted amply to include such matters as the

international exploitation of cheap expendable labor, tourism and migration, and the cross-

border trafficking of human beings. Youngs (2006) found:

> It is a commonplace statement in Feminist IR that women, while continuing to be under-
> represented in national political structures and positions of power, are even less in
> evidence in the processes of state-to-state international politics. While men
> predominantly speak and exert influence "for women" within national political settings,
> they almost exclusively do it in international settings. (p. 7)

The feminist critique of IR theory provides rationale for the study at hand as it has significant

considerations for women's agency in peace building and boundary crossing efforts. If women

are not true or full players in the scholarship on IR, what impact does this have, over time, on

their ability to influence the discipline and, more importantly, to bring women's voices and

viewpoints to the predominant mainstream winds of IR theory? The potential and promise of a

human security paradigm for international relations becomes more evident.

Human security: A growing paradigm for international relations. In this study, 18

women collectively explored themes of human security and the shifting senses of security

experienced in their lives. The theme of security intertwines with political narratives. At an

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[25] Youngs (2006) confirmed this noting "the absence of women's and feminist voices as an enduring characteristic of IR theory and practice" (p. 5) is a problem that the *Feminist International Relations Journal* was launched in 1999 to address.

individual level, it connects to both foreign policy and our thoughts and experiences about

the relations between people. Simply put, the theme of human security can represent a move

toward speaking of security less as defending territory and more in terms of protecting people.

Manchanda (2001) noted "the human security discourse has come up from below, from peoples

and groups excluded from the national security debate, defined, and articulated by civil society

groups, social movements, and marginal groups, especially women" (p. 1).

> Human security, in contrast to national security, is a concept concerned with the security of all people, rather than only those within a given nation state. Further, it enlarges the scope of security to include all the issues that affect personal security and not simply the danger of enemy attack. (de Rivera & Paez, 2007, p. 244)

Human security has come into the fore since the "United Nations Development Report

of 1994" and the "Millennium Report of 2000" were issued. Mahoney and Pinedo (2007)

pointed out one way people seek security is by participating in, supporting, and thus, in a way,

creating governments that attempt to foster safety and provide for common welfare. However,

political theories that address security (such as IR theory) have usually focused on national,

rather than human, security (United Nations Development Program, 1994). It is in light of this

gap that a number of scholars have begun working with the concept of human security. (See

Frerks & Goldewijk, 2007; Goucha & Crowley, 2008; Shani, Sato, & Kamal Pasha, 2007; and

Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007 for additional recent scholarship in the arena of human security).

Bunch (2004) noted the term *human security* emerged as an alternative to the state

centered concept of *national security*, which is rooted in the military security-defense domain

and academically lodged with realists in the field of international relations. Part of what helped

the human security discourse take hold is that it has been deemed credible and useful both

within key policy circles of the United Nations and in global civil society.

In defining human security I turn to the following United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2009) characterization: "Human security focuses on enabling peoples to contain or avert threats to their lives, livelihoods, and human dignity" (p. 2). UNDP further defined human security as the "liberation of human beings from these intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable" (p. 23). In their "Human Development Report," the UNDP (1994) outlined eight dimensions of human security.[26] Of the eight, *personal security*, *community security*, and *political security* are most directly relevant to the current study. Among other things, personal security requires that individuals are free from threats from the state (physical torture), from other states (war), and from other groups of people (ethnic tension). Community security delineates security derived from membership in certain groups, such as family, community, organizations, or a racial or ethnic group, and can provide the individual with a sense of identity. Political security requires individuals live in a society that honors their basic human rights (UNDP, 1994). It is within these more specific contexts that human security is a key construct for this study. Ultimately, this debate calls for the subjects of security to be redefined from the state to the individual.

Up until 9/11, human security was seen by many to be a more imminent problem of the developing or war-torn world. The events of 9/11 upended this notion. In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. embarked on a war on terror—a perceived global conflict against the perpetrators of the attack on the World Trade Center aimed at guaranteeing human security "in spaces formerly perceived as secure" (Richmond & Franks, 2005, p. 30). It can be useful to distinguish an immediate sense of, or desire for, personal security (perhaps felt more by Arab Americans) from a more abstract, future-oriented sense of, or desire for, security (perhaps felt more by non-

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[26] Economic security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security, and global security.

Arab Americans). Both of these types of human security appear to depend on the community in which a person lives, as well as on the nation itself (de Rivera & Paez, 2007). It is not hard to sense human security is a more humanizing concept than national security, and yet, as we know, they are interrelated.

The field of human security, as with any field, is not without its scholarly detractors. There are those who contest aspects of human security. Some question who or what are the objects or referents of security and who provides security? Others question for whom security is intended: individuals, groups, nations, states, regions, the world—or intangibles such as values (Richmond & Franks, 2005)? Regardless, there remains a certain resonance for me with the distinction between traditional and new security.

De Rivera and Paez (2007) shed further light on the distinctions between homeland and human security:

> Human security, in contrast to national security, is a concept concerned with the security of all people, rather than only those within a given nation state. Further, it enlarges the scope of security to include all the issues that affect personal security and not simply the danger of enemy attack. (p. 244)

There is a dualism whereby state and human security compete. In the war on terror, for example, many things have been done that invoke foreign policy machinery to protect our human security. However, questions abound. Is one country being protected at the expense of another? Whose human security is being protected? Whose national security is being protected? Whose homeland security is being protected? And whose homelands are being made insecure in the process of securing one's own? Scholarship is turning towards the fate of the individual, the security of humans within the complex constructions of national and homeland security. UNDP (2009) found:

While preserving the integrity of states remains the highest consideration of national security, a newer concern with protecting the lives of the people who reside in them has overtaken that preoccupation. The concept of human security, which complements that of national security, brings this change in perspective into focus. (p. 2)

I align myself with the above concepts of human security that hold that the individual (not the nation) should be the focal point and goal of human security. El-Baradei (as cited in UNDP, 2009) maintained:

The modern age demands that we think in terms of human security—a concept of security that is people-centered and without borders. A concept that acknowledges the inherent linkages between economic and social development, respect for human rights, and peace. (p. 23)

Lykes, Beristain, and Cabrera (2007) showed how political and social violence shatter basic assumptions about the benevolence of the social world and the prevalence of justice, meaning, and control, thus creating an emotional climate of fear and sadness, and threatening a basic need for security.

Women crossing borders and boundaries: Actors in human security. One of the firm underpinnings of this study is a deep-seated belief that women coming together in dialogue and action can and does make a difference in our human security. Women can and do cross physical national borders to come together and they travel across social boundaries (race, class, age, ethnicity, religion, etc.) to create change (Cockburn, 2007). This section characterizes these sentiments.

Arguably, Bunch (2004) maintained:

One of the most significant forms of feminist peace organizing in the last two decades is embodied in efforts by women to cross national and ethnic lines and reach out to women of the "other" side, as well as to critique their own government or community's position. (p. 83)

Bunch (2004) pointed to initiatives that have taken this step in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Mali, the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and across the India-Pakistan border. "Central to

such efforts is women's rejection of the nationalist project of dividing groups along racial/ethnic, religious and/or cultural lines and dehumanizing 'the Other'" (Bunch, 2004, p. 83). Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler (2002) prompted important questions about how we respectively imagine our borders noting the very different permeability of borders in the West and in the Middle East. "Borders play a central role in the discourse of states and nations. Claims for changing borders, 'retrieving' pieces of 'the homeland,' are probably the most popular reason why nations go to war, next to defending the" (Yuval-Davis & Stoetzler, 2002, p. 332) *womenandchildren* (term from Enloe, 1990).

Wilford (1998) warned "contesting theories of nationalism, debates about the relationship between ethnicity and 'race,' ambivalence about the celebration of 'difference,' together with the problematization of 'women' as an organizing construct, all combine to lay a conceptual and political minefield" (p. 1). While her views are evidence of inherent tensions, we also recognize women have their own agency with relation to these questions. In this study, the question of agency is central, specifically, "women's agency or lack of it to shape not only our own lives and destinies but those of the wider societies to which we belong" (Youngs, 2006, p. 6). George (2002) maintained self-interrogation must also ensue:

> We also need to learn postcolonially. That is, how do we transform concepts of security and insecurity, state and nation, violence and desire at the interstices of contending world orders. Such conceptual transformations exist at the margins (e.g., women's approaches to conflict resolution) but rarely do they find a critical mass given the elite's monopoly on public discourse. (p. 533)

George advised we focus our energies on forging transnational alliances, both cultural and material, to make another world possible.

A sparsely researched area of research is informal citizen diplomacy, and more specifically, women's diplomacy. Researchers found the global rise of women's leadership

coincides with the success of citizen diplomacy to open an important role for women, termed

"women's diplomacy" (Bernards, 1998, p. 52). Bernards examined this phenomenon

finding:

> Women are well positioned to create opportunities for dialogue and problem solving that do not exist in conventional corridors of power. First, precisely because most women are outside of traditional power structures and are not yet high in the hierarchy of existing societal institutions—military, religious, industrial, or governmental—women are often able to think of solutions that are "outside of the box," outside of the mainstream ways of thinking. (p. 52)

In effect, Bernards (1998) argued we need to take advantage of our outsider status.

Bernards was the only direct reference I found on the concept of women's diplomacy.

Cockburn (1998) successfully worked according to the principle that women meet as

individuals, often transcending ethnic, racial, national, religious, and other boundaries. This

principle is one I diligently tried to apply with the current study as well. Also important is the

thinking of Pace (2005), whose work with the Compassionate Listening Project looked at how

ordinary citizens grapple with complex matters that arise in ethnic and identity-based conflict

and citizens' emerging role as peace builders in divided societies. Pace found "contrary to

traditional, top-down approaches to international diplomacy and peacemaking, is the

assumption that citizens have an important role to play in arenas of protracted, social conflict"

(p. 5). Pace maintained many scholars have argued small, person-to-person efforts can make a

positive difference in arenas of protracted ethnic struggle, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

(Lederach, 1997; Rasmussen & Zartman, 1997; Rothman, 1992; Saunders, 1999; Weiner,

1998). There is a critical mass of scholarship finding women have unique modes of working

and important contributions to peace building and conflict resolution.

Yuval-Davis (2006) further maintained:

> It is often the [political] right that works to build higher walls around the boundaries and borders of the national collectivity and to mobilize people towards exclusionary politics, often relying on narratives of fear and threats to security. Paradoxically, these kinds of politics often have the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading further and further away from a social, economic, and political climate, in which any notion of human security can happen. (p. 4)

Human security as a concept has been appropriated by many activists, including feminists, as a substitute to the notion of human rights (Yuval-Davis, 2006). This study involved taking collective note of our emotion and motivation around issues of human security and human rights. Galtung's (1996) work in the areas of structural violence applies here in relation to human security. He named as violent all "unavoidable insults to basic human needs and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible" (p. 197). He defined the four basic human needs as survival, well-being, identity-and-meaning, and freedom (Galtung, 1996). Cockburn (2007) found that, in this view, "violence includes avoidable hunger and misery, lack of care, morbidity, destruction of life sustaining environment, alienation, and exclusion" (p. 191). Part of the Arab/American interchange in this current age revolves around patterns of alienation and exclusion, which goes on in both directions, initiated by both Arab and non-Arab people. These human concerns should be of interest to us all.

Researchers are also working on relating emotional climate to research on human security and cultures of peace (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007; de Rivera & Paez, 2007; de Rivera, Kurrien, & Olsen, 2007; Mahoney & Pinedo, 2007; Rime, 2007). The works highlighted above further validate a focus on emotion as part of my present study. Exposure to mass media information about collective violence reinforces affects and helps to generate an emotional climate as studies on the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings show (Schuster et al., 2001; Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, & Gil-Rivas,

2002). An emotional climate in which fear is predominant is associated with the perception

of an environment of threat, low control, and uncertainty. Feelings of fear have been associated

with defensive and protective in-group behavior, higher ethnocentrism, and lower political

tolerance (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004). Bar-Tal (2001)

suggested the concept of a *collective emotional orientation*, a concept that refers to the

characterizing tendency of a society to express a particular emotion. He noted the emotion and

the beliefs that evoke a particular emotion are widely shared by society members and appear

frequently in the society's public discourse, cultural products, and educational materials. These

orientations may even characterize entire civilizations, as when Moisi (2007) referred to

cultures of fear, humiliation, and hope in the Western, Islamic, and Eastern worlds. It is also

important to contemplate the effect of our human security status on future generations. Smith

and Reynolds (2002) highlighted concern for the well-being of children during these times,

proposing:

> The basic sense of security of childhood has been shaken [by 9/11]. Children watched
> firsthand the expressions of the helplessness of parents and caretakers during the crisis
> . . . . Due to the cataclysmic nature of the terrorist attack, children have lost the
> expectation that adults can adequately protect them from such danger. (p. 1)

In closing, the review of the literature points to a disturbing degree of social incivility,

insecurity, and a widening of the gap between Arab and non-Arab peoples. The present study

examined these trends qualitatively through the creation of political narratives that reflect our

current times. I believe the current study fills a gap in the existing literature. Very few researchers

are looking at the opinions, feelings, and experiences of non-Arab Americans on these topics. The

ones who are have used largely quantitative methods (surveys, questionnaires) to examine fairly

narrowly framed questions about discrimination and racism (Echebarria-Echabe & Guede, 2007;

Panagopoulous, 2006). As far as I can tell, no researcher (Arab or non-Arab) is engaging non-

Arabs using qualitative methods on these topics. I have not found anyone using freewriting as the research methodology for developing texts and themes. Lastly, I have not found any studies attempting to bring together Arab and non-Arab women in a constructivist, participatory study that aims to explore relations between Arabs and non-Arabs. Chapter 3 describes the modes of inquiry I used to realize this work.

Chapter III: Modes of Inquiry

How, then, to create an inquiry that reveals aspects of the relations between people during periods of protracted conflict? How to give voice to women on these topics? Narrative inquiry provides a methodology that is both sensitive and elastic. In particular, the current study employed the use of freewriting complemented with small focus group activity as a means for uncovering key themes by individual which were then explored more completely through one-on-one interviews. I then used situational analysis to disaggregate the women's narratives, seeking new lenses to aid in understanding the themes and relations between themes. In chapter 4, I sought to reaggregate the data around the voices of the women in the study, speaking to the themes.

Narrative research has been used as an analytical tool for trying to understand wider social phenomena (Andrews, 2007b). Andrews stressed the importance of debates over meaning of history. In this investigation, the women probed such topics as: How do we (each) interpret the events of 9/11? The current war in Afghanistan? In Iraq? How have these issues affected their lives directly and/or indirectly? The current study examined some of the complex frameworks of meaning surrounding these events in the minds of Arab women, non-Arab women and Arab American women. At its core, narrative research is relational, whereby the researcher and the researched are in relationship with each other and the idea is that both parties will learn and change. This passage illustrates the balancing role researchers must play:

> The ethical conundrum in narrative research derives from the fact that the narrative researcher is in a dual role—in an intimate relationship with the participants (normally initiated by the researcher) and in a professionally responsible role in the scholarly community. The researcher must balance "dignity, privacy, and well-being of those studied with a scholarly commitment to accuracy, authenticity and interpretation." (Josselson, 2007, p. 528)

Josselson (2007) highlighted what I see as a concern with narrative inquiry which is that the interpretation of material can differ among narrative researchers in terms of whether their research goal is "giving voice [to their participants, or] decoding texts of their interview at some other level of understanding" (p. 548). I believe every researcher, including myself, struggles with doing both of these things—giving voice and creating new meanings at different levels. Careful thought must be given, then, to how to balance these purposes to be true to both relationships with participants and scholarly contribution.

Wood (2000) described narrative comprehensively as:

Epistemological stance, research methodology and scholarly discourse—all uniquely capable of "getting at" the content of human lives. Narrative, they argue, captures and investigates experiences as human beings live them in time, in space, in person and in relationship. . . . Human lives they suggest are woven of stories. Individuals construct their identities through their own and others' stories. . . . Social phenomena become a converging point for individual, collective and cultural stories. (pp. 1-2)

An appreciation of the relevant world historical context has been crucial to this work. Certain world events are formative for us all, influence our personal biographies, and become part of our individual and collective narratives. Langellier (1989) saw personal narrative performances as crucial for marginalized communities whose voice is seldom heard in the society: "Personal narrative has transformative power to assert self-definitions about who matters and what matters: the existences, worth and vitality of a person or group of meanings not otherwise available to an audience" (p. 134). I would argue that the voices of women on the issues the current study investigated do not reflect prevailing national narratives. By this, I mean women's voices are underrepresented in the U.S. and in the Arab world. The current study urged new voices forward and, ultimately, the methodology yielded findings that indicate a sense of the readiness for dialogue between the three participant groups.

The remainder of this chapter does the following: (a) provides a further theoretical framework for this inquiry; (b) elaborates the research design; (c) discusses the rationale and positioning of the author; and (d) describes additional key considerations of the research practice that guided this work. Each of these areas will be considered in turn.

Theoretical Framework for Inquiry

The next several pages of this chapter are devoted to reviewing literature that helps to frame this study both philosophically and epistemologically. Every moment in time is a moment worth capturing, worth understanding more fully. This study focuses on the post-9/11 moment with all its incumbent intertwining in history, politics, and lives. Freire (as cited in hooks, 1994) emphasized "the important initial stage of transformation—that historical moment when one begins to think critically about the *self and identity in relation to one's political circumstance* [emphasis added]" (p. 130). Freire's sentiment articulates one of the key purposes of the current study—to collectively capture a moment and think critically about ourselves and our identities in relation to our political circumstance. hooks (1994) furthered this:

> To engage in dialogue is one of the simplest ways we can begin as teachers, scholars, and critical thinkers to cross boundaries, the barriers that may or may not be erected by race, gender, class, professional standing, and a host of other differences. (p. 130)

In my preparation for the current study, I experienced vulnerability around what I did not yet know, what I had not yet felt. That said, through this study I became more aware of the realities of others and more able to integrate and create space and a place for these realities. One understanding I tried to gain in the study was how each particular woman with whom I spoke (listened to, wrote with) reflected wider social, political, and historical changes that formed the context of her life.

The work of Andrews (2007a, 2007b), notably her perspective in the areas of national identity, political narratives, and cross-cultural research inspired the current study. Andrews provided an insightful series of questions that help to create a philosophical frame for this work. In *Exploring Cross Cultural Boundaries*, Andrews (2007a) asked:

> How is it that we access, interpret and analyze stories that, at their heart, are distant from experiences that we ourselves may have encountered not only in our own lives but in the accounts of others, which are part of our own narrative repertoire? How do we prepare ourselves for the very demanding task that listening must be if it is anything? And how is our sense of identity affected by opening ourselves to the very different realities that are encountered others? (p. 489)

Andrews (2007a) discussed cross-cultural narrative research as predicated on narrative imagination (Brockmeier, 2009). Put simply, if we wish to assess the frameworks of meaning for others, we must be willing and able to imagine a world other than the one we know. Andrews went on to argue narrative imagination, which Donoghue (1998) described as "the seeing of difference" (p. 16), lies at the heart of cross-cultural research. At its heart, the current research is about connecting across cultures. Apfelbaum (2001) wrote "the issue of communicating across cultural boundaries is a major challenge to the very foundations of our dominant theoretical frameworks" (p. 32).

This study is also influenced by feminist theory and methodologies. (See, in particular, the works of Edwards, 1993; Gilligan, Spencer, Weinberg, & Bertsch, 2003; Hill Collins, 1991; Naples, 2003; and Smith, 1999).

According to Edwards (1993), the feminist reformulation of the research process calls for:

1. Open acknowledgement by the researcher of her or his assumptions, beliefs, sympathies, and biases, especially those emanating from her of his sex, race, social class, and/or sexual orientation,

2. rejection of the traditional separation of the researcher from the researched, and

3. adoption of the goals of research as consciousness-raising and empowerment. (p. 184)

The methods selected for the current study responded to these three points. This study used two complementary data collection techniques: (a) the use of freewriting sessions (coupled with focus group activity) to develop written texts that became the basis for discussion and the initial development of themes; and (b) interviews. Feminist methodologies advocate "the researcher is a central part of the research process and her own feelings and experiences should be analyzed as an integral part of it" (Edwards, 1993, p. 184). Later in this chapter, I describe aspects of my personal rationale—my motivations and some of my emotions surrounding the work. While this is not an autoethnography, there are aspects of this project that involve self-study.

The study revolved around the use of freewriting as a means of creating narratives that illuminate the thinking of Arab and non-Arab women about current world affairs. Aspects of Popadiuk's (2004) work validated my intuition about the values of using a frame of narrative methodology that included writing and reflection. Popadiuk described what she terms *feminist biographical method* as follows:

> The examples of the biographical method that I read about highlighted the flexibility of the method over and over again by its inclusion of multiple strategies for data collection such as interviews, focus groups, observations, and personal reflections. What especially intrigued me was that written texts were often themselves used as a major part of the research endeavor. Sometimes texts from the participants themselves were collected an analyzed such as journals, poems and stories. (p. 393)

Freire's (2003) work in the area of dialogue provided both a theoretical philosophical underpinning and a bridge to methodology. Freire's thinking on these matters helps us see the meaning behind collaboratively finding what he termed the *generative themes*. He maintained:

The methodology of that investigation must likewise be dialogical, affording the opportunity both to discover generative themes and to stimulate people's awareness in regard to these themes. Consistent with the liberating purpose of dialogical education, the object of the investigation is not persons (as if they were anatomical fragments), but rather the thought-language with which men and women refer to in reality, the levels at which they perceive that reality, and their view of the world, in which their generative themes are found. (Friere, 2003, p. 97)

Freire's position that people who would normally be considered objects of an investigation should instead act as co-investigators rattled the status quo. How does one practically manage participants who are co-investigators? Freire's (2003) sentiment was "the more active an attitude men and women take in regard to the exploration of their thematics, the more they deepen their critical awareness of reality and, in spelling out those thematics, take position of that reality" (p. 106). This validated my thinking that it would be valuable to participants and to the study overall to have the participants involved in the initial identification of themes. This is, in essence, what freewriting does—it sets up a way for people to come up with themes that are of interest/passion to them through writing initiated by broad prompts. Freire (2003) advocated engendering:

A *critical perception of the world* [emphasis added], which implies a correct method of approaching reality in order to unveil it. And critical perceptions cannot be imposed. *Thus, from the very beginning, thematic investigation is expressed as an educational pursuit, as cultural action* [emphasis added]. (p. 111)

Freire provided a deep well of theory and practice to draw from and the methodologies I chose fit practically and philosophically within this frame. Freire's constructions empower his notion of collaboratively finding themes and creating an environment for liberating cultural action.

The current study enabled me to explore the use of freewriting for research purposes. In thinking about what the determinants of success with this method should be, I believe the richness of the research findings (discussed in chapter 4) is one possible measure. In addition, I solicited feedback from participants on how they viewed the freewriting process. The non-Arab

and Arab groups had the best fit with this method. Overall, they described a favorable

experience. They liked the privacy the method afforded, the ease ("it's like talking to

yourself"), that it helped deepen their thinking, and was a good preparation for the interviews.

Other women spoke of how there were no limits ("just whatever comes out") and was a good

way to capture spontaneous thought. Some said it was easier to speak out when writing and

they were more true to self than they might have been if they were speaking. In terms of

critique, some women saw value in that speaking allows conversation to build from one person

to the next. Another woman noted with freewriting you cannot clarify things the way you might

verbally. The main critique with the freewriting method in this study was simply that some

would prefer not to go on the record in writing in this way. The Arab American women had a

higher preference for and comfort level with the focus group approach and more of their

preliminary work happened through focus groups. See Appendix A for excerpts of the

women's comments about their experience with the freewriting method.

Research Design

As discussed, this study was conducted in the qualitative tradition of narrative inquiry**.**

The data gathering was done by and with women in Qatar and women in the U.S. initially

through the use of freewriting techniques. Texts (narratives) generated by the freewrites were

the basis of (a) a dialogue with the self—the act of freewriting and sharing with others in the

group via focus group discussion, and (b) a dialogue with the researcher—through the sharing

of texts. After the freewriting sessions, interviews with each woman were conducted that went

deeper into the themes raised by the freewriting process and encouraged new themes to emerge.

Chapter 5 depicts this initiation of dialogue between the groups of women through a collection

of questions the women had for each other. While the current study did not have the creation of

a dialogue as a goal, it did seek to gauge the readiness for dialogue between the groups. The questions the women had for one another speak to this evidence of readiness. Figure 3.1 depicts the levels of dialogue.

Figure 3.1. Levels of dialogue.

There are several additional broad motivations I had for the use of freewriting. My hope was that the freewriting would help to create an atmosphere where it was safe for the women to express thoughts and emotions. I believe the freewriting helped a great deal by allowing the participants some advance opportunity to think about the topics of the study—which in turn, helped prepare us all for the interviews to follow. The self-identification of themes that resulted from freewriting allowed the women to own their interests and ideas. Lastly, I hope the practice of freewriting has been a useful tool for the women themselves—a way to create narrative and texts for personal uses, whatever they may be.

Participants, mode of sampling, and selection criteria. It is rare for a study to engage participants who are Arab, Arab American, and non-Arab American. Many studies focus on one or two of these groups, but this study adds to the relevant scholarship by bringing these three demographic threads together. This study involved six Arab American women of varied

ages and backgrounds, six non-Arab American women, and six Arab women currently living

in Qatar, also of varied ages and backgrounds. The women represented a range of ages from

20-61 years old. The selection criteria I used included diversity of ages, range of countries of

origin, diversity of occupational backgrounds, some foreign policy interest and awareness, as

well as a desire to reach out and increase understanding and a willingness and ability to be in

the study. The current study asked participants to give a considerable amount of their time, so

the feasibility criterion (willingness/ability) was also relevant.

The majority of women living in Qatar are originally from Lebanon, Jordan, Oman,

Palestine, and Syria. Fewer are native Qatari women, born and raised there. Overall, Qatar is

comprised of approximately 600,000 people of nationalities other than Qatari, and 180,000 native

Qatari people. Given this demographic context, it was important to work with a representative mix

of women, originally from a variety of countries. My research partner in Qatar, Muneera Spence,[27]

recommended women to be selected in Qatar. She initially approached people within her circle of

acquaintances. In general, we wanted those selected to have an interest in the study and current

foreign affairs and in reaching out to further understanding. The Arab group included three women

who were students pursuing their bachelor's degree, two psychiatrists, and one clinical associate.

In the U.S., I identified people starting with Arab American and non-Arab American friends

and colleagues, and used a snowballing strategy to find other women with an interest in the current

study. The group included predominantly women with bachelors and masters degrees working

within university and public service settings. I attempted to recruit several active non-Arab peace

activists, but was not able to secure commitments from these women. In most instances, they were

too highly engaged in peace advocacy work to make time to be in the study. The Arab American

group included women with their bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees working within the

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[27] Muneera Spence is a faculty member of Virginia Commonwealth University-Qatar.

university or other educational settings. I looked for a diversity of perspectives and choose women from within my extended circle of acquaintances. A link of trust often exists using the snowballing method of referrals, as opposed to approaching people unknown to the researcher or to trusted others. Specifically, I used purposeful sampling, with a focus on information rich cases. Patton (1990) found by including in the sample individuals the researcher determines have had quite different experiences, it is possible to more thoroughly describe the variation in the group and to understand variations in experiences while also investigating core elements and shared outcomes.

While the backgrounds of the women in the groups will be discussed further in chapter 4, a summary is provided here. The Arab American group included both Muslim and Christian women from Palestine (two women), Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. In Qatar, the sample included Muslim women from Lebanon, Qatar (two women), Bahrain/Persia, Tunisia, and Sudan. The ethnicities and religions of the non-Arab group were diverse, including a range of religions backgrounds (one raised Catholic, one leaning toward Eastern religion, one Jewish, one Muslim, one raised Baptist, and one not declared). The nationalities of the non-Arabs included Mexican/Irish, Indian (raised in Africa), Spanish/Mexican, Guatemalan/Madagascar/Swiss, Nova Scotia/Scotland (two women), and Dutch/English.

Anderson (2006) is well-known for describing the nation as an *imagined community*. This study probed the notion of the imagined community as it is felt and interpreted by each group of women. Perceptions of particular wars, for example, are vastly different depending on which Arab (or otherwise) country one may be from, how old one is, and whether one's family either benefited in some way from the conflict or was damaged by it. It was important to engage a range of different-aged women because their memories and the impact of these events were different for someone who, for example, lived through the Six-Day War. History becomes

very personal. In some cases, "first generation Arab-Americans immigrated as refugees

fleeing repressive regimes or war-torn countries. . . . The events [of 9/11 and the Iraq War] have

caused a re-traumatization for them in a country they had considered a haven" (Orfala, 2006,

pp. 309-311). See Figure 3.2 for a schematic of the research process.

Figure 3.2. Schematic of research process.

Reflective freewriting. Idea generation for this study was initiated by the process of

freewriting. Freewrites are a free-form way of writing thoughts quickly and smoothly—mind to

pen without analysis or censorship. Freewrites provide a way for people to not be influenced by

others and allow for untainted vetting of thoughts and deep reflection. When sharing verbally in

a group, each person is influenced by prior offerings. Thoughts become entwined. This can put

people in a reactive mode instead of a generative mode and move people away from their

personal thoughts and perspectives. The use of freewriting changes this dynamic by creating an

unthreatening environment. Belanoff, Elbow, and Fontaine (1991) maintained freewriting

usually moves people toward the condition of putting down language without thinking about it,

toward transparency of language production that is characteristic of speech. "Just talk onto

paper" is one of the best directions for inexperienced freewriters.

In consulting with Arab acquaintances and colleagues before the onset of the study as a way to test out this methodology, I was advised some Arab women might be uncomfortable writing and going on the record in this way, due in part to the oral nature of Arab culture. The women I consulted with urged me to have a secondary method ready to use to gather the preliminary information that I sought. From this guidance, the idea of using a focus group format evolved, which ended up working well. I was able to toggle back and forth between writing (freewriting) and talking (focus group) formats depending on the situation and my sense of the needs of the people with whom I was working. At the onset of a session, I talked to the various groupings of participants and explained we could use using freewriting, the focus group format, or a combination. I gauged their comfort level and we determined the best course accordingly. All groupings chose to do a combination, which made for an interesting mix of writing and speaking. For pairings of people who preferred to write less and speak more, I took notes on a flip chart and, in this way, captured their themes. I added their initials next to comments so I would be able to recreate who said what. Both modes served the purpose of getting us into the themes and issues of concern.

The freewriting process began with an unstructured first freewrite, allowing women to get accustomed to writing in this manner. Initially, I maintained a neutral topical framework, asking women to rapidly sketch the bones of their life in a loose timeline (personal narrative). I prompted women to think and write about moments, turning points, history, revelations events, and so on, using words and images, letting them know these could arise chronologically, emotionally, poetically, or in any manner at all.

The second part of the process was guided by broad prompts. The women had knowledge about the study from my initial interactions with them and from what they read in

the consent forms, hence the nature of the material in the prompts was not new to them. For example, one prompt was "In three words, what is the war in Iraq about?" Women were then asked to freewrite about their own three words as a prompt for a given number of minutes.

The third writing was repeated with different prompts. The process was the same when the vechicle shifted to the focus group mode. I gave a prompt, discussion ensued, and I took notes on a flipchart.

At this point, the group was asked if they wanted to share parts of their writings. The non-Arab group said they felt comfortable with each other and wanted to talk and do this as a group exercise. The Arab groups also elected to share together. If the Arab American groups of women had met in a full group setting, they may have also elected to share. Once the freewriting texts were created, I asked the women to read the material over and, with a colored pen, underline things that surprised or revealed something to them. Then, I asked them to identify what (if anything) surprised them. Next, I had them look through their text again and identify themes that they saw. In this way, the women were able to highlight what was of most importance and interest to them and to identify themes on their own terms. This is an intensive methodology and when using it in the future I would consider having the theme identification happen after a few days or a week when participants were less saturated and had a bit of time to integrate their thoughts. The process of extracting themes was difficult in some cases for people due to fatigue, a result of having created a lot of material in a relatively short time.

One of the values of using the freewriting technique is it allows a lot of information to be gathered at once, rather than people talking one by one. A more important value of freewriting is it has an equalizing character—each person contributes at the same time, equally,

without concern about domination of conversation or struggling for airtime. Participants are conversing, with themselves and with each other, just not verbally.

In terms of logistics, the non-Arabs met together as a group of six and did full freewriting and discussion. Due to logistical issues (where participants lived and worked, complex schedules, etc.) the Arab group met in two groups of three (one group on the campus of Education City and one group at a place of work). They did both freewriting and focus groups. The Arab American group met in three groups of two, with one person meeting individually with me. They did more focus group work and less freewriting. Both the freewriting and focus group modes provided preparation for the interviews. While the mode of preparation varied, I found all the women to be similarly prepared for the interviews and with equivalent levels of thematic development found within the resulting narratives.

I began the sequence with the non-Arab group, followed by the Arab group in Qatar. The Arab American group has a unique role as intermediaries in the dialogue in the sense that they, in some way, have a foot in both worlds—both Arab and American, and I think the work benefited by working with this group last. This study revealed how post-9/11 narratives evolved for each of the three groups. As expected, there was a key positionality of the Arab American group—and notable complexity for this population in the post-9/11 era.

Interviews. Next, I interviewed each woman in the study. I used the freewriting results and flip chart notes to create questions for each woman that drew on their particular areas of passion and interest. In this way, I was able to focus on gaining additional depth on key themes identified by each woman. New themes also surfaced during the course of the interviews and there was a shared core of discussion areas between all groups. Interviews for the non-Arab women were held at various locations on the researcher's home university campus. One non-

Arab participant did a phone interview. Interviews with the participants in Qatar were held

in two locations: at the Education City campus and at a workplace. Arab American

participants' interviews were held at the following locations: on the researcher's home

university campus, at a library in a nearby city, and at the home of one of the participants. All

locations were quiet and private. Interviews were taped and transcribed, and all participants

were given the opportunity to review their transcripts and strike portions or make clarifications,

which a number of them did. There were several initial areas I asked everyone about including

basic information such as age, education, their first language, and how old they were when they

acquired other languages such as English. At the end of the interview, I asked everyone these

questions: Do you have any questions for the other groups on these issues of Arab/American

relations? Is there anything that you are surprised did not come up or any topic that you wouldd

like to say more about? Do you have any feedback regarding the freewriting experience?

Freewriting: An Innovative Research Methodology

Given the use of freewriting as a research methodology is uncommon, it is important to

review literature encapsulating this field. The founding of freewriting is largely attributed to

Ken Maccrorie and Peter Elbow. It has been a methodology in increasing practice since the

early 1970s, and, while it has a history, it does not have very robust literature. Belanoff et al.

edited a book in 1991, called *Nothing Begins with N: New Investigations of Freewriting* which

begins to pull together thinking in this area. Halton (as cited in Belanoff et al., 1991) linked

Elbow's freewriting pedagogy with political implications maintaining that "the concept of

freewriting initiates a fundamental change in the authority structure between teacher and

classroom" (p. 276)—and by extension, I would maintain between researcher and participants.

Researchers have found once students (participants) accept this invitation, not only their

writing, but they themselves become freer, assuming power over and responsibility for their own writing. Halton noted that Freire made explicit "the relation between pedagogy and political liberties" (p. 276). The notion of decentralizing authority in the research process is vital to this work. From Elbow's (as cited in Belanoff et al., 1991) perspective:

> The function of freewriting is to allow each member of a [group] to be fully and frankly present within the group, by offering to other members of the group not merely finished, final products but the *spontaneous movements of her mind* [emphasis added]. **(**p. 277)

Freewriting provides a way of "saying some things that can be said *only* in this way, as a form in its own right, a new and liberating—post-modernist, if you like—form" (Belanoff et al., 1991, p. 277). Freewriting focuses on the generative part of writing, as opposed to the judging part, with the idea being to suspend judging to allow generating to happen. Hence, "generative uncertainty, rather than being a problem to be eliminated is a power to be sought and cultivated" (Belanoff et al., 1991, pp. 225-226). This focus on generating, listening, and reservation of judgment was critical given the current research involved topics that were sensitive in various ways and carry political and emotional charge. There was intrinsic value in the women beginning the research process by writing about themselves and their lives. Fontaine (as cited in Belanoff et al., 1991) maintained that in doing this they come to understand the personal lens through which they view the world. Further, the tool and experience of freewriting is something we were able to give to the participants in this study—that may have use to them in their larger lives. Hill Collin's (1991) work tailored the notion of decentering authority. She described an ethical system of care and accountability rooted in values of personal expressiveness, emotions, and empathy. In her view, these are made accountable through an interactive call-and-response dialogue. She found in such a mode there is no need to decenter others in order to centre our own expert voice and arguments adversarially. Rather, she

maintained the center of the discussion is constantly and appropriately pivoted, so

participants can all exchange wisdoms, and acknowledge experience and knowledge are partial

at the same time as they are valid. Hill Collins' words embody the spirit of this study and

helped to depict and confirm the possibilities inherent in the use of freewriting as a research

methodology.

I have prior experience working with freewriting methodology in a training program

context with a group of 14 women in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. While not a research setting, I

attained valuable practice and a sense for how this method could work in other settings.

Interestingly, we spent a month living and working together and the topic of the civil war[28] in

Tajikistan never came up in the group sessions, except during the freewriting exercise. Only

through the freewriting process did we collectively learn something about the various sides of

this bitter conflict and the resulting toll on the lives of the women in the group. These lessons

were written and shared through a general life history prompt: "Write the bones of your life"

(events, places, dates, people, turning points, etc.).

I believe the freewriting methodology provides a safe area within which to think, reflect,

and privately express before sharing. It allows the writer to maintain a boundary and to begin

with an inner dialogue. The boundaries were different for the three groups. Interviews were

conducted, but only after freewriting and focus group work had happened and a psychological

connection to the topics of the study had been established. Participants created texts

(narratives) using the freewriting process described and, from within their self-generated texts

and focus group material, themes emerged. These themes became the basis for our interviews,

which was the second phase of data gathering. In essence the freewriting process helped

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[28] The Tajik civil war was from 1992-1997. An estimated 50,000 to 100,000 people were killed with an additional
1.2 million displaced. The summer of 2002, when we were in Tajikistan, the country was celebrating the five year
anniversary of the end of the civil war.

prepare participants, cognitively and emotionally, for the interviews that went further into themes they hed already been contemplating. In this way, the methodology had correspondence with my conceptual frame. I relied on the process of freewriting and focus groups to surface initial themes instead of creating interview questions and, thereby, deciding what I thought were the important themes. Josselson (2007) suggested "most participants will talk about whatever they think can be heard. We listen people into speech" (p. 547). I think there is merit in the idea that, with freewriting, the first listener is the self.

Data analysis. Data analysis was aided by the initial identification of themes within the freewriting texts (or on flipcharts) by the participants. As described in the prior freewriting discussion, my intent was to honor this collective thinking, which provided the first layer of thematic analysis. The analysis then progressed with a modified use of Clarke's (2005a) situational analysis categories. I used her categories to question the data to provide higher order contextualization.   I used Clarke's (2005a) situational analysis categories in an expansive way, to open up the data, rather than as a means of dividing the data. Clarke (2005b) stated her goal with situational analysis is to open up the analytic moment and provide alternative ways of grasping the materials for analysis:

> I want researchers to be able to grasp the situation as a whole as well as the basic social processes and particular parts of the situation that seem most important and interesting… Most of all I see the [situational analysis] maps as ways to push oneself analytically. (p. 4)

> Clarke (2005b) also felt:

> The time has come to be much more explicit in situating one's research—temporally, geographically, etc. Not to do so today reeks of unacknowledged imperialism. It is quite challenging to adequately situate research and I think situational research can be particularly helpful as more global aspects of situations would appear as elements in the situation and analyzed as such. (p. 5)

The literature review surfaced approximately 250 sensitizing concepts—all of which were important in terms of setting up a comprehensive contextual frame for this study. Blumer's (1954) notion of *sensitizing concepts,* as described in Clarke's (2005a) work, helps here to explain my process. As Blumer (1954) originally explained, "whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look" (p. 7). My initial conceptual frame was rich with sensitizing concepts and fit with the qualitative, emergent, interdisciplinary study I carried out. Ultimately, the dominant themes that came from the data helped drive a refocusing and narrowing of scope. It was important to me to consider power within the research process and to be truthful to the ideas I espoused of decentering authority by encouraging and trusting themes to evolve from participants—even though, at times, the temptation to decide myself what themes were important was present.

As I did the freewriting/focus group sessions and interviewing, I began to be conscious of the themes that were and were not coming up, and I made notes regarding these observations. I made preliminary versions of situational analysis and social worlds maps and, ultimately, settled on situational maps as the most useful for my purpose with this study. The detailed situational analysis process is described below.

Details of the situational analysis process. There were 18 transcripts, six from each group. From each individual transcript, I created a comprehensive list of initial themes/sub themes. I then transferred each element in these lists into Clarke's (2005a) situational analysis categories.

The Situation of Action

(Labels around the circle:)
Related discourses (historical, narrative and/or visual)
Local to global elements
Individual human elements/actors
Nonhuman elements/ actants
Collective human elements/actors
Spatial elements
Sociocultural/symbolic elements
Discursive constructions of individual and/or collective human actors
Discursive construction of nonhuman actants
Implicated/silent actors/actants
Major issues/debates
Temporal elements
Political/economic elements

Figure 3.3. Clarke's (2005a) situational analysis categories.

I added the category of key events as I noticed a recurring tendency in the data to refer to

specific events. This proved to be another useful category to organize the analysis around.

According to Clarke (2005a), the use of these elements in mapping the data can deeply

situate research projects individually, collectively, organizationally, institutionally, temporally,

geographically, materially, discursively, culturally, symbolically, visually, and historically.

Looking at the data with these categories in mind helped to reveal the findings—yielding

observations that, otherwise, would have been missed, and providing the context within which

to situate this study. The use of Clarke's categories helped me to further dissaggregate the data

through this placement of each data element into the most appropriate of Clarke's 13 categories.

To create a composite situational analysis for each group, I coalesced the elements

within the six transcripts per group, yielding a situational analysis for the non-Arab group, the

Arab group, and the Arab American group. (See Appendix B for ordered/working versions of

these situational analyses.) From these three situational analyses (ordered/working versions),

I distilled eight preliminary thematic areas for the study:

1. discrimination, racism, and Othering,

2. cultural misunderstandings and understandings,[29]

3. human security,

4. emotion,

5. identity,

6. broader considerations (political/economic elements),

7. education and the media, and

8. events.

I also retained Clarke's (2005a) named categories of human actants (individual and collective),

non-human elements, and implicated silent actors to use directly in the creation of messy maps.

Next, I used these themes and their associated subthemes (in combination with the prior

situational analyses working /ordered version) to create three messy maps (one for each group).

Clarke discussed the value of getting everything relevant in the data onto one page. This was

quite useful and made for some very large (2 feet by 3 feet size) maps to capture everything of

relevance. After the full analysis, I ultimately arrived at the interrelated themes of identity,

racism, discrimination, and Othering, the media, and human security. Identity is the core

element of the thematic mapping and a building block for the rest of the themes. Who we are

relates to how we treat others and how we are treated by others. Identity connects to the media

in terms of a host of representation issues. Identity is linked strongly to human security as well

as to a sense of security. The degree of overlap and interconnections made it difficult, at times,

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[29] This heading was subsequently renamed as embedded perceptions and opinions.

to cleanly place the findings into one or the other theme. I used my best judgment for findings that embodied more than one theme.

In the early part of chapter 4, I discuss further how Clarke's (2005a) method helped me to open up the data, make organized sense of the voices I was hearing within the transcripts, and explore it through the various lenses offered by Clarke. For example, particularly useful were the categories of symbolic elements, silences in the data, and temporal elements (events), which are explored in the context of the actual data in chapter 4. My intent throughout was to let the study be emergent, which required me to counter the impulse to be more prescriptive at every turn. Instead, I had to trust that, within the broad topical outlines drawn for participants, the important issues would surface.

Working in Qatar: Considerations. Regarding Qatar as a research site, from the outset I felt strongly that this research would be strengthened if it included perspectives of Arab women living within an Arab context. For the following reasons, I believe Qatar was an important and compelling study site.

First, Qatar provides an Arab context that is demographically diverse. There is an interesting dynamic of the Arab expatriates in this Arab country vastly outnumbering the native Qatari people. The native Qatari people (just 20% of the population) are inundated with the majority of the population being from other places including India, Pakistan, Iran, North Africa, other Arab countries, and various Western nations living and working in Qatar. I, therefore, had the opportunity to get a wide Arab perspective (participants were from five countries). The non-Qatari people living in Qatar are less stable within Qatar and, in many ways, are existing in a more unsettled place, and are sensitive in a different way to the regions conflicts than Qataris. They are outsiders—foreigners themselves. While not enemies, they are certainly not insiders

in Qatar, and are often treated as such. As expected, they did not have a homogenous view

on the current wars and aftermath of 9/11; rather, each woman who participated in this project

brought a nuanced story forward depending on her country of origin and how her life, place, and

identity in Qatar, and elsewhere, had evolved. They are Arab women observing the aftermath

of 9/11 and, in particular, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but from a much closer proximity.

Second, Qatar is politically stable. The nature of the relationship between Qatar and the

U.S. makes it appropriate (not politically incorrect) for women from Qatar to collaborate

with U.S. women. That said, Qatar presents contradictions. Al Thani, the present Emir,

governs a country with relative calm and stability both economically and socially. Al Thani

seized power from his father in 1995. As mentioned, it is widely known that Al Jazeera is

not independent when it comes to reporting on Qatar as a country. The Emir and his family

are off-limits. Qatar—a British protectorate since the fall of the Ottoman Empire during

World War I—became an independent state in 1971. It is a traditional monarchy, whose

power rests with an emir and his royal family. Since the mid-1800s, this dominant role has

been filled by a single family, the Al Thanis. The state has diplomatic relations with the

U.S. and is closely allied with Saudi Arabia on regional and global issues. Most Qataris are

Sunni Muslims of the Wahhabi sect.

While the Qatari population may have a need to fall in step, conversely, the Arab people

living there from other countries in the Arab world may be more free and outspoken about

matters of foreign affairs. This had implications for the current study in that the women in the

study represented a broader set of views that reflect the varied contexts of the Arab countries

they are originally from. Qataris tend to be fairly apolitical, in part, due to aforementioned

reasons, and due to the fact that there are no political parties as they are banned, or political

pressure groups—no political opposition or public dissent is tolerated by the Al Thani monarchy. The media is allowed freedom of expression of opinion and counter opinion that conforms with the country's prospective development process. However, newspapers recognize the need for self-censorship in not publishing material critical of the ruling family, the government, or religious issues (Miller, 2005). Qatar is actively reforming in the areas of education, economy, media, and women's rights—women can drive and vote in Qatar—while, at the same time, politically and culturally holding firm to traditional values of much of the Arab world.

Third, Qatar has intriguing progressive tendencies. Part of what brings Qatar notoriety is the presence of Al Jazeera, a 24-hour Arab language television news station with a regular viewership of 35 million Arabs in its primary Middle East market, as well as hundreds of thousands of viewers in the U.S. and Europe. It is a privately owned station where state-run media is the norm in the Arab world. Al Jazeera is based in Qatar and is considered the most free and unfettered broadcast source in the Arab world. That said, Al Jazeera rarely criticizes the ruling Al Thani family (Miller, 2005). Qatar hosts the Doha Debates—a provocative international forum for debating controversial social and political topics. Qatar has a stated country goal to promote the social transformation of women. Qatar is creating a culture of seeking engagement with the rest of the world via its budding knowledge economy and substantial investment in collaborative research.

Fourth, Qatar is the site of the U.S. Central Command for the Iraq War. The U.S. has its command center for the Iraq War based in Qatar, which provides another contextual complexity. Qatar, as a country, is on speaking terms and can be considered a supportive friend to the U.S.—in the government-to-government sense. However, Qatar's alliance with the U.S.

puts it at odds, or on thin ice, with some of its Arab neighbors (e. g., Iran). Because the U.S.

military[30] has a sanctuary in Qatar, Qatar, at times, finds it is within the line of fire for

retaliation. Hence, Qatar[31] is a more strategically relevant and involved country than it may at

first appear. The narratives I gathered are situated within this reality and were affected by it.

This is not to say that another Arab country might also have an equally important/compelling

list and, perhaps, some of the same exact attributes. However, for Qatar, I had the added benefit

of a co-researcher living there who could assist me with the field research.

 Confidentiality and anonymity. While the informed consent for the current study

included details of confidentiality and anonymity, the intercultural and sensitive nature of

aspects of this study warrant a discussion here. Standard assumptions of anonymity were

described and upheld in this study—the written consent form covered the ways this would

happen. The transcription of interviews was done by a professional firm, New England

Transcript Services. There was no need for an interpreter as all participants spoke and wrote in

English. No names were used in the transcripts. Participants were identified throughout the

research and dissertation development process by number only. Careful effort was made not to

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[30] Qatar hosts the U.S. Central Command for the Iraq War and is of particular strategic interest to this study. The State of Qatar is in a unique situation, because it has two U.S. military installations. Particularly noteworthy, the U.S. Central Command, which is currently controlling the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, has its forward-deployed headquarters in Qatar. Ironically, the U.S. military provides Qatar with a unique level of security, while at the same time it places the state in a precarious situation should that presence go away and with their strategic location in the Arabian Gulf near major petroleum deposits, should Qatar become a target (Freedom House, 2005).

[31] Qatar is experimenting on a large scale with innovation in educational diplomacy. The country is involved in a sweeping collaboration and exchange by engaging with the Western educational system. They see the development of a world-class educational system as key to its continued success. They are cultivating a shared sense of value and understanding through education. Georgetown University, Cornell, Texas A & M, Virginia Commonwealth, and Carnegie Mellon are there—working to provide U.S.-style higher education in the Middle East. This large campus, called "Education City," is a Qatari project located outside of Doha. It presents an interesting option for women—they can get exposed to Western-style education, faculty, and ideas while continuing to follow their traditional cultural ways.

reveal names of cities or towns, with the exception of Doha, where the vast majority of the population of Qatar lives. Every possible step was, and will be, taken to adequately disguise the participant's identity in any published materials or presentations going forward. Regarding the interview transcripts, I am confident that I can offer a guarantee of confidentiality and anonymity. However, regarding the freewiting outputs and focus group discussions, portions of which were shared between participants, this presented another situation entirely. In order to handle this, at the beginning of the time when the group gathered (any group of two or more participants), I suggested we have ground rules to govern our time together and our honoring of each others' confidentiality. To this end, we collectively agreed to not name names or otherwise identify anyone personally in subsequent conversations about the study. I did not believe it was reasonable to assume no one would speak about the study to others, hence, we found it more pragmatic to create a code of ethics that we could all abide by that centered on confidentiality and anonymity of the shared information.

Smith's (1999) reminded us of the vital need to establish a sense of the importance of this research to the people in the study—Arab women, Arab American women, and non-Arab women alike. Smith talked compellingly about bicultural and partnership research. Her work brings the specter of U.S. colonialism to the fore—and it is hard not to think of our invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and the subsequent echoes of colonization. In thinking about Smith's perspectives, the stance of this study became more clear. This study was less in pursuit of knowledge, than it was in pursuit of understanding—creating some modest understanding between the women and the meanings that flow from this understanding. The understandings arrived at contribute to the scholarly literature in Arab/American relations.

The Author and Her Rationale[32]

The next several pages give the reader insight into my rationale and positioning as a researcher. In recognition that a major aspect of the aftermath of 9/11 has been the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is important to give the current statistics on the war. These facts were part of my motivation for this study. My aim here is to provide a dispassionate accounting of the facts—a snapshot in time.

The number of Iraqi deaths is, in itself, a matter of some debate and controversy. The Iraq Body Count website is an ongoing human security project that maintains and updates the world's largest public database of violent civilian deaths during and since the 2003 invasion. The count includes civilian deaths caused by coalition military action and deaths caused by military or paramilitary responses to the coalition presence (e.g., insurgent and terrorist attacks). It also includes excess civilian deaths caused by criminal action resulting from the breakdown in law and order that followed the coalition invasion. The reported minimum number of deaths is currently 96,050 (as of May 8, 2010), and the maximum is 104,767 (Iraq Body Count, 2010). In a report that received significant coverage from the press, the number of excess deaths attributed to the war is 654,965 through the end of June, 2006. (Burnham, Lafta, Doocy, & Roberts, 2006). .Bill Moyer's Journal (Moyers, 2007) reported estimates show up to 750,000 Iraqis have died, and another 2 million Iraqis have fled the country. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2010):

> The intensification and spread of the armed conflict in Afghanistan continued to take a heavy toll on civilians in 2009. At least 5,978 civilians were killed and injured in 2009, the highest number of civilian casualties recorded since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. (p. 1)

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[32] This title borrowed from Karam (1996).

As of 2007, over 25,000 American military personnel had been seriously wounded; of these, 5,000 are head or brain injuries, and 1,500 involve lost limbs (Moyers, 2007). The current estimates of U.S. military wounded from March, 2003 to March, 2010 are 31,668, including U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, according to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count (2010). The number of U.S. Iraq Coalition military fatalities in Iraq (as of May 8, 2010) was 4,397. The number of Afghanistan Coalition military fatalities (as of May 8, 2010) was 1,060. As if the human cost of these wars were not enough, the financial cost to the U.S. of these wars since 2001 is estimated by the National Priorities Project (2010) at $991,781,000,000 (as of May 8, 2010).

Part of my personal motivation for this study is to honor those who have died in this global conflict—Iraqis, Afghans, Americans, and all. We cannot divorce ourselves from the emotion within or from the emotion that surfaced in the study. Emotion both separates and connects us during times of intense stress on our social systems. One of the realities of this study is it allowed me to transition from my own, somewhat paralyzed role of a bystander into a more active role. I feel great sorrow for the told (and untold) numbers of deaths and injuries incurred on all sides of this conflict. I feel shame for our nation's role and tactics, and I feel confusion about the antagonism I see toward Arab American people in this country and the rampant conflation of identities placed on people of Arab descent by others. My personal communications with Arab American friends and colleagues have revealed, for some, there is a perilous feeling of potential parallel with the U.S. internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. This impending feeling that something similar could happen to Arab Americans is an indicator of the post-traumatic context since 9/11. Other Arab American friends and

acquaintances revealed poignant stories of incivility and feelings of dis(ease) and fear at this point in history in the U.S. before I began this research.

The role of the bystander is significant to reproducing injustice. I believe that two increasing trends—those of anti-Americanism and racism—may be exacerbated by the bystander role many assume. Bar-On (1998) described the gradations of bystander—comparing *bystanding* that simply means someone is not intervening in a situation in which they might, versus being the kind of *bystander* who fails to intervene in a situation which requires it. Fine (1980) found bystanders often notice injustice unrecognized by victims because it is less personally threatening for the bystander. Staub (as cited in Opotow, 1990) further described the important role that can be played by bystanders:

> Defined as members of society who are neither victims nor perpetrators, and who witness injustice but are not directly affected by it. Bystanders can be individuals, groups or nations. Among the actions that bystanders can take to combat moral exclusion, detection may be the most important, for an early response to moral exclusion is crucial for reinstating victims in the moral realm. The way bystanders define and respond to event can call attention to violations of justice and can assert the inhumanity of perpetrators' actions. (p. 176)

This study, by its very nature, pulled (and continues to pull) me from my own bystander status. My hope is this is something, at least in part, that is shared among the participants in the study—a venture further from bystander tendencies.

The study raised issues of belonging and security. While I inquired of participants on these topics, I also inquired of myself and questioned my own belonging. What part of America do I embrace, what parts do I question, or fear? How has my own sense of security changed as a result of the foreign policy context of this decade? How comfortable am I as an American? While working on identity politics, Yuval-Davis (2006) found the politics of belonging is not

just about membership, rights, and duties, but also about the emotions that such memberships evoke:

> Neither citizenship nor identity can encapsulate the notion of belonging. Belonging is where the sociology of emotions interfaces with the sociology of power, where identification and participation collude, or are at least aspired to or yearned for. It is only when ones safe and stable connection to the collectivity, the homeland, the state, becomes threatened, that it becomes articulated and reflexive rather than just performative. It is then that the individual, collective and institutional narratives of belonging become politicized. (p. 4)

Given my background as a non-Arab person of European Caucasian descent, born and raised in the U.S., it was critical I carry this study out as a shared endeavor. The process of using writing and reflection to build linkages between individuals is in sharp contrast to the more static concept of studying an other and felt like a sensitive footing for the study. Through this work, we created a new narrative about the foreign policy context that both draws us together, while at the same time, pushes us apart as peoples. Personal, rhetorical questions guide this work for me and include: Can we start thinking about restitution in the midst of a long and divisive conflict? Is there merit or possibility in a construct of advance restitution, whereby one can work toward employing some of the principles of restitution and forgiveness in the moment?

A further and final aspect of my rationale for embarking on this study had to do simply with my work over time in the international women's arena. Through my university work, I have been able to work and learn through projects with women from Macedonia, Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Ukraine, and the current study is a natural projection of those experiences.

In closing this section, I will take a moment to consider my own emotions within the current study. What I realize is that time has helped me to integrate and digest many of my more raw emotions and frustrations. In addition, the act of doing this study helped me feel like

I was contributing something positive that will help reveal important aspects of

Arab/American relations. This contrasted with the growing helpless and anxious feeling

regarding these topics I had from 2003 to 2006, as evidenced by the following excerpt from my

research journal:

> I feel differently about travel, my passport, my citizenship these days. I think back to the beginning of the color coded warning system for levels of anxiety—yellow, orange, red . . . our nationwide system for ramping up security (anxiety). I think back to the precise moment in Colin Powell's now infamous speech to the UN where he utters the word "nuclear." Many of us seized up when we heard that, thrown into another time, another cold war way of being. (During Powell's speech, immediately after he said, "nuclear" in the way that he said it with respect to Iraq and proceeded to show a blizzard of blurry air photos . . . I recall a sort of hollow feeling forming in my belly, and an acute awareness of self and family. Rachman (1998) argued that anxiety can be described as the "tense anticipation of a threatening but vague event" or a feeling of "uneasy suspense" (pp. 2-3) (which is what the color coded warnings leave us with). While fear is described as an emotional reaction to a threat that is identifiable (Rachman, 1998). Colin Powell used his (then) credibility to "activate" the nuclear word and all that comes with it. With a well-placed and manipulative word in a speech given with gravity, a relatively trusted source turned anxiety into a tangible fear and opened a door for many people to go along with the initiation at least of the unthinkable. A masterful use of fear to support policy. (CMG Journal Entry, 2006)

During the study, there was one moment in an interview where a woman said something

so insightful and poignant it brought me to tears. I was as surprised by my upwelling as she

was. From the women in the study, I sensed many emotions underneath and within their words

and mannerisms, but these were largely contained. All participants were given a list of local

therapy providers in the event the study stirred up issues they wanted to talk to someone about

during or after the study.

Considerations for Research Practice

The following section captures several additional aspects of my research practice for this

study. I explore my rationale for choosing to focus this study on women, as well as my view of

feminism as a contested construct. I then broach the nature of risk and trust and the politically

sensitive nature of this study. Finally, I discuss the importance of respecting the variability

within the Arab world and the complexity around issues of naming.

Rationale for focusing this study on women. While scholars represented in the

international peace building literature remind us all women are not natural peacemakers—some

women are aggressive combatants (Alison, 2006), Porter (2007) maintained that, because

women are prime nurturers in relationships, families, and communities, they play crucial roles

in peace building, but often in informal, unofficial ways. Women have unique and important

voices, and yet women are less likely to be asked for their ideas and opinions and are less likely

to be heard on matters of foreign affairs. So, while women have a unique and important voice

they are not heard enough. Youngs (2006) provided encouragement for research in this arena

when she said "we need studies that explain how women have been marginalized, othered, and

silenced, as well as *studies that counter that marginalization, Othering, and silencing by making*

women present in diverse ways [emphasis added]" (p. 9). It is important to help to give voice to

women on these topics, thereby making women present in diverse ways. The literature review

(explored in chapter 2) highlighted the important contributions women have made to the

scholarly and practitioner literature in a number of the key research threads. Bunch (2004)

provided further rationale for the focus of the current study being on women as she noted

having different life experiences than men means women bring different issues to the table and

bring awareness of different needs and different possible solutions to the process. A number of

studies have begun to document the specific ways in which women generally have a more

cooperative and less hierarchical approach to solving problems and are more inclusive in

bringing others into the process which can lead to giving more people a stake in the peace

agreements and compromises reached (Anderlini, 2000; Boulding, 1995; Cockburn, 1998;

Moser & Clark, 2001).

Feminism as a contested construct. In this study, I am relatively quiet about the

concept of feminism. I am sensitive to the multiplicity of opinions on and the tangle of views

about western and non-Western feminism. I do not feel the label is useful within the specific

implementation of this study and, in fact, may be counterproductive to use feminism as a frame.

We can talk about issues of concern to women's lives, political issues, issues of war, and

foreign policy without couching our discussions as within (or as) feminism. Hence, while vital

aspects of feminist methodology do inform the current work, feminism is not the central lens for

this work. I believe there is good reason to have sensitivity as a non-Arab working with Arab

and Arab American women.

Shakir (1997) added her voice to considerable numbers of Arab scholars who feel they

have to "mount a third front against Western Feminists who claim to speak on their behalf but

wind up lampooning them" (p. 3). Glucksmann (1994), amongst others, pointed to the angst-

ridden efforts of feminists to foster egalitarian relationships with the women they are

researching, and she suggested reflexivity and reciprocity is potentially confused with actual

feminist politics:

> Nobody imagines that we could transform the various relations between women: we do
> not and could not overcome the structural inequalities between women *within the
> research process* [emphais added]. Yet the creation of a transparent and equal relation
> between researcher and researched where each is equally involved and each gets
> something from the process does sometimes appear to become the objective of the
> research. . . . We find a quasi solution for frustration in the current political climate by
> focusing down onto the research process, perhaps the one situation in which we can
> have an active role, and over which we do have some control. (p. 151)

This is a very interesting observation and I have felt some of what she described (inequities,

misunderstandings between women, and the desire to create a microcosm where we get things

right—where we transcend the everyday positionalities and learn collectively) outside of the

normal constraints of our respective societies and ways of being. Cockburn (2007) described

feminism as being "a term so diversely deployed, the site of so fierce a struggle to fix meaning,

it isn't surprising if some women keep a certain distance" (p. 207). She described many

feminisms: individualistic and competitive feminism, essentialist and self-righteous feminism,

Western feminisms, inadvertently racist feminisms, as well as radical, liberal, and socialist

feminisms. Feminisms that do resonate with me, as articulated again by Cockburn are:

> A holistic feminism which defends international *human rights and women's rights*, negated in war and the development of international justice . . . and transnational feminism, in the dual sense of aspiring to cross state borders and to negate and transcend the system of sovereign nation states. In these movements women tend to ascribe feminist leadership not to women in the white Western world, which none of us can doubt is a significant source of militarization and war, but to women living in conditions of war, and by extension, of colonization and poverty. (pp. 228-229)

Cockburn (2007) discussed how many in Western countries "feel inhibited by the powerful

backlash against feminism today" (p. 230) and I feel this acutely at times. Vickers (2006)

proposed the concept of gender justice. Because what constitutes feminist differs cross-

culturally, she used the concept of gender justice to accommodate some diversity in what

"positive outcomes for women" (p. 104) can involve. This goes beyond definitions of feminist

that place gender conflict at the center (Beckwith, 2000). At a minimum:

> Factors or experiences[33] which promote gender justice or are positive or women-friendly involve support for: women's citizenship, reproductive choice and access to education, occupation and resources. In this way outcomes can be measured against a standard without imposing 'western' feminist conceptions. (Vickers, 2006, p. 104)

Questions of risk and trust in politically sensitive research. Why would women want

to participate in this study? Why would women willingly put themselves in the vulnerable

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[33] These criteria reflect the agenda shared by women's movements in 43 countries around the world identified by 61 authors speaking 23 languages, as reported in Nelson and Chowdhury (1994).

position of writing about political and emotional issues ultimately to be read and shared by
and with each other? Practically, questions of risk and trust come down to the following:

1.   The climate established from the first moment, the first contact (humility,
     curiosity, openness, non-judgmental, accessibility, and respect).

2.   The way participants are identified contributes to success (i.e., through pathways
     of known people with whom we share a relationship and have trust).

3.   The choice of methods and employing these methods so that a sense of equity,
     collaboration, and inclusion is fostered.

4.   Careful work with informed consent, confidentiality, and a system for anonymity.

     The success of the current study depended, to a large extent, on understanding and
appreciating the risks and the ability to build (and keep) trust. Recruitment of participants for
research that deals with sensitive topics can be difficult. I have had positive experiences in
other settings with the use of networking or snowballing strategies as a recruitment method.
While this method assumes there are trusting relationships, it does not always work out. People
can de-select, even if a trusted network link is there. I believe it was difficult for some women
to participate. Feelings of trepidation, wariness, extreme concern for anonymity, fatigue, and
flashbacks to negative incidences occurred for some. And (at times, in the same person), I also
found a genuine willingness to talk, to reach out, to understand and to help me understand, and,
ultimately, to trust. As the research progressed, I sensed identity hurt (Cockburn, 1998), the
weight of the past, and a spirited day-to-day resilience from this group of women.

     In this study, sensitive topics emerged and included: the Iraq and Afghan wars and
related politics, aspects of U.S./Arab culture and values, Israel/Palestine issues, the global
war on terror, failed leadership, extremism, colonialism, and the phenomenon of

Westernization, along with the incumbent emotions of fear, embarrassment, shame, and pride. It was essential to be attuned to potential costs and risks throughout the study. This study was inevitably influenced by what is happening with events in relevant foreign affairs at the precise time of interviews.

I worked carefully to ensure transparency and clarity of process, strong follow-up and responsiveness, keen listening skills, and a commitment to openness. In thinking about risks and costs, I tried to be especially cognizant of the needs of my participants in terms of anonymity and confidentiality. Sevenhuijsen (1998) described an ethics of care in a situated way based on values of reconciliation, reciprocity, diversity, and responsibility, and with an awareness of power. See Appendix C for questions related to the practice of politically sensitive research I collected and contemplated with this study in mind and which have been adapted primarily from the works of Smith (1999) and Mauthner, Birch, Jessop, and Miller (2002). See also Appendices H, I, and J for ethics committee institutional review board approval, participant consent form, and research participant recruitment background, respectively.

Respecting the variable Arab world and complex issues of naming. Lastly, it is important to understand how Arab Americans and Arabs self-identify and for what reasons. The need for attention to definitions is obvious when you see how often the media, and the public at large, conflate the categories of Arab, Arab countries, Muslim, Islam, Muslim Arabs, non-Muslim Arabs (i.e., Coptic Christians), and non-Arab Muslims (i.e., 20 million Chinese Muslims). Uninformed generalizations lead to the spread of misinformation, Othering, and distancing. It should not be underestimated what the problem of misnaming and misidentifying does to cultural misunderstanding and, ultimately, to relations between

peoples. In short, we do not know each other and this is born out in the complexities of naming.

It was very important to be thoughtful about terminology throughout the current study. I realized, for example, my use (for convenience) of the constructed terms Arab and Arab American[34] was potentially fraught with problems. While these are terms used widely, they are not particularly descriptive. As mentioned, the profound general lack of understanding of the complexity of the Arab identity perpetuates their misuse. Using specific countries of origin wherever possible (such as Iraqi, Yemeni, or Egyptian) will often have more meaning. There is no common Arab identity I can credibly speak to as a non-Arab. Witteborn's (2007) highlighted the impact of 9/11 on Arab identity expressions in the U.S. She documented a highly nuanced web of situational use of terms (e.g., Arab, Arab American, Muslim, Iraqi) Arab Americans use to invoke different aspects of their identity at different times with different audiences. Hence, it can be seen that, even within the Arab American community, the naming and self-identification can, and does, change situationally.

Arab Americans are most often defined by ancestry and national origin. The U.S. Census identified Arab Americans as Americans who can trace their ancestry to the North African countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco Sudan, Tunisia, and the western Asian countries of Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. A more expanded definition sometimes used includes individuals who can trace their ancestry to countries that are members of the Arab League. This includes the counties listed above and also Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, and Comoros (Kulczycki & Lobo, 2001). Yet another definition states Arab Americans are

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[34] For example, some Arab and Arab American activists have contested the terms Arab or Arab American as rubrics for organizing identity. They have argued these terms are nationalist in scope and, therefore, exclusionary toward non-Arab minorities in the region (Jamal & Naber, 2008).

individuals who hail from countries where the predominant language and culture is Arabic

(Baligh, 2003). In a discussion of definitional problems surrounding characterization of the

Middle East, McAlister (2005) made a compelling case that supports being respectful of

variability. She maintained "the attempt to tell a 'total story' of culture and society that would

tie together the diversity of the region [Middle East] was itself something of an imperializing

ambition" (p. 36). In my work, I will borrow the wisdom of Baligh (as cited in Sweis, 2005)

who defined "an Arab American as any individual who can trace their origins to an Arabic-

speaking country and who claims such an identity" (p. 7). The women in the Arab American

group identified as Arab American, but not exclusively. They also identified as Iraqi,

Palestinian, and so on, and as American.

In summary, the current study experimented with the method of freewriting as a means

of generating texts and creating reflection with the women in the study identifying themes from

within their own writings and speaking. My hope was, instead of me (as researcher) coming in

with a particular stance, together we could co-construct meaning from the themes we gathered

through the freewriting process. I believe this provided a valuable platform from which the rest

of the study (one-on-one interviews) and analysis flowed. There is significance in the stories

people may choose to share and the stories they will ultimately write down as part of the

freewriting/focus group process we construct together. Andrews (2007a) reminded us:

> If conducting research outside of one's own community (however large or small that is
> to be defined) it is imperative to obtain a sense of what the larger narratives are that
> guide the self-understanding, and therefore the self-presentation, of that group. (p. 506)

Understanding these larger narratives of East/West relations and Arab/American

contexts through the literature, popular culture, and by being in the world and observing these

dynamics is essential. Rodriguez (2002) helped to bring us full circle with echoes of Freire

and action:

> Compelling narratives push us to act upon the world. They challenge us to understand
> and reckon with the implications and consequences of our actions and lack thereof.
> Narratives are meant to be shared. In our narrativeness we find our impulse to share our
> experiences, our understandings, our meanings, our humanity. No narrative is meant to
> be kept to ourselves. Narratives make us human by binding and weaving us to each
> other in unique ways. (p. 4)

Ultimately, I used this methodology to determine whether there was a receptive basis or

readiness for dialogue that could be deduced from what the women said, how they expressed

what they felt, and what common (or divergent) insights and ideas they put forth. This

methodology helps us learn about the possibilities for communication across conflict. Chapter 4

describes the results of this methodology presenting the findings and interpretations of the

study.

Chapter IV: Findings of Study and Interpretation

The research questions driving this study are: What are the narratives of Arab women (in the U.S. and in the Arab world) and non-Arab women in the U.S. about Arab/American relations, particularly in this time since 9/11? What, in their views, are inclusive ways toward human security (RQ1)? How can dialogue be used to surface narratives and improve mutual understandings (RQ2)?

To answer these questions, the current study ventured into the voices, sensibilities, ideas, and feelings of 18 women—all of whom share concerns and have hope about the state of Arab/American relations. In this chapter, I discuss the themes that emerged from the data. The arc of findings within this narrative inquiry begins with *self-identifications of identity*—understandings about who the women of this study are and how they feel about who they are with regard to Arab/American relations. The second theme relates to *attributed social identities*—projections by others characterizing the women and the groups they are expected to represent. The women reveal experiences and concerns about racism, discrimination, and Othering perpetuated by and affecting both Arabs and non-Arabs. The third theme, the media, plays a role in the public representation of various identities. The media plays a role in exacerbating racism, discrimination, and Othering, which also, ultimately, influences human security—the culminating theme of the current study.

The Path to the Findings

As described in detail in chapter 3, situational analysis was used to open up the data, and to contextualize and understand it. To reiterate, themes in the transcripts were identified and

then organized into Clarke's (2005a) situational analysis categories.[35] This helped to further

disaggregate the data and allowed me to open the data and more fully explore it through the

lenses of Clarke's categories. The next step was to begin to reaggregate the data around key

themes as determined by my initial thematic analysis and informed further by the situational

analysis work. As mentioned, the broad themes of identity, racism, discrimination, and

Othering, the media, and human security ultimately captured the vast majority of findings.

Figure 4.1 illustrates a summarized version of that initial analysis, where clusters of items

surround the overarching themes.

Figure 4.1. Final situational analysis messy map.

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[35] Clarke's categories: individual human elements/actors, collective human elements/actors, discursive constructions of individual and/or collective human actors, political/economic elements, temporal elements, major issues/debates other key elements, nonhuman elements/actants, implicated silent actors/actants, discursive construction of nonhuman actants, sociocultural/symbolic elements, spatial elements, related discourses (historical, narrative, and/or visual), and events.

The application of Clarke's (2005a) methodology, as explained in chapter 3, yielded several discrete areas of findings that were helpful tools in probing the data. In the appendices, I compiled the results of several of these lenses of the data: specific events mentioned in the data, (Appendix D), human actors (individual and collective) (Appendix E), nonhuman actors/actants (Appendix F), and broad situational factors (Appendix G). It will be of interest to the reader to review these detailed findings for each of the three study groups (Arab, non-Arab and Arab American) as they illustrate some of the intricacies and angles of the situational analysis methodology, as well as the respective responses to these lenses by the three participant groups. Clarke's category of symbolic elements shows an example of how the situational analyses infiltrated the thinking of this researcher. There were certain symbolic events relating to Arab American relations depicted in the media and represented in the data by the women. For example, all groups mentioned the shooting of a particular Palestinian boy who was being shielded by his father.[36] Certain images are seared on the memory and become symbols around which opinions are formed. This mode of thinking about each of Clarke's categories helped me to deepen my analysis. As another example, situational analysis prompted me to look for silences in the data. One of my readings of the data was exclusively reserved for noticing what was not being said. This category of silences is discussed in chapter 5. Within this findings chapter, I have noted other areas where situational analysis was especially helpful in contextualizing, exploring, and arriving at particular themes.

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[36] This incident in October, 2000 involved a 12-year-old Palestinian boy who was shot by Israeli snipers while his father tried to protect him. This scene was captured by a France 2 cameraman and shown live on world television, becoming a highly covered news story, worldwide. I should note all aspects of this incident have been contested by those with various stakes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

How to Approach the Remainder of Chapter

The findings in this chapter are reported by group—non-Arab (NA), Arab (A), and Arab American (AA), the order in which I did the fieldwork. For each group of six women, I will give some descriptive information about the women and the setting of our gathering, along with some sense of the nature of the interactions. During the analysis phase, I intentionally stayed within the data sets for the groups to more deeply hear the voices and issues within the group. After completing the non-Arab analysis, I moved to the Arab data set, and then on to the Arab American data set. This sequence allowed me to build toward the most complex data set—that of the Arab Americans, a result of having a foot in both worlds of Arab/American relations.

While the findings for all three groups fell within the broad themes of identity, racism, discrimination, Othering, the media, and human security, the subthemes under these themes differ. This chapter illuminates the nature of the findings and provides a picture of how these themes are interconnected. This chapter reaggregates the data to an extent and, thereby, honors the wholeness of the narrative voices of the women in the study. To this end, I have crafted a set of passages around key themes that emerged from the situational analysis.

Ultimately, this chapter desires to bring the reader into the minds of these women, into their accounts, their interpretations, their hopes, and their concerns for the state of Arab/American relations. At a few points, the passages I included are lengthy out of respect for the narrative cohesion and flow and so critical context is kept intact. Many of these narratives illustrate the relationship between the personal and the political (espoused by Andrews, 2007b). Close observation reveals how global events filter down to the lives of the women in this study. One can see within the passages how foreign policy and the range of politically motivated events are very much a part of the day-to-day reality and identity of the women in this study.

What I ultimately found were the thoughtful and often poignant voices of 18 women each bringing unique thoughts, emotions, and ideas on core themes that, when taken collectively, describe the status of Arab/American relations.

From the findings of the study, a story line emerged that became conceptually useful to me as I worked with the findings. This was the beginning of bringing the situational political and social mapping into interpretative frame. As depicted in Figure 4.2, it is not meant to imply causality nor hierarchy.

Figure 4.2. Story line of study findings.

The Non-Arab Group

The ethnicities and religions of the non-Arab group were diverse including a range of religions backgrounds (one raised Catholic, one leaning toward Eastern religion, one Jewish, one

Muslim, one raised Baptist, and one not declared). The nationalities of the non-Arabs

included Mexican/Irish, Indian (raised in Africa), Spanish/Mexican,

Guatemalan/Madagascar/Swiss, Nova Scotia/Scotland (two women), and Dutch/English. Their

ages ranged from 41 to 61. Four of the six women had children.

I met with this group of women at a space I rented which was furnished as a library den with

book-lined walls, easy chairs, and lots of small lamps. We began with a shared meal of Thai food.

Immediately, I sensed the women were curious about each other. I had not revealed the group

membership in advance. I was then struck by the willingness of this group to try the freewriting

methodology. They dove in, asked clarifying questions, and, in between sections, they engaged in

spontaneous talk and sharing. There was a collective sense of interest in the process. There were

two sisters in the group, who live apart from one another and the study gave them a chance to

recollect aspects of their childhood as Americans in Saudi Arabia. There were two work colleagues

who were able to support each other and debrief together about the study. In debriefing with them,

one woman said she wrote until her hand was sore and another said she could have kept writing and

writing and expressed dismay that we changed prompts before she had gotten all of her thoughts

down. Their comfort seemed to grow throughout the day, though, perhaps their fatigue grew as

well. At the end, they preferred to share and talk as a whole group instead of in pairs, as I had

originally intended. In essence, this group had an open, empathetic, curious, and relational feel.

The interviews, conducted one-on-one, were done in the private home of participants for two

women, in a private rented room at a university for three women, and one interview was done by

phone.

Non-Arab Group Findings

Figure 4.3. Schematic of non-Arab group findings.

      Theme one: Identity from the perspective of the non-Arab group. The findings

dealing with identity give insight into the collective struggles of the women in these groups to

understand both themselves and each other. Identity is both personal and political. Further, self

and group representation is often an expression of identities and the perception of identities.

The key sub-theme that emerged from the data deals experiences and opinions about adaptation,

belonging, and representations. Each illustrative passage below represents a window into the

narratives of these women and shows how identity is at the core of Arab/American relations.

      Adaptation, belonging, and representation. The key findings in this section are

captured by the interrelated concepts of adaptation, belonging, and representation. Adaptation

refers to the cultivation of shifting and multiple identities within the context of Arab/American

relations. Adaptations are often made by people to increase a sense of belonging. Lastly, there

are important considerations here in the area of representation—or the feelings people have

about being represented by mainstream culture, the media, and/or the government—and how this reflects on identity and interconnects to aspects of security.

Below, a non-Arab woman reflects on how an Arab woman might want to be identified. She ponders whether Arab women are conflicted about how they choose to portray their identity. Toward the end of her wondering aloud, she links this hypothetical person to her own identity struggles and her own path as an immigrant to the U.S., which was strongly influenced by her grandfather:

> When I'm looking at the same Arab woman who's not covered. How does she want to be identified? It's, it's up to her; you know, do you want to step out at this time and say yeah, I'm not dressing that way but I want you to know who I am. Or, do you want to just blend in? . . . So again, where do they, where do they want to be identified? Do they want to be I'm here, I was born here, my mother and father were not and we're living, and so I'm this way and this is how I'm going to be. Or are they conflicted? And I think a lot of it is conflicted with however their family feels. Like with me my family said no, you are this way and this is who you are, and yes we love our family who speaks Spanish and you know, go to Mexico, and da da da, but that's not who we are. We're American because that's what my grandfather said. And I didn't know my grandfather. (NA, 3) [37]

The prior passage illustrates non-Arab people from various ethnic groups (i.e., Hispanic) can have a level of understanding and empathy for the complex identity terrain in which Arab Americans find themselves. This group had a tendency to take an empathetic posture regarding the dilemmas faced by Arab and non-Arab women. One can sense this non-Arab woman's own struggles with identity, adaptation, and belonging and, in this way, we detect hints of possible common ground with Arab Americans. Individuals adapt their multiple and fluid identities (Bahr & Sweat, 2006) in unique ways, as findings in this section will continue to show.

Two women in the non-Arab group spent periods of their lives living in Arab countries and were influenced by being expatriates, leaving them with complex perspectives on Arab

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[37] The findings of this chapter are coded in the following way: NA = non-Arab, A = Arab, and AA = Arab American. The six participants in each group are indicated as 1-6. For example (NA, 4) means this quote is from participant #4 in the non-Arab group. This is consistent with the order of my work with the groups.

American relations, as well as feeling of alienation in their home culture—the U.S. This may, in some ways, parallel the situation for Arab Americans who, as we will see later, resonate deeply with both the Arab and non-Arab worlds, and may perhaps be another area for common ground.

> You learn very quickly when you come to the United States. . . . I remember one time, at Thanksgiving dinner at my boyfriend's house and this was a boyfriend that was kind of a serious boyfriend and it was Thanksgiving, and I brought up something about a Muslim custom and I watched faces of horror, just from one face to the other. And maybe I was superimposing it but I don't think so. Like, the face of "did she just talk about Muslims at Thanksgiving?" You know, it was just like okay, well that test is over, we will not bring that up anymore. And he used to get mad at me, like why don't you share, why don't you tell people about and you know, it's just like I choose, you know, who I'm going to share that stuff with because people do not want to hear it. (NA, 4)

The prior passage speaks to a need for this woman to represent and adapt her identity in a certain way, in certain situations. Another non-Arab woman who also lived extensively in Arab countries echoes this sentiment:

> I feel like I did my significant growing up, my values formation, my understanding of the world and how people get along, in those years in Saudi Arabia. Even when I returned to the U.S., I felt more close to other international students who were living at the University of Arizona going to school than I did with Americans who were, had lived there all their lives. . . . [With those Americans,] I definitely kept my international experiences really on the back burner. I only told anybody about it if they really got to know me well, and we'd had lots of other conversations because I found that most people seemed to be put off when I would talk about international experience. That taught me don't talk about it. (NA, 5)

Another woman recognizes the layers of privilege that attach to identity. The relative anonymity of many non-Arabs can be taken for granted. The data will show, later, the infractions on the privacy of Arabs in America are perhaps not widely known and take a considerable toll. In contrast, a non-Arab woman describes the safety she feels that results from her identity, and we see the links between security and identity:

> I mean, it's safe for me to be redhead and green eyes or you know, it's a safe way of me to look and it's a good way for me to look. I never really realized that I was in the

privileged look because I never think of it that way, but as I have opened my eyes to seeing how we profile, that this is pretty darn safe. (NA, 3)

The findings of this study arise from non-Arab women of differing ethnic and religious backgrounds. The following passage speaks to the complexity of allegiances and the diversity of identities that exist within one person and one family. After spending formative years of her life living in Saudi Arabia, she eventually met and married a Jewish man and converted to Judaism:

> We ended up staying together and we got married, and we had always agreed to raise our children Jewish. I found that in educating my children about Judaism, I decided that I really liked it and that I wanted to take the official step to be Jewish also. I had some conflict with that because I had closely identified with Arabs and Palestinians, and continue to this day to feel great sympathy and empathy for the Palestinian people. But I learned that I could be Jewish, be critical of Israel as well as acknowledge their right to exist. I've made my peace with it. I feel like I am honest, and not betraying anybody by my stances on that. (NA, 5)

Her multiple identities influence her outlook on Arab-American relations.

These prior narrative excerpts show the range of voices in this group. Some of the women are immigrants who experienced discrimination in the U.S. due to their ethnicity. Others felt displaced living in the U.S. with deep ties to other places. It is important to appreciate the uniqueness of the women's experiences and upbringing. In all, we see complex choices about how to represent oneself—choices regarding fitting into mainstream culture, abbivalences and conflicts about representation, and the shifting and fluid nature of identities.

As is seen, individuals are influenced by the collective identity, history and vision of their families, and their new communities for a future in America. In this way, the histories, religions, and ethnic backgrounds of the women in the non-Arab group affect their identities in ways similar to the Arab Americans. Further, they will likely have had different trajectories in terms of access to wealth, political representation and power, and treatment by the main stream

of culture. This history is influential. The women in this group have an idea of where they and their people are in terms of assimilation. They also have opinions about where other groups of people are. One woman described being raised in a family that emigrated from Mexico where they actively muted their Mexican heritage and language in favor of what they saw as a more rapid assimilation to the U.S. This non-Arab woman shares her opinions on what she sees as the tendency of Arabs to assimilate:

> They don't want to assimilate for the most part. They want to be, they like that they can still be Muslims, and still wear hejabs, and still function as Muslims here. So any time that that ability is threatened, then they complain about being in the States. I think that they don't have the goals to assimilate. I think they want to be, maintain their distance from mainstream America. (NA, 5)

There is also in the data a recognition about the role of mainstream America[38] in reinforcing patterns of assimilation which prevents the mainstream from being exposed to cultural difference. One participant refers to it as a collective "staying within the zone of safety" (NA, 1) that includes a lack of effort on the part of non-Arabs to learn about other cultures and languages. Further, there is an awareness among non-Arabs of the mainstream U.S. collective treatment of various non-Arab immigrant groups in America—resentment toward Mexicans, shunning of Japanese Americans during WWII, and now expanded to Arabs as well (NA, 5). This history and practice influences the ability to reach out and connect and, ultimately, can constrict the possibilities for improving Arab/American relations. Narratives of adaptation and belonging are the backbone of these findings.

Moving now to issues of representation, one can see in addition to 9/11 being a security related topic, it also has a deep connection to identity (i.e., representation). For some, 9/11 and the aftermath created a dilemma whereby non-Arab women in the study have felt misrepresented by the U.S. media and prevailing actions of the country and the government.

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[38]This is not an easily defined grouping.

One woman raises the question of "whose America?" She does not recognize herself in the patriotic tenor after 9/11:

> *Well there's no America* [emphasis added throughout excerpt], you know. There is the dominant, I can only say what I think is a dominant society, and I am assuming that that's me, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, you know. But, *my America is not the same America* as you know, the Philippino Americans or the Japanese Americans, or whatever. Um, there isn't, there is an America and it's [makes growling noise] but in terms of remember after, during Iraq, after September 11th *when all the flags were flying*? …That was freaky because *that was America saying who America was*. The rest of us *who did not connect with that*, you know, the rocket's red glare we are America posse kind of mentality that was going on. (NA, 4)

Other non-Arab participants described how 9/11 caused an identity shift —from the U.S. as invincible and secure, to the U.S. as vulnerable and insecure within our borders. We come to see the changing ways in which America must now represent itself and the resulting impacts on people living there as the passages below explore:

> I remember not feeling safe in the world anymore. It was very weird. It was very weird how small the U.S. felt at that moment." This was, "We had you. We're at war with you. We want you to die. We think your ways are wrong, and just this idea that there were kids out there that would be willing to die, or people would—who would take an aircraft and kill thousands and thousands of people, or who would spend their lives training to do that, or you know, they hated us that much was a strange feeling. (NA, 2)

Post 9/11, the U.S. identity includes a repertoire of being vigilant in terms of self protection with associated costs in civil liberties and a loss of innocence. One participant said, "When 9/11 happened, all I could think was well it's about time we felt like this" (NA, 4). Non-Arab women in the study expressed the need for an identity shift—a different representation or view of themselves as Americans and a questioning of what it means to be an American. Fear now comes home to these non-Arab women and they voice a new and collective sense of what it feels like to be hated. This occludes, to an extent, the prior sense of

being a protector for the world. In addition to having to adapt to an evolving view of

America, the women have their personal identities and representations with which to contend.

In the following passage, this non-Arab woman shares her heightened awareness of

being a Muslim in America and the incumbent host of concerns and identity shifts pulling her

toward her Muslim faith, as well as an identification she has with the post-9/11 concerns of

Arabs. As with many of these findings we see the inextricable links between identity and

security:

> And immediately *I became one of those [Muslim] people* [emphasis added throughout excerpt], you know? It was such an interesting thing, not thinking about myself as being vulnerable. Really, not quite vulnerable till then, and then I became—because they were equating al-Qaeda with Islam, and I'm a Muslim, *so I became one of them*.
> Well, I think because of my history, because of being isolated and kicked out of another country before, in my mind it was, "Oh, no. Here it is again," you know? The safety that I felt *about being an American in America* was so easily washed away. It was frightening that it was so easy for me to *lose the connection to my country*, my adopted country. (NA, 6)

We see that this is very much about both identity and security. When I asked if it

would be accurate to say that she had more empathy towards her faith after 9/11 she

responded:

> Definitely. Definitely. I could hear the news with a little bit more questioning. Why are they saying this about these people? You know, what is it in my faith that made al-Qaeda perpetrate this crime? But also, how can they be saying this about *all these people* [emphasis added throughout excerpt], you know? So, I think both sides become—I became much more aware of—*of being Musli*m. (NA, 6)

These accounts point to the relationship between identity and security, in a post-9/11 U.S.

Identity is a basic factor that can contribute to peoples propensity both for acts of racism,

discrimination, and Othering and for resisting or counteracting these.

Theme two: Racism, discrimination, and Othering from the perspective of the non-Arab

group. In this section of findings, one can come to appreciate some of the personal experiences

the non-Arab group of women had with feeling Othered and how that provides fodder for

understanding acts of racism and discrimination against Arabs. The women also voice their

critique of aspects of American culture that perpetuate discrimination, racism, and Othering.

   Experiences with Othering and defending Arabs. As compared with the other groups,

the findings on Othering were less expansive. One woman spoke about contending with

Othering from her own friends regarding her enjoyment of traveling to the Middle East and

having Arab friends and connections. She also let us see the discord within her close family

that arises from her interest in the Arab world and people:

> Oh yeah, they think as I said that I'm crazy to do that, that I should be focusing on my
> own country and people here that need help that I shouldn't be going. . . my husband is
> one of them. He will not go to the Middle East, he's so fearful. His thing is they kill
> people over there. . . . I said, well maybe one person can make a difference and to show
> you that not all the Americans hate you. (NA, 1)

Two women talked about the complexities they feel in defending Arabs. Given their

interest in Arab people, culture, and language, they feel they have a responsibility to defend,

explain, or dispel myths to others. This woman shares her feelings about what she felt was

being Othered[39] in the Middle East:

> I didn't like being Othered. I wanted to be included. I wanted to be like them. So any
> time when I wasn't, it was surprising to me. If anything, I was used to people craving to
> talk to me, either men following us in town because we were American girls and they
> wanted to see if they could get anything off of us. So that was somewhat positive
> attention. Or it was Arab women wanting to talk about things, and practice their
> English, and want to be friends. Because I was so used to that approach and that
> treatment of me, then any time it was different I didn't like it at all. (NA, 5)

We see a classic case above of wanting to fit in, to be invisible, to not stand out as

different. Yet, we see her comment about positive attention conflicts with this in that she also

does want attention because she is different, "because we were American girls" (NA, 5).

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[39] This may be more about being privileged as a non-Arab or as an American. Othering is about preserving
positive self-image by stigmatizing others, which is not the case in this situation.

The following woman makes observations, stimulated by what she sees as a sense of cultural superiority among Muslims. This passage articulates embedded perceptions around differences in cultural practices and values:

> Amongst those [devoutly Muslim] people, I really do think that they feel a superiority to some of our, some American cultural ills. Our high divorce rate, our, once a divorce happens the fact that our children are in these custody fights. . . . I think they're worried about our spiritual souls, and they pity the fact that we don't treat our own selves better. We don't treat our bodies more sacredly. . . . But certainly our attitudes about sex and fidelity are different than theirs, and it does cause us problems. (NA, 5)

The U.S. as an unreflexive culture. Several non-Arab women described sentiments of the U.S. as an unreflexive, judgmental culture and the impact of this. A precursor to racism, discrimination, and Othering is our (Arabs and non-Arabs alike) tendency to (absent facts, critical thought, and in the presence of provocative media) to make quick judgments. A non-Arab participant shares her thinking about this type of judgment and one can sense the kind of damage it can cause:

> We're judgmental about their [Arab and Arab Americans] faith and their—especially their religious practices, but you know, politics, as well, and then it goes both ways, you know . . . I think that's what I was referring to is the judgmental stuff that goes back and forth, where they're looking at us as heathen Americans . . . if I were judged by only Las Vegas, then yeah, that's probably what it would be, and if I judged all Arab-Americans by a few extremists, then. (NA, 2)

She goes on to talk about our tendency to Other whole groups of people:

> Those Arabs, they all share the same faith, and thus, instead of being able to say, "Oh, he's their Timothy McVeigh; he's nuts." . . . I think that we are very quick to cut an outlier from [our own] herd, but we're not willing, or we don't seem to be very willing to let that occur somewhere else. We "Other" the whole group. (NA, 2)

She explores the lack of reflexivity of the U.S. to make critical comparisons between cultures and points out the hypocrisy inherent in this.

Another woman explores anonymity, Othering, and our collective treatment of various immigrant groups in America:

> Currently there's a lot of resentment towards Mexicans who come across the border and are in the U.S. There's the perception that they're stealing our jobs, or that they're having tons of babies, and eating up our welfare money, or something. It seems like a pattern that whatever the group is, currently the underdog or the new man on the block, there's the tendency to criticize them, and to point fingers, and to blame them for all the woes of the world. From what I understand, when it was post WWII, or during WWII, the Japanese Americans were very much shunned, and no one gave them the benefit of the doubt to say, "Were you directly responsible for killing any servicemen?" They just saw the Asian faces and automatically attributed all the hateful things about the Japanese-American war onto those particular individuals. (NA, 5)

These passages highlight the transferability of Othering that can happen from one ethnic group to the next in the U.S. and the collective failure to learn from history. Some of these ways of being contribute to reduced human security. As one woman summarizes, "My personal opinion is it [9/11] would've happened anyway whether we supported Israel or not. There's just so much hatred of the Americans abroad" (NA, 1).

Theme three: The media from the perspective of the non-Arab group. Non-Arab women talked about the power of the media to represent and the sense of powerlessness they feel when they are misrepresented. These findings get to the heart of questions about the role of the media during times of war and conflict.

Identity, representation, and the role of the government. This non-Arab woman reflects on the media, truth, and the complex politics of representation with her simple but profound statement: "Don't assume I think like what the media says Americans feel" (NA, 3). This brings us back to the question of who has the right to say "we Americans"? The U.S. government policies during the Bush administration were ultimately a catalyst for action for this woman, who continues:

> I was so embarrassed because I think at that time was when I was really learning how bad we were coming across, and I was . . .and you know before the Bush administration. I don't know, I mean I paid attention but that really, he was so um, he so misrepresented many people. Okay? And this is, and I'm just, in my opinion he so misrepresented many people that we were all put into the same kind of cultural box as people from other

countries were, and that's where I started becoming more open and aware, and saying ah, that, now wow I know how people in other countries feel when their government or their political person in power says things and then they're all saying we're not all like that, we're not all like Al Qaeda. He (Bush) was the one that really brought, really pushed my political buttons to the point where I was speaking up. Never had been to a peace rally in my life. (NA, 3)

In this prior passage, one can observe her voice as concerns her threshold for action, for agency. As a result of being so misrepresented, she found her voice. We also sense her newfound empathy for people from other countries who are misrepresented by their governments. This is, perhaps, another area for common ground between groups—being misrepresented by the media and the government.

Manipulation of trust. The voices we hear speak to both a frustration with presumed agendas of the media coupled with a recognition of the great potential of the media. This woman talked about her feelings of being manipulated by the media:

I'm kind of now turned the focus to Afghanistan. But you know what, when I think about that [Char] why? Because that's what's on the media right now. See, I'm so prone, and I think that's what I'm being influenced to do. It's like okay we're getting out of there, so now and so again I'm probably following right where the media wants me to follow. (NA, 3)

She also sees 9/11 as a potential opportunity for education and awareness, however this is mitigated to an extent by the difficulty faced in trusting information sources:

So when things like that happen in our country on our soil, we become much more aware and so it's right there. I don't think there's anybody in the U.S. right now that did not know that 9/11 happened. They may not know where it is, where it came from, but they know it happened and they have an idea of the source where it came from. That's about it, so that's the opportunity right there. But, the trust factor is, where is the correct information? Where, when you get your education, where's the correct information? (NA, 3)

This woman further described the repetition of the media and its impact:

The images of September 11th over, and over, and over again . . . as I look back, it even shaped my perspective. Everything gets so out of balance, it's like all of what

you're eating every day, all of what you're consuming is this global threat, fear, vigilance, worry people have. (NA, 3)

We are led to contemplate the responsibility of the media and in particular who defines the responsibility of the media. This woman implicates us as the consumers of the media, to an extent, but she also is wistful about the media taking more ownership and social responsibility. We talked about what might have been done differently regarding 9/11:

Because we consume it, and that's the one that nobody is talking about is even if you try to communicate with the media that you have this great responsibility, and this great ability to move or paralyze masses of people, you should be very careful about how you use that. The reality is that people elect to follow, and listen, and watch. (NA, 2)

She described her personal experience working closely with the media, "So, I know they have the potential to be careful and thoughtful, and ethical" (NA, 2). And she expressed her interest in knowing more from the perspective of the media about the coverage of 9/11, "I'd love to hear what they think about the coverage [of 9/11], if they think that it was important to do what they did, and to hear their perspective" (NA, 2). This may also be an area of common interest and concern among the groups. Given the nature of the media and findings that evoke a sense of being manipulated, misrepresented, and of not knowing where the media at large gains its sense of responsibility, we see that these factors contribute to the sense of human security and have significant impacts on Arab/American relations.

Theme four: Human security from the perspective of the non-Arab group. While aspects of identity, acts of racism, discrimination, and Othering impact a collective sense of human security, the findings also show specific events and foreign affairs situations poignantly illustrate the nature of human security in the post-9/11 time period. The context of post-9/11, the war on terror, and the U.S. as perpetrator of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, bring home issues of human security very directly for this group.

There is also recognition in the findings of how these situations impact Arab Americans. As voiced by one woman, "[What a] paradox for Arab Americans living here with more freedom, but then that's contrasted with the wartime context where the U.S. you know, our military is inflicting damage on their homelands" (NA, 4).

The experience of 9/11. "A great global dread" (NA, 2). "When 9/11 happened, all I could think was well it's about time we felt this" (NA, 4).

This study, while not specifically about 9/11, recognizes the pivot point in Arab/American relations that has resulted from this event and the subsequent aftermath. The voices of women from each group provide us with a snapshot in time of this historic event that will, undoubtedly, continue to impact Arab/American relations for decades to come. Each of the passages to follow speak to the impact of 9/11 on a sense of human security from the perspective of the non-Arab group. Reading this initial passage gives us the sense of entering an unknown terrain. "There was just sort of this immediate waiting for the other shoe to fall feeling, and I don't think we really—there wasn't any precedence in our lifetime for how do we do this?" (NA,2). This same woman had to grapple with 9/11 in the context of her professional role in the arena of homeland/public security. Here, we sense her loss of innocence and newfound concern about keeping people safe at mass gatherings:

> Oh, my God, and mass gatherings worrying about football games, and all those potential victims together, they could be a target, and you just—there were things that were outside of our—not out of your consciousness, but outside of what you really thought about day-to-day. And again, kind of like losing your innocence, and now all of a sudden those were not games to watch; they were opportunities to exterminate mass people. (NA, 2)

Another woman described coming to terms with 9/11 and the new reality she felt about being a Muslim of Indian origin living in the U.S. She tells of her need to think in new ways about the way she and her children look, their Muslim names, and the potential implications of

this, post- 9/11. Ultimately, she comes to the realization that, with this event on U.S. soil and

the tie to Muslim perpetrators, she, as a Muslim in America became the Other:

> I remember going to work that day, and—phew!--just shocked about it, and everybody
> had this deep quietness, and this sadness all around. And my boss, the chair of my
> department at the time, came to me and said, "[Name], be careful, stay at home. In
> fact, I would suggest that you don't walk with your kids." That's what he said, Don't
> be outside with my kids, because my kids look American, and I don't. . . . I got home,
> and I was thinking about that my kids names are Muslim names, and if this goes
> further, then what will happen? You know, what will happen to us? What will happen
> to them, really? Unnerving. (NA, 6)

The prior passage gives us insight into how America as refuge was lost to an extent for

this woman in the post-9/11 climate. We begin to appreciate how 9/11 turned America from a

safe and secure place to a site of acute insecurity for some.

One woman observed that America's retaliatory mode is what kept insecurity high in the

years after 9/11 and eclipsed America's reasonable voice, which she has come to depend on:

> The thing that I admire so much, and love so much about being in America is this
> reasonable voice that happens. This group of people feels strongly, this group of
> people will counterbalance it, and in the end, it will be a safe place, you know, in the
> balance. But for how many years after 9/11 there was no balance, not in the news
> media, not in the way people voted, not in neighborhoods.   (NA, 6)

In the following description of travel post-9/11, this woman shares perspectives as she

reveals her new levels of scrutiny of fellow travelers and her feelings associated with these new

behaviors:

> I remember feeling the awkwardness, and the discomfort, and having things enter my
> head that would never have been there before, you know? . . . I remember catching
> myself, and noticing people, and thinking, "Wow, this could go from a simple flight to
> a weapon of mass destruction." And then noticing that in myself, and then noticing
> how uncomfortable it seemed that the people who appeared to be of Arab descent
> were, and how others—you know, you catch those other glances? . . . It really struck
> me how much discomfort there was, and those are not things that I would have ever
> noticed before. (NA, 2)

As part of the direct aftermath of 9/11, the conflict in Afghanistan was examined by a woman who struggles to contemplate how the U.S. is (or is not) helping human security in Afghanistan. We sense her trying to understand how human security might feel or be defined by a person living in Afghanistan. Passages like this one reflect an empathetic tendency and a reflexiveness about the day-to-day lives of people who are influenced by U.S. policies influence so directly and dramatically:

> But the human security falls within you know, when you look at it worldwide the little babies, the little children that are in like Afghanistan right now . . . so the soldiers come in and say we're here to protect you and then as soon as they leave the Taliban comes in and it's like if you don't do this we're going to kill you. You know, and then where, how does that feel? That makes me feel like where is that, there's no human security. They have the right, they're living peacefully in their own little village. . . . How do you feel secure? What makes you feel secure? Hopefully when they go lay down next to their loved one or they're holding their baby, or they're having a meal amongst themselves, that's where their human security comes in, pulling it from that. Because, I don't think you can depend on society to make you feel secure. (NA, 3)

Related to this, there were several findings from non-Arab women contemplating security from the perspective of Arab Americans. In the following two passages, the non-Arab women share their understanding of the experiences of two Arab American friends post 9/11. This woman speaks of the situation in which a Jordanian American friend found herself:

> Then when 9/11 hit, and her teenage boy was getting picked on in school, and her husband was pressuring her to remove her hejab so that they wouldn't be so, stand out so much in public. She told me she was really wondering if this was the best thing, if coming to the United States was the best thing for their family because she felt that she was having to compromise a lot of what she truly believe in just to not make trouble. She said, when she thought when she came here that she would be free to express herself, free to be able to do what she wanted, and now she was feeling very restricted. (NA, 5)

We come to understand some aspects of the impact of 9/11 on an Arab American family, but through the eyes of a non-Arab. The next passage is useful to include in its entirety

as it uncovers the elaborate weighing and balancing of securities that are perceived and experienced in America, after 9/11.

> [A] Palestinian friend of mine has four children, and she is uncomfortable when she goes back to Palestine because, in addition to worries about bombs or soldiers bothering her or something, she doesn't like that they don't use car seats. She doesn't like that the driving is so wild. She has really become accustomed to our [U.S.] day-to-day securities. So she feels more safe driving. She feels more safe crossing the street. Sending her children to school she feels more safe here in the United States than if she lived in Palestine. But she is, if a group of men are hanging out at a corner, and she needs to pass them in order to walk her kid to elementary school, she is sure that they are thinking hateful thoughts toward her, and she really tries to avoid being near them because she thinks they might hit her, or certainly say something to her. That's post-9/11. So on the one hand she feels safe because she doesn't think the [U.S.] government's going to do anything, or that there's going to be bombs, and that everybody's going to follow the rules of the road. But on an individual, personal level she is more fearful. (NA, 5)

The prior passage reiterates the paradox that Arab Americans face, again as seen through the eyes of a non-Arab. While they are safer in the U.S. in some overt ways, at the same time, Arab Americans are experiencing high levels of insecurity on an immediate personal level. These are also important findings for this study due to the evidence of reaching out between non-Arabs and Arab Americans and the importance of empathy as part of a basis for future dialogue. Chapters 5 and 6 delve more deeply into this area of reaching out. In the early stages of this study, I had to think through my own intent and my right to reach out in this way, at this time, with this study.

On the Iraq War.[40] This section of findings captures the women's reflections and voice on the Iraq War—another key area that influences human security and ultimately Arab/American relations. Iraq, as with 9/11, is a sort of security touchstone or indicator. The reflections women had about Iraq lead us deeper into the political terrain of these women showing how they comprehend and internalize these events. One can sense increasing

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[40] Iraq War (2003-present) military campaign which began on March 20, 2003.

frustrations around representation and an overall emotionality surrounding the ongoing

subscription of the U.S. to this course of action. Each of these passages speaks to the impact of

the Iraq War on a sense of security.

This woman spoke of the Iraq War and the country of Iraq, and the idea of whether it

will recover its spirit post-war. She wonders whether we (the U.S.) will be able to be part of it,

invoking this idea that "will we have done so much damage and be so unwelcome or whatever

that we won't even be able to see when it does recover, or help it?" (NA, 4) She continues this

train of thought:

> I'm specifically thinking about a conversation I had with a Jordanian here when the war
> started and he was telling me about everything that was being lost, because he knows. . .
> . And I feel ashamed, and I feel like I would like to go with the person who's explaining
> to me all those things and get to see them with him, but I can't because they've been
> destroyed and I'm American. You know?   (NA, 4)

This woman used the term racist to describe the war in Iraq and she responded this way

when I asked her to tell me more:

> Well, you know, I think that how the war has spun up, you know, certainly there was
> mention of the need to disempower Hussein and his government, but there was also this
> sense of this whole country being a threat, and all of these people being a threat, and that
> their leader or their thinker for them needed to be taken out, so that they would be
> disempowered. . . . "We don't understand them, but we're pretty sure we don't agree
> with them, and that they're dangerous, that they're all together, there's too many of
> them. It's a threat to us. (NA, 2)

She goes on, exploring the notion of the power of reciprocal hate:

> It's for me almost embarrassing, you know, to be 45-years-old, and to be shocked by
> any of this, but I was shocked and disappointed, and it's not as if I don't believe the
> Holocaust happened, or don't know about all of the incredulous things that our country
> has done, but this still was something that was like, wow. And not just the hate of the
> folks who would have perpetrated this behavior, but the vengeance and hate from our
> country, you know? . . . The reciprocal hate, you bet. The declaration of war against
> anyone who would disagree with our country; I mean, just such a broad brush, and
> such a—you know, and all of this stuff invented the weapons of mass destruction, and
> you know, it's just astounding to me how potent hate can be, and how persistent it can
> be. (NA, 2)

When I asked what she thought the root of this is, she responded:

> Fear. I mean, I think—I think it's always is to kind of put a stop to fear is—fear that somebody else is going be in charge; fear that somebody else will have control, and not knowing what their motivations are, or what their beliefs are, and frankly not being willing to find out, so some of it's fear, and some of it is just laziness and arrogance. (NA, 2)

It is interesting to note that the fear of loosing human security on a large scale actually may feed their collective insecurity.

Another woman's perspective on Iraq reflects on healing the wounds caused by the Iraq War:

> I think the outcome in the end, a long time from now—10 years from now—might be what people really want—wanted, or want. But the hurt is very deep; it's like having a very big cut in your body, and the healing process, I think, is way longer when there are crimes in the way that there have been committed in Iraq against families, one family against another family, you know, not only the bombarding of the city, and the shooting of innocent Iraqis by Americans, . . . I think it takes a long time and really good people to settle those issues. . . . It's still, you know, we're in the middle of it. It's still—it feels to me still, like one people against another people, against another people, and we're not talking about healing yet, at all. I don't feel it. (NA, 6)

The prior passage speaks to the relative readiness for dialogue. One can begin to understand why forgiveness and reparations so often happen many, many years after a conflict.

In the final passage below, we see a glimmer of hope surrounding some of the interactions this woman imagines must be occurring between Iraqis and Americans over in Iraq:

> I'm just really struck by this idea of the Iraqi soldiers and the American soldiers having to live under the stress together, about them getting to see women and probably definitely going to the homes of Arabs. That is happening, and so some of the fear is getting replaced by some context and some discussions, because from the experiences I had, Arabs love to talk and they're very well educated, and so you will have a very interesting conversation very quickly with someone. That's you know, that's going right to understanding is pretty cool. And they'll ask questions that probe you, you know, so I don't know it just brings intimacy pretty quickly. (NA, 4)

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The findings confirm what is generally believed,

namely, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict influences human security and the status of

Arab/American relations. Some in the non-Arab group had opinions and experiences regarding

Palestine and speak specifically about the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to Arab

American relations:

> You're always going to have recruits [terrorist] as long as that Israel problem is a
> situation. And, I want to know if Americans understand that, and if they understand . . .
> that there are a lot of reasons why many Arabs; moderate, conservative, educated,
> uneducated, really feel burned about that situation. Because, I don't think Americans
> really understand how painful that whole thing is and how unjust it is, and that is my
> bias. . . . Fifty years of being hemmed into really small quarters and having this other
> country that is essentially your enemy control your human security is not humane. (NA,
> 4)

This woman also speaks to what she perceives as a lack of understanding about this conflict by

mainstream America.

There were also perceptions within the non-Arab group that other Arab countries did not

or do not do all they can to support Palestine and that this has affected the fate of Palestine:

> I think everybody knows this, that none of the Arab countries really liked the
> Palestinians and they would rather feed them billions of dollars and keep them where
> they are than relocating them to their countries. And that's common knowledge. (NA,
> 1)

> It isn't so cut and dry, you know, and the Arabs, the Arabs are a big reason why the
> Palestinians are in the situation that they're in. You know, the Arabs never supported
> the Palestinians, they wanted the land you know. They didn't care about the Palestinians.
> (NA, 4)

This thinking was extended to the leadership of Palestine not doing the right things to

protect Palestinians. This woman described her visit to Israel and Palestine and her

observations therein:

> I saw a lot of poverty. At the time Yasser Arafat was the leader of the PLO and I
> visited—I saw schools how dilapidated they were, the roads were a mess, potholes
> everywhere, the houses in very, very poor condition. People there were living—the

Palestinians in utter poverty. And all of the—without exception all of the Gulf countries paid Arafat billions of dollars for infrastructure, for anything, but what he used the money on, [Name] was weapons. You saw very little of it trickle down to the people. And so this is how he kept I think his thumb on the Palestinians by inciting hatred towards Israel and not wanting to work together because he was getting all this money and he would say well it's Israel's fault for not helping us do this. And then when he died you saw all the millions he had in his bank account and the villas he had in Europe, why? When all of that money could've been spent on his people. (NA, 1)

Homeland security. We turn now beyond the specific situations engendered by 9/11, Iraq, and Israel-Palestine to the arena of homeland security. Homeland security refers to security efforts to protect the U.S. against perceived external and internal threats. The findings raise questions about the role of homeland security in providing a greater sense of human security. With government attention turning to homeland security, both in the U.S. and to a large extent abroad as well, do all the incumbent modes of profiling, prevention, preparation, and protocols leave us with an increased sense of comfort? For Arabs and non-Arabs alike? One participant contemplates:

> The funding that followed September 11th was terrorism-based, and so what you see is that people would have to articulate in grants some kind of terrorism risk, which is—I mean, this is normal. After Timothy McVeigh there was all of this vigilance around chemical purchases in quantities, and domestic terrorism behavior, and all of that stuff, so this is normal stuff, but conversely, [city] was like, "Here? I mean, of all places?" And then the echo is, "But the university has people from other places." And then it's like, "Well, yeah, but they're scholars and students, and like-minded, and not a threat," and then the echo back is, you know, "But how perfect. This is the perfect place, you know, to hide in plain sight." (NA, 2)

The prior perspective comes from a woman who, in her position in the area of protecting homeland/public security, needs to seek balance. In the passage, she attempts to weigh overreacting with underreacting in her professional life, while honoring her personal feelings and beliefs, and her instincts about the small community in which she has lived for a long time. We talked further about the area of profiling and security, and she spoke about the difficulties:

And the one side of the argument is we're using experience, knowledge, wisdom, good judgment, and applying that to what we're doing. And the other side of that is we're using prejudice. . . . The problem with things like homeland security is that it's viewed to be so top secret, you know, that there aren't a lot of eyes on that, and well, really horrible things can happen when that occurs. (NA, 2)

In this woman's contemplation of the human and homeland security interface one can sense that she does not necessarily feel safer as a result of new homeland security procedures:

Human security is again the factor where before 9/11 I didn't even really think about that. I thought about being aware as a woman, being alert, being you know, thoughtful and know my presence, but not ever threatened as a person. With this, the 9/11 happening, became more of a like whoa, yeah. And then, every single time I go to the airport with my shoes having to be, it's a constant reminder of the threat and so at one point, I mocked it because I thought we were just like overreacting and laughed about it, like . . . does that make me feel better? [speaking about the red, orange, yellow threat coding system] Because, it didn't make me feel better because I didn't even understand it. I mean when I would ask somebody what does the orange mean versus the yellow versus the red, and they couldn't even come up with a concrete answer. So, nobody really knew but so, that was false sense of human security that I think was being projected out there, and we were all so freaked out about 9/11 and you know, that we took it just for face value, saying okay so now we're going to do this, now we're going to do that, and so that's where I was kind of thrown back and forth just like, what makes me feel secure? (NA, 3)

One can see evolving ideas about what brings security and what may not—homeland security vigilance may or may not increase our actual human security and may also reduce our perception of how secure we are. It also raises the question of whose human security is being protected, and at what cost. See Table 4.1 for a summary of the main findings for the non-Arab group.

Table 4.1

Summary of Main Findings for Non-Arab Group

Theme	Findings
Identity	The events of 9/11 and the aftermath created new complexities around representation, sense of being misrepresented by the U.S. government and by the media.
	Perceived identity of the U.S. itself has shifted (invincible, secure to vulnerable, insecure) post-9/11, leaving sense that non-Arabs are not as secure in the U.S.
	There has been identity positioning and shifting of the women in the group post-9/11 in order to adapt to changing political circumstances.
	The tendency of mainstream Americans to stay within a comfort zone coupled with the tendency of Arab Americans to also stay within comfortable groupings influences Arab/American relations.
Racism, Discrimination, and Othering	Non-Arab women have had experiences and observations of Othering and see ways in which the U.S. can be an unreflexive and judgmental culture.
Media	Non-Arabs feel misrepresented and manipulated by the media.
	There is a lack of trust of the media and concerns about the social responsibility of the media.
Human Security	The events of 9/11 brought unknown terrain, a loss of innocence, and loss of reasonable voice, new understandings of the power of reciprocal hate, and the power of fear culminating in a increase in insecurity.
	Overall, there is a new contemplation of security that had not been in the mainstream American psyche prior to 9/11.
	There are perceived contradictions inherent in human security infrastructure and policy.

The Arab Group

     I met the women in the Arab group in two separate groups of three. The first group of

three women were Muslim from Lebanon, Qatar, and Bahrain/Persia. Their ages ranged from

20 to 21 years. The group setting was a comfortable room in a building with a lovely design on

the Education City campus. We began by sharing a meal of pizza and talking generally. We

then started with an icebreaker[41] where I asked them to write some thoughts on cards about

questions they might have or ask if they were doing a study about Arab American relations. We

shared these together and this provided a good segue way into the session. We started the

freewriting and I explained how we could toggle from writing into focus group mode (speaking)

with me recording their thoughts on a flip chart. They seemed quite comfortable with swiching

back and forth between the two modes. One thing that stands out about this group of three

women was a certain readiness for the material at hand, possibly due to the nature of attending

an American school and being exposed to Arab/American relations firsthand via this

educational experiment in which they were active participants. Further, these young women

were somehow unprotected in their responses, close to their emotions and to their day-to-day

life experiences and problems. They were very candid, optimistic for the most part, and with a

sense of empowerment and excitement that comes from being in one's early 20s and

experimenting with possible areas of one's life's work. Also evident with this group was the

family—a stew of expectations, constraints, support, and tradition. Their need to balance these

aspects with their newly forming identities was tangible. We did the one-on-one interviews on

the Education City campus in a private office space.

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[41] This icebreaker was an idea given to me by an Arab American acquaintance.

I met with the second half of the Arab group at their place of work. They were colleagues and we met in a meeting room that was unadorned. These women preferred to write less and talk more than the other three Arab participants. They were older (from ages 30 to 37 years), all Muslim, and from Bahrain/Persia, Tunisia, and Sudan. What stood out for me about this group was their work within the psychiatry field, which gave them a sensitivity to Arab/American relations from the perspective of psychological well-being and put them in touch with aspects of human suffering. These three women had, earlier in the year, traveled to a professional conference in the U.S. This was the first time to the U.S. for all of them and this, perhaps, peaked their interest in the study at hand. I conducted the interviews for this group also at their place of work. In essence, this group reflected youth, both the opportunity and isolation of Qatar, and curiosity.

Arab Group Findings

Figure 4.4. Schematic of Arab group findings.

Before delving into the detailed findings for this group, it will be useful to briefly outline some ways this set of data compares with the prior, non-Arab set. As I approached the second data set for analysis, I had the benefit of having the first set in mind. This helped begin my

comparative view of the data. The non-Arab and Arab data sets were similar in they

illustrated a shared sense of being misrepresented and manipulated by the global media. These

two groups also shared concerns about the Iraq War and its implications. The groups were

dissimilar in the following ways. The issues of race, racism, discrimination, and Othering were

more pronounced in the Arab group findings. The events of 9/11 hit the non-Arab women's

sensibilities much harder, with the Arab group being somewhat removed from the physical

realities of 9/11. There was an equal level of concern about the aftermath of 9/11. The very

political posture of the U.S., as compared with the apolitical posture of Qatar, influenced the

findings. Lastly, the non-Arab group did not have issues around Westernization and

globalization (the U.S. is a key perpetrator and benefactor of these phenomena).

Theme one: Identity from the perspective of the Arab group. In the area of identity

for the Arab group three main sub-themes surfaced: globalization and westernization,

representation and Islam, and Qatar as an apolitical entity.

Qatar is contending with Western modes of development—a model that is contested by

some, embraced by others. Related to this, Qatar is also importing Western modes of education

via the creation of Education City,[42] which comes with incumbent benefits and costs.

Corresponding to this, there is a collective concern in Arab culture about how the country, its

way of life, and traditions are being affected by these trends.

Globalization and westernization. Globalization presents a new age of crossing borders

and boundaries and directly influences the ways that people connect as cultures. Dykstra (as

cited in Livesey, 2005) helped to reveal one of the paradoxes of globalization—besides having

the power to exploit, globalization has the power to enhance women's lives (p. 152). The

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[42] Education City is a complex of U.S. universities providing higher education in Qatar at the behest of the Qatari government, part of a move toward a knowledge economy.

women in the Arab group have two main areas of interaction with the U.S., responding to

rapid development trends and engaging in the U.S. educational system. Their narratives show

how, within the same person, there can be both a critique of western modes of development and

a recognition of the benefits to be had from a Western style education or interpersonal

connections with Americans living in Qatar. For example, the data in this study suggest a

personal decision to date an American or study within a Qatar-based U.S. educational system

can potentially counteract misrepresenting stereotypes about Arabs and non-Arabs alike. This

passage reflects an identity shift which results from personal intercultural experiences—in this

case, dating an American and highlighting the freedom this engenders:

> Now that I'm with an American, I think more about myself than I think about him, and
> he lets me. He doesn't like me to be controlled; he doesn't like me to do what he
> wants—what he wants me to do. So, I think now I have the freedom, like for the first
> time in my life, just to think about myself. That's why this time, especially this period,
> is —I don't know, very insightful, you know? I'm beginning to learn about myself.
> Probably people would start doing that when they were teens, but for me, I'm starting to
> do that now, and discovering who I really am. (A, 5)

The Arab women in this study help us to understand the complex feelings of, on one

hand, resentment about the speed and style of Western-type development on certain traditions in

their culture, while, at the same time, being compelled by the American educational system and

the possibilities of critical thinking, freedom of expression, and independence (often attributed

to American identity). The data show clearly how the West is often perceived as both a threat

and a lure.

When talking with a participant about the rapid cultural change and the impact of

globalization on Qatar she said "the educated thing to do is to develop, but that as Arabs we're

following—just following western modes of development" (A,1). She depicts the loss of

identity that comes from accelerated development and merely following the path that others

have made. Her perspective:

> I want to do something where I can bring language back . . . because it's essential knowledge that we need in order to have pride in what we are we say we have pride, and I'm proud—I have to say I'm proud to be a Qatari, and proud to be an Arab, proud to be Muslim, but it's going away. Now, people younger than us don't have that pride as much as I do, and it keeps on going. And I want to bring that essential knowledge back, and I want to figure out a way to do it. (A, 1)

This same woman laments the trend toward loosing the Arabic language:

> I feel like when somebody loses a language, they lose their identity, their sense of identity, and I feel like a lot of history is being taken away, and taken away very, very fast, because like Doha—you can see Doha in 10 years became—in 10 years became globalized, and became so modern. We won't have respect for our country; we won't have respect for who we are, or our identity, because you don't know where we stand anymore. (A,1)

> Another voice echoes these concerns and more directly connects the globalization

patterns to the U.S.:

> And now, it's developing here, without even considering, like to a certain extent, they're not considering like the Qatari identity, so people are developing, and we're accepting it. We are and like we're taking American education, right? . . . So, that's where the backlash comes, and I think with the backlash, it's either they'll—like a hate will develop, or just like they would say unintentionally bad things. They'll be like, "These Americans. Let's be us." (A, 2).

She continues:

> I was born in 1989, so it was still undeveloped, and it was more like you could drive your bicycle anywhere, and nobody would judge you. It was so much simpler. It was a simpler life. So, to me I'm not hating the Americans, or the foreigners. I'm hating this development, because now it's all—like it's like a trend, let's build tall building—skyscrapers—well, why? Is there a reason? No. (A, 2)

This participant's comments speak to both a lack of control and anger related to the development of the country and wistfulness for a recent times of greater simplicity. Conversely, other voices articulate support for the changes happening and describe benefits of collaborating with the West/U.S.:

Here in Qatar? I think it's, more for us it's much better than before. We used to be on the, like one kind of people living the same area. But what happened, lots of people have lots of friends from other nationalities, are you know, exchanging their culture, their way of living, and you know, they are able I feel that they are going to bring more, our people are more interested now in like, in being like part of the universe, not a part of a country. So, it's much different than being just a community, and sitting in the same place. (A,3)

While the traditional identity of the U.S. as a haven is shifting for some, Arab participants in the study talked about the continued importance of and value of American citizenship to Arabs despite all the events of the past decade. One can start to sense the type of deliberations the Arab group must make in deciding the costs and benefits of what the West/U.S. brings. In thinking about what is gained and what is lost, one can hear the struggles the women face. There is a draw toward freedom, independence, and desire for freedom of expression, as in the next passage that reflects an interest in modes of critical thinking that are part of American education:

The thing that I liked about it is the idea of critical thinking, and asking why, so not being able to—not to sit at one, which is really kind of weird, because when the media shows people—some people don't ask why, and don't go and search. They are okay with what the media gives them. But here [Education City] I've been so taught—I've been taught that not to settle for one idea, and not to settle for one person's thought, and search, and make my own decision in a sense. That was something really good, and I've been taught how to think, which is really amazing. (A, 1)

The collective voice is one that is struggling with the negative effects of globalization and outside influences, while also wanting to reap the benefits of these same trends:

A lot of people see America as a threat not when it comes to political issues, but when it comes to culture, because the media—you know, the media in America is very huge, and people love to see all the glamour—glamorous that, you know, the stars, and they would want to relate them somehow, and a lot of people, especially parents—older people, they really see this as a threat to their children, because it changes the way they think about their religion. But I always wonder if it's a problem to be influenced with, because maybe as a graphic designer, I have to be influenced all the time by other cultures, other people, just see the world differently makes you grow up, not only as a designer, but also as a person, but a lot of people are afraid for their children to be grown up, and to think, you know? Because when you think about the West a lot, you become

more independent. You would want to be more independent, and in this culture, especially if a woman is independent, it's very intimidating. (A, 5)

This woman sees independence as a virtue and American influences as desirable, while also recognizing the views of her elders. The prior passages show the difficulties inherent in negotiating a shifting identity in a globalizing world and dealing with the perceptions of those within one's close family circle. The presence of Education City in Qatar presents a microcosm of new intercultural complexities and opportunities. The data show root tensions around identity and globalization with the U.S. implicated as a key driver of growth—both the general development of Qatar and the growth of the educational sector in particular. This provides an important piece of context and, at the same time, points with hope to a new generation of women who are cultivating their voice on important global issues. The issue of voice is discussed in more depth in chapter 6.

Representation of Islam. The Arab women in the study had a strong desire to educate people about Islam. They feel their religion is badly misrepresented and those depictions are harmful to Arab/American relations. One woman advocated bringing out the "better knowledge of Islam, rather than making it seem like if you are a Muslim you have to be serious; you have to have an angry face" (A, 1). Five of the six Arab women spoke about the similarities they see between Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. There is a common sense these similarities given sufficient focus and are not understood, allowing negative perceptions of Islam to persist. One woman expressed a sentiment common to the group when she simply stated, "God is the same one, for Muslims or for Christians or for Jews. He is the same God" (A, 6). The following narrative passages illustrate a palpable frustration that Islam is not better understood and it is actively misinterpreted and misrepresented:

The government of Qatar should really educate people of what Islam is really about, and educate them that it's not about violence. Islam—the word "Islam" means peace, it doesn't—it means peace. Islam means surrender to God; it means peace. So, there's no violence in the name of Islam, because Islam is based on peace in a sense, and the government should also when we have the lectures and prayers, know what's going on—to have an idea of what's going on. Who is giving these lectures? Who are the people that are saying things? And kind of bring out the better knowledge of Islam. (A, 1)

To let people know more about Islam, and to, Islam is not terrorism, it has no relation to terrorism, but terrorism . . . it's not coming from the religion itself, it's coming from the frustration from people who are suffering from a lot of things. The problem that those people they are Muslims because they are colonize, I mean the country which is colonize is a Muslim country. Iraq is a Muslim country; Afghanistan, also. Palestine is also a Muslim country, so it's just because Muslims are colonized. So, it's not coming from Islam, it's coming from the, well if it comes it shows from the frustration of colonization. But Islam never asks any person to kill or to do anything for no reason. (A, 6)

Qatar as an apolitical country. A common sentiment threads through the narratives

was Qatar is an apolitical, unbiased country. While this is espoused nationally, it also translates

to the individual level. It was common to hear the sentiment, "I am not political," or "I am not a

political person." One woman said, "We don't have, you know, this political gathering. We are

not political people, so we had only a few talks about this issue [U.S. role in Iraq] here" (A, 4).

And another, "It's like Qatar is the middle country in politics, like it's a bias country; it doesn't

go with Iran; it doesn't go with Islam; it doesn't go with Israel, or America, or whatever" (A, 2).

Qatar, as a nation, prides itself as being a neutral convener or facilitator on the regional[43] stage.

This active, but apolitical climate appears to have a stabilizing effect on people concerning

human security. This is complicated to an extent by the existence of a U.S. military base in

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[43] This extends to the world stage as well, as Qatar hosts events such as the annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum which seeks to address critical issues dividing the U.S. and Muslim world by providing a platform for dialogue and learning and development of positive partnerships between key leaders and opinion shapers. See www.dohanetwork.org/

Qatar and the corresponding alliance between Qatar and the U.S., which will be explored

further in the human security section.

Threats to identity for this group stem from the phenomenon of globalization and

westernization and also from the misrepresentation of Islam. The role of the media will be

discussed in an upcoming section. This woman shares her feelings about the Arab identity in a

very poignant passage:

> People are too afraid to be who they are. They can't even show their true identity,
> because they're worried about what other people will think. And honestly, everyone is
> worried about what would say. Everyone, deep down, is worried about what they think
> about how I look, how I—so, they just hide it, and just follow, and accept it, and just
> not spread the right knowledge, because they're afraid. And I think maybe any—if it
> was spread out differently, I think everyone would be able to see the similarities that
> we're together, that we're the same. (A, 1)

Theme two: Racism, discrimination, and Othering from the perspective of the

Arab group. The misunderstandings people have of one another stemming from a lack of

knowledge about identities and cultures intertwine with various forms of discrimination, racism,

and Othering. The next section illuminates some of the forms this takes.

Racism, discrimination, and Othering in the Qatari contex. This section explores

racism, discrimination, and Othering as experienced by Arab participants in Qatar. The casual

visitor to Qatar would observe a culture with a great majority of the population being from

South Asia (South India and Sri Lanka). These people service the ruling Qatari class and do the

physical work of the country as drivers, construction workers, domestic home, and gardening

workers. Qatar presents an opportunity for these people. However, there are tight rules about

employment and living conditions for workers are of a very low standard as compared to the

conditions for indigenous Qataris and other Arabs. Some participants volunteered an awareness

of this; however, most did not choose to engage this topic; still others showed active

reluctance to discuss racism in this context.

What was more predominant in the findings were examples of an Arab-Arab

discrimination taking the form of Othering based on where one is originally from within the

Arab world. There is active cultural rivalry between Arab countries and, in some cases, direct

Othering and racism. These are real divisions between peoples of Arab origin depicted as

"racism in terms of nationality" (A, 1) by one participant. Collectively, these passages provide

narrative evidence of the complexities of cultural differences between Arab peoples revealing

subtle but real discrimination between peoples of Arab origin. A participant (whose family is

originally from Lebanon) says it this way:

> I don't look like a regular Qatari. I have the looks of either a Lebanese or Palestinian,
> because my grandma is Lebanese. . . . It's sometimes—I don't know—it's not insulting
> to be from a different nationality, but it's insulting to a person who has been living here
> his whole life to be called a foreigner. It makes you feel like an outcast. (A, 2)

And another:

> I'm like originally Persian, so a lot of people can tell that by my family name, or
> sometimes even by the way I look, and I lived—like I experienced racism since I was
> really young. So, yeah, maybe it's not more about color, but it's more about family
> names, and where you're originally from, and whether or not you're pure Arab.[44] (A,
> 5)

The discrimination extends to expatriates:

> Between us Arabs, we're like, "He's not from here," or, "She's not from here." And
> it's kind of an insult. We like insulting, but not so much, like if I tell you you're an ex-
> pat, it's not insulting, but between us, it's like we're insulting the person, sometimes.
> (A, 2)

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[44] There are several ways to be considered an Arab. One is by lineage, considered to be pure Arab, which can be
traced as far back as Noah through his son Shem. Another group, considered to be Arabized-Arabs, come from
North African or Middle Eastern countries outside the Arabian Peninsula. This group includes anyone who speaks
Arabic, follows Arabic traditions, and is loyal to Arabic politics (New World Encyclopedia, 2010).

Racism? For me, honestly not, but I can see—I could see differences in thought. I can see that, and it's not racism in the sense of color, but maybe nationality. It's not—I don't know if it's considered racism. I'd probably say it's racism, but it's in nationality, I think, like not treated as equal. So, yeah, that's for sure. I see that; I notice here. (A, 1)

These passages hint at the complexity of experience the women in the Arab group have with race and racism   The lived experience of discrimination they refer to is largely framed in terms of nationality and culture. There are varied manifestations and it seems often people hold to the unique orientations of the individual countries from which they originate. While beyond the scope of the present study, this theme would benefit from further development and interrogation regarding historically specific structures of power that shape relationships between minorities in the Arab world. Race almost certainly does not capture the full context.

Multidirectional racism, discrimination, and Othering. Cockburn (1998) introduced the term of identity hurt that she described as "occurring when there is friction and disjuncture between a woman's sense of self and the identities with which she was labeled, that she was held to account for, or felt seduced by" (p. 10). Identity attribution is not is not a one-way phenomenon confined to stereotyping about Arab Americans, for example. Negative judgments made by Arabs on the U.S. as a whole, or on specific people, while perhaps not as threatening, damaging, or intense, also play a part in the overall phenomena of Othering and distancing between peoples. Findings of this study include a range of Arab perceptions about the collective U.S. identity. These include: America is dangerous (A, 2); drinking is prevalent (A, 2); America is racist (A, 2; A,6); discrimination driven by 9/11 dominates public opinion (A, 3); America is controlling (A,4); America is crime-ridden (A, 3); you may be attacked or stolen from in America (A, 3), and so on. That said, I did not hear blanket anti-American voices in this study. It could be due to the influence of my presence. People gave thoughtful, specific

and personal examples and tended not to overgeneralize. There was a wide recognition from

participants that there is a large gap between American people and the policies of the U.S.

government.

The following passages depict some Othering towards the U.S. and some experiences

of discrimination experienced by women in the Arab group.

> It [the U.S.] seems like it's okay in certain, like states. But then, it's more dangerous in others, so even my brother when he wants to study in the U.S., I had to ask an American colleague here, if it's okay to go to this country, is it like more for drunk people, and . . .
> Because it seems it's more safe in one state, and then in another it's very dangerous, or just it seems like a racist part, or they have nothing, because I've been told like there's like a state where like college students have nothing to do except drink, and since my brother—drink and party—and since my brother is a Muslim, he can't do that, so it's not really necessarily a good place for him to go as a college student. (A, 2)

> Yeah, you know what, my preconception was that people there [U.S.] they are racists. They don't like Arabic people, and maybe they will mistreat us. But, all the idea was just from media, and I don't have really American friends or people that I know that I can have idea about what real American people do. But, when I went there it was totally different. Nothing, they were treating us like any other person. Everywhere. (A, 6)

> We are hearing a lot about the American, and you know there are, they are more open-minded than other countries, but still they have this issue about 11 September and they hate Arabs, and they don't like to see Arabs very frequently and feel that Arab are, you know, not simple-minded but you know, are you know, are not trustful, aren't respectful or trustful. So, 'twas big for me because you know, usually I don't think much of the things that people say, I would like to know by myself, to experience these issues by myself. . . .
> [After visiting] I had this great impression that they are very nice people, and frequently I am asking my husband we need to go again, I need to see New York, I need to see other parts of America. I want to see people there, I want to live there, I want to study there. I want to start you know, to search on the internet for master degrees and everything I want to, and even you know, just I want to see more the U.S., U.S.A. So, it's still very different picture than before. (A, 3)

One woman and I talked about her thoughts about America before she had been there.

She said her husband had been trying to get her to visit the U.S. for seven or eight years and

she expressed her concerns:

I wasn't comfortable to go there. We are Muslim; we are black. I wear a [hejab], all these things, yeah, and I was afraid of this—all these things. But because of what we hear from the media, how they actually treat them there, and this stuff. (A, 4)

After the visit, her impression shifted: "So, the people there are very kind, and very helpful, so I changed my idea, actually. And we said, that, oh, we have to go back" (A, 4).

An exception for those women who had traveled to the U.S. came when they encountered U.S. airports:

Only problems was in the airport, because I'm wearing scarf and they kept searching me and they were afraid, as if they are afraid. And one was afraid, because they are afraid that I'm going to do something, please don't hold anything, please walk directly, please don't do anything, any more and you know, even from searching, the person was searching, I went with the cabinet, the air cabinet and they felt that maybe I'm holding something I don't know. (A, 3)

They have to take some people to search them thoroughly. And I was surprised, because me and my husband randomly, does not logic—I mean, why me, and my husband? If only me or only him; so okay, but both of us, you know? So, that like—we actually kept in our mind that because we are Muslim, because we are—I'm wearing hejab, and they are afraid of us. This is the only bad experience. Otherwise, it was perfect, and the trip was perfect to us. (A, 4)

Airport experiences and preconceived feelings based on media accounts left women with a sense of being Othered and discriminated against, coupled with a sense of resignation to aspects of the world post-9/11. This was mitigated, to what seemed a great extent, by the mostly positive experiences of those who had traveled to the U.S. On a note about the analysis, I would mention here exploring the data with Clarke's (2005a) category of nonhuman actacts in mind, led me to envision airports as nonhuman actants. While they are in some ways buildings like any other, they are also influential sites for Arab/American relations—highly charged in the post-9/11 era and a place for fear, discrimination, and misunderstanding. Airports are nonhuman, but actants in the arena of Arab/American relations, just the same. That said,

airports would not be locations of fear, discrimination, and misunderstanding if humans did

not gather within them. See ACLU (2004) for discussion of racial profiling since 9/11.

Another vein of Othering within the findings was internalized stereotyping, or Othering

aimed at the self. This passage shows Othering internal to Arab culture. Observe the stigma

attached to the wearing of a beard and the related distancing that occurs:

> Yes, I like Islam, but a religious guy with a beard? No. I just hate beards. Even if
> he's not religious, I like—this idea of a beard, I just can't stand, because it's like
> communicative, like you hate it because they're very strict, and now it's becoming
> more insulting to you. (A, 2)

In the following narrative passage, a women recounts an exchange in a mosque between

a religious figure and his followers. It shows frustration with peoples tendencies to practice

internalized stereotyping. Her plea and the point of the story is for people to espouse what she

calls "right way Islam" and bring a better knowledge of Islam forward to contradict the

abundance of negative stereotypes. In this narrative, one sheik describes social pressure from

another sheik to not eat ice cream in public. Reading this account, we sense her desire to

contradict internalized stereotyping:

> I remember one of the priests . . . he has a beard, of course, but he was sitting down,
> and he was like, "I don't know why people think that because I have a beard I'm angry.
> I'm happy . . . " He said, "Once I go, and I buy an ice cream," and he's like, "And I'm
> eating ice cream, and one of the other people . . . " We call them [sheik, sheik of
> Islam]; "So, he's like—he comes and asks me, 'Are you seriously eating ice cream in
> front of these people? You're a [sheik], how are you eating ice cream?" He's like,
> "What, because I have a beard I'm not allowed to eat ice cream anymore? It's like,
> I'm a human being. It's not . . . " So, I feel like people should understand—
> [laughter]—yeah, he said that. He's like, "What? I'm not supposed to eat ice cream,
> because I have a beard?" (A, 1)

She continues:

> And he said that. He's like—he even mimicked how the guy was saying it, and he was
> saying it, of course, in a mosque to all these people, so he is—he's spreading the right
> way of Islam, and I think there should be more people saying that, more people not
> being embarrassed because through media—media, really, because of what other people

are showing of Islam, and what media is emphasizing on, people are embarrassed. A lot of people are embarrassed, and are not—don't take pride in who they are. (A, 1)

Her recounting of the story reveals something about her own voice and her frustrations with people who do not speak out and contradict harmful stereotypes. The choice between keeping a low profile and following the path others have made versus speaking out and breaking up limiting stereotypes becomes apparent.

Theme three: The media from the perspective of the Arab group.

Identity and representation. A recurrent theme was the media portrayal of Arabs and the embarrassment it causes them to the point that they feel violated in their identity and can actually change (constrain) their behavior as a result. Women in the Arab group talked repeatedly and earnestly about the misrepresentation of Arabs by the media. There is a belief among participants that the media has a large role in creating an image of terrorism as the exaggeration of Islam. It is viewed as common practice to equate the wearing of the hejab or a beard worn by the wrong person with being a terrorist.

> Because of what other people are showing of Islam, and what media is emphasizing on, people are embarrassed. A lot of people are embarrassed, and are not—don't take pride in who they are. (A, 1)

> It's not what they show in the media that's true, and because the media shows it a lot, it makes people afraid to really stand up, so it shows that Islam is being terrorist, and wearing a hejab means you're a terrorist—a woman terrorist, and a—having a beard means you're a man terrorist, then they are too embarrassed to show who they really are, so they just keep it low; they don't even educate other people about it, because they're too afraid to be thought of as a terrorist. And I feel like we are just lost in that sense. (A, 1)

> I don't see how exaggeration—terrorism—that's not Islam, and he is doing a lot of things that are—that are showing the bad side, and I know media is a huge part of that, like saying—as showing what exaggerated parts of what Osama Bin Laden does. In Islam you cannot kill innocent people; you cannot kill children, old people, men without arms, so in other words you don't kill unless somebody has attacked you first, and the idea of killing someone for Islam is not how Islam goes, so I don't—I feel like he's giving a bad image about Islam. (A, 1)

One can sense a profound helplessness to counteract the media machine and the frustration at being represented by Osama Bin Laden. It was concerning to me to see evidence of this extreme embarrassment caused by misrepresentation. Chapter 5 discusses the media in more depth.

Manipulation of trust. This participant describes her experience with the media:

> What I feel—I've been noticing that over and over—is that somehow there's a war in Iraq, the media shows it, exaggerates it for a week, and then completely puts it aside . . . . And then, a month later the war is back. It seems as if the war is not—like for me now, if I don't go on the news and read, I'd feel like the war ended. There's no war anymore. . . . So, I felt like the media has a huge impact on that, because they kind of tell you—even though the war is going on, they defer our thinking, and defer our attention to something completely different, and we forget that there are wars in Iraq, and Afghanistan, and Palestine, and Africa, it's like wars all around the world, but they choose which war to look at, at what time. (A, 1)

Theme four: Human security from the perspective of the Arab group. While the findings about human security had instances that were heightened and emotional, on the whole this topic was narrated with a sort of detachment as compared with the non-Arab and Arab American narratives about this theme. This section begins with some insights about human security and identity and then explores human security aspects of having a U.S. military base in Qatar, the experience of 9/11, and the Iraq War.

Human security and identity. Narratives about human security within the Arab group revolved predominantly around a fear of loss of identity resulting from globalization and westernization. One participant characterizes it in this way "you're scared, and you feel like all this is going to fall down, that you're losing your identity, and your language, and your pride" (A,1). This woman's narrative depicted what is being lost and she talked about this as the primary threat to security from her perspective. One can see some of this struggle within the

data with incumbent implications for a sense of security on a very personal level. Feeling

secure within the rapidly evolving Qatari context is challenging for some.

Participants otherwise exhibited a sense of safety due perhaps to the relatively stable

government and the high degree of harmony between the people and the Emir. This was not a

line of conversation that I pursued systematically, however, the sense I got was almost of a

stance taken by people, which depicted harmony, pride, and alignment between the people and

their government. There is a distinct apolitical positioning of the Qatari government that

translates to the people and creates a sense of being in a protective bubble. Qatar feels

geographically removed from conflict in the region. While relatively close in proximity to Iraq

and Iran, this is not apparent day-to-day. Qatar is physically removed from the Israel-Palestine

conflict zone. One exception to this safety context was a dramatic sense of reduced security

while traveling since 9/11, discussed in the prior section on racism, discrimination, and

Othering.

In talking with one Arab woman about human security, she spoke about how she does

not feel threats to her human security because of her faith:

> You know, it makes you know, security much more obtainable, you can afford to, you can have it once you believe in it. You believe that everything is like in God's hand and you don't need to worry much so you feel more secure in everyday life, everyday, and daily. . . . We don't worry much about everything. (A, 3)

Another woman, who is a doctor in a psychiatric hospital, spoke of the psychological

effects of the current wars and how the people she treats trigger her own emotions:

> You know I see people who are suffering from the Iraq War, from Palestine war, from Afghanistan, from different areas in this war. So, the point was I should be the psychiatrist who is helping them, okay but at the same time I'm getting some of those ideas. They feel that they are unable to help those people, the same thing for me. Okay, just maybe I'm trying to help those people coming to us, but there are people in Iraq, we are not helping them. (A, 6)

Note the prior woman's perspective on security differs to an extent from others in

her group as she articulates security from the psychological perspective she has come to

understand through her deep work with a cross-section of people.

Implications of the U.S. military base in Qatar. On balance, the U.S. base in Qatar is

viewed as a provocation by the Arab women in the study. There is a wariness and perspective it

could make Qatar a military target within the region. Several women had concerns about the

presence of the U.S. military base in Qatar:

> You know for me, you know, the U.S. base is meant for wars. It's not meant for a
> solution. And wars is not the good results, it's not the good answer for any problem. . . .
> Maybe I would prefer to have like another, it's not a base, military base, but I mean
> some kind of educational base or something, or a cultural base; something that I really
> need in our culture, but I don't need a base, I don't need a base for war. I have lots of
> things else that we can share, not wars. (A, 3)

I then asked her about the base being a possible deterrent to things happening from Iran,

or rather, if there was a sense the presence might actually be provocative.

> Yeah, I thought maybe because it's a strategy to other plans. I don't know what kind of
> strategies there are, but maybe it is a way of being near to other threat, threats like Iran
> and north there is the problem with the U.S. maybe, this is a kind of way that they tell in
> Iran we are here, we are next to you and we are going to have a war with you if you like,
> um, here for. So maybe this is a way but I don't want my country to be a part of this
> war. (A, 3)

Another woman felt the base means "Qatar is threatened maybe at any time because of

that" (A, 2). She continued:

> Actually, I don't—I don't care if the base is here or not. It doesn't matter, since we're
> all living in peace, and nothing really happens. It's only when like we're related to
> Iran, because Iranis will be like, "Hey." [Snaps fingers.] "It's a target, Americans are
> there . . . we felt insecure, because these rumors about Iranis having Qatar as a target,
> that scared us. (A, 2)

> Well, here I feel secure. In Qatar, really I feel secure, but sometimes when we are
> traveling we don't know if there is—someone will kidnap the airplane; someone—if
> any airplane—to help any outsider. But here I feel secure. Nothing change for me in
> Qatar, but outside, you never know what will happen at any time. (A, 4)

The women were aware of the U.S. base, had opinions about it, and some had had interactions with U.S. military personnel.

The experience of 9/11. The Arab group was more removed from 9/11 than the other groups, which makes some sense in they were physically distant from the scene of the attacks. The direct impact of 9/11 on the women in the Arab group was the insecurity and discomfort felt while traveling and insecurity around being represented by Osama Bin Laden:

> So, for like 9/11, we weren't really affected. It was just like the part where we wanted to travel; it became scary. So, we're like—we can't go to America, because it's going to be dangerous there, like people would hate us, even if it's not our fault, alas, we're considered terrorists, anyways, since nobody knows what happened, and like it's pointed all towards Bin Laden, and people would connect what we think that like Americans would connect Bin Laden to all the Arab world, but it's not necessarily the case. . . . It's like we're forced to be underneath his name, somehow, underneath like terrorism, even if we're not like that. (A, 2)

One woman talked about her dismay at the negative assumptions being made about Islam post-9/11, Islam as the cause of this terrorism, and presumptions that Arabs have a tendency to kill others. Reading the following passage, we sense her deep helplessness about the inability to affect a different, more positive view of Arabs:

> What kind of things we can do? We can't do anything. How can we change other's opinion? We cannot reach America, we can't go there. How can we change it? We're not the media, they have lots of ways and whatever we have in our media is the front of the media and the U.S. So, how can we reach U.S. if I'm here and don't have, what can I change others' opinion? There's no other ways. So it felt as we are tied up, we can't do anything. Just we hope that they would move to meet some Arabs and they will change their mind. (A, 3)

Another woman described her experience of 9/11 and suggests that it is not clear who the real perpetrators were:

> It [9/11] was really bad, and we were shocked, because you know, some Muslim involved in this very horrible action, as we only heard that Osama Bin Laden or Al-Qaeda or whatsoever that belonged to Muslim. And this is against Islam, because Islam is religion of peace, and our prophet, Mohammed, is the fairest, I think, or one of

the fairest who asked for peace. So, this is against our religions. So, we were shocked, really, about this. And I don't know if they really did it, or not. We are not sure till now; we are not sure. I didn't know what—100% sure who did it. (A, 4)

On the Iraq War. The Arab group questioned the motives of the U.S. in Iraq. Oil and colonization were the two motives offered, attributed to the U.S. The women had these thoughts and feelings associated with the Iraq War:

> And, this is what I believe that the war is nothing but suffering, so the soldiers are going to leave their family, the family they have consequences, they will have lots of problems, financial problems maybe, maybe they are suffering emotionally . . . the children they will rise without one parent is not there. At the same time there are, there are . . . fighting against someone we don't know. They are fighting against Iraqi people but what kind of things that, what are the rules, what are the burden of killing someone. I don't know the full background about that person, maybe I misunderstand him. There are different languages so they are not going to understand each other very well. The Iraqi people, the simplest area they don't know English as well, so how they communicate with each other? Are they communicate, do they understand what is done there? They don't. (A, 3)

This passage is insightful in that it highlights a very basic lack of knowledge and understanding of each other, while intimately engaged in conflict.

> In discussion about Iraq, one woman talked about American colonization:

> Why America in Iraq? This I could question: Why? Are they caring about our people? Are they caring about Iraq itself, the Iraqi people? Or are they caring about the oil there? What do you think? (A, 4)

> She (originally from Sudan) continues:

> Why they are caring about Sudan, about that war? Are they caring about Sudan as people? Where do the America when start our war; we had lots of war in Sudan. Where were the American people? Because they discovered that Sudan is rich of oil, also, so this colonization, they are not caring about the Iraqi people. They are not caring about the peace in Iraq. . . . They are just killing Iraqi people there… I know nothing about politics, by the way. I mean, I don't talk in a political way, but this is my very simple opinion, because it's not logical for me to believe that the American government come to Iraq to protect them from Saddam. Saddam was there for years and years and years. . . . It's not logic, you know? (A, 4)

> In this analysis, we see not only the woman's views on the war, but also an interesting

retraction for espousing a political voice. She covers the areas of intent for war, colonization, and governmental critique—all political topics.

The following woman highlights what she sees as inequalities of focus on Arab terrorists to the exclusion of terrorists from other places:

> There are terrorists from all around the world, terrorists from Russia, terrorists from India, terrorists from Italy, terrorists from all around the world, but I feel like everyone is just afraid from terrorists from Afghanistan, and from Iraq, and things like that. And when a person creates war there are terrorists, no matter what, but I don't know. I feel like it's not considered terrorism, because they're fighting terror with terror, like for— it's confusing, but it's the idea of fighting crime with crime. They're terrorists, too. (A,1)

The prior passages give a sense of the collective voice of the Arab group on the Iraq War. Layers of mixed emotions are exhibited about suffering and lives lost, the vastness of the cultural misunderstandings, concerns about colonialism, and the U.S. quest for oil. See Table 4.2 for a summary of the main findings of the Arab group.

Table 4.2

Summary of Main Findings for Arab Group

Theme	Findings
Identity	Globalization and Westernization are important identity factors that present both opportunities and threats to this group.
	A core aspect of identity for the Arab group members revolves around a strong desire to educate people about what Islam is and is not, striving for a better representation of Islam.
Racism, Discrimination, and Othering	Multifaceted experience around race, racism, discrimination, and Othering (evidence of internalized oppression, Arab-Arab, Arab-non-Arab forms).
Media	Arab group feels badly misrepresented by the global media. Also group feels manipulated by the media.

Human Security	The fear of loosing identity due to westernization/globalization was a major determinant of human security for this group.
	There were some security concerns resulting from the presence of the U.S. military base in Qatar.
	The events of 9/11 make this group feel misrepresented by Osama bin Laden. Also, a sense exists that Islam is misrepresented as being in support of such actions.
	Overall sense of helplessness to be able to affect a more positive view of Arabs.

The Arab American Group

The Arab American group included both Muslim and Christian women from Palestine (two women), Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Their ages ranged from 25 to 61 years. I met with these women in four separate settings. I would have rather met as a single group if not for complex schedules and different locations coupled with time constraints. Regardless, we made it work, as I will describe. Two of the women and I met in a university setting in a comfortable boardroom, where I had snacks available. Two others and I met in a private rented room in a nearby city, complete with clanking radiators and long drapes, and where we shared a meal from the restaurant menu to start. I met individually with the remaining two. With all, we did a mix of freewriting and focus group work and they all had higher degree of comfort with talking than writing. This group had a tremendous amount to say and were decidedly passionate about issues of Arab/American relations. However, this group did require a lot of careful pre-work. I answered questions, explained the study and its emergent nature, and built trust in advance of them committing to be in the study. Once this testing phase (which continued into the freewriting/focus group sessions) was over, the interviews resulted in an outpouring of

thoughtful information and feelings. This group was the most interested in reviewing their

transcripts in detail and nearly all gave me changes they wanted to see, which I made carefully.

The interviews were done one-on-one—one in a room in a university library, one in a private

home of a participant, and four in private rooms at a university. The stamina of the Arab

American community and the difficult realities many are facing cannot be underestimated as

will be shown with the data in this section.

Arab American Group Findings

the experience of 9/11

Human Security

post 9/11 human security

on the Iraq War

history and the relative nature of security

Identity

adaptation, belonging and representation

Media

identity and representation

manipulation of trust

Racism, Discrimination, and Othering

political and everyday racism in the US

multidirectional racism, discrimination and the fluidity of Othering

Figure 4.5. Schematic of Arab American group findings.

Again, I will briefly outline some ways this set of data compares with the prior non-Arab

and Arab data sets. As I approached this final data set for analysis, I had the benefit of having

the first two sets in mind. The Arab American group shared a complexity with the non-Arab

group around representation resulting from 9/11 and the aftermath. These two groups also

shared immigration-assimilation issues. They shared concerns with both groups that the media

misrepresents Arabs and about the Iraq War. The women in the Arab American group were

much more directly affected by racism, discrimination, and Othering in the post-9/11 U.S., and,

as such, their human security concerns are magnified. The differing histories of the Arab

groups and related different outlooks on human security was an area of difference with the non-Arab group.

Theme one: Identity from the perspective of the Arab American group. These women have roots and alliances in both the Arab world and in the U.S. These multiple and fluid alliances are influenced by the nature of U.S. foreign policy involvements in the Arab world. Living in the U.S. in the post-9/11 climate has had profound impacts on them and, in some cases, also on their families. The shifting identity of the U.S. itself plays a part. The findings mostly involve their reflections on adaptation, belonging, and representation.

Adaptation, belonging, and representation. Some of the women in this group came to the U.S. under conditions of duress. Some are not free to return to their home countries or cannot do so securely. Each woman's individual history has direct bearing on her sense of identity and belonging and also on how she interprets human security.

One woman expressed in one word how she feels about living in America: "grateful" (AA, 3). She expands:

> It's only because if I do have a citizenship—an American citizenship—I guess my country will respect me more. I just feel like I'm a second-hand citizen back in my country, but if you're American, you're just like—you're having a lot more than what you're getting if you're only Saudi. (AA, 3)

> Maybe the best thing that happened to me is getting my American citizenship. It's a different feeling, you feel you're safe. If I go to Egypt I can come back to the U.S. anytime I want. It's a dream that came true, actually. When I went to Egypt, I felt that my American passport granted me respect from others. I'm not going to be treated like a [XX] in Egypt, but like an American. (AA, 5)

The Arab American woman in the following passages describes a complex path of identity that has been influenced by outside entities. She is Palestinian, was born in Jerusalem, and lived there for half of her life. She has held an Israeli identification card (that says she is

Jordanian). Meanwhile, she considers herself (in part) a Palestinian. Understanding this

woman requires some thoughtfulness as she describes aspects of her identity:

> How do I identify myself? At this time in my life, you know, things change, because I did not—I mean, in my particular situation, I did not have an—I've had an Israeli ID card when I was in the territories, but it says that I am Jordanian, and it's—and I'm not Jordanian, you know what I'm saying? So, for me, that was my first thought that—that's not me, but that's the ID card, so—but I identify myself as a Palestinian. (AA, 4)

> She lived for a time in France and was issued the French equivalent of a green card and

on it her nationality was listed as "undetermined." The French administration changed

leadership and her nationality became "to be determined." Her account continued as she

described her move to the U.S. In the U.S., her documents indicated she was born in

Jerusalem, however it was assumed, at certain times, she was Jewish. At some point, she was

not allowed to renew her Jordanian passport because she had a U.S. green card. Eventually,

she got some degree of resolution with the granting of a U.S. passport:

> I was happy to have the American passport, to tell you the truth, . . . I can go everywhere, and no problem . . . I'm very proud of my Palestinian-Arab heritage, and I'm also very happy with the culture, and everything I have accumulated in this country [U.S.], so I really feel—at this time in my life, I don't feel a pure anything . . . definitely I know where my roots are where I grew up, and I'm Palestinian. I also identify myself as American, because I lived here half my life now, exactly . . . then I also lived five years of my life in France, and it's my undergraduate and graduate education, yet the number of years are small, but the impact of the culture is huge on me. So, I do consider myself a little bit of all three, if you want. And I'm comfortable identifying myself as all three. (AA,4)

While there is a degree of resolution and some satisfaction in the issuance of an

American passport, one senses from this narrative the critical importance of history and the

seriousness and complexity of her thoughts and feelings concerning her identity. The paper

documentation web and her surrounding story signifies a complex negotiation of multiple and

fluid identity in the face of external influences. In speaking with her, I sensed her frustration

and powerlessness at the circumstances surrounding her citizenship path, but also the strong

sense of identity she gathers predominantly from Palestine, America, as well as from her time spent in France.

As with some members of the non-Arab group, Arab Americans find themselves part of an adaptation trajectory that influences how they engage with mainstream U.S. culture. In this passage, there is a dynamic whereby this Arab American woman senses that they are not assimilating the way non-Arabs "would like them to":

> Arabs and Iraqis are very resilient people. . . . They're probably the most difficult people—or the people that assimilate the least, you know? Especially Iraqis. I mean, just seeing my family, and just seeing how long they've been here, and just how they stick to tradition, you know? You can take Iraqis out of Iraq, but you can't take Iraq out of Iraqis, and that's how—and I think—I feel like that's what Americans have a real problem with Arabs is that they don't assimilate as well as Asians, or Hispanics, or other minority groups do. (AA, 2)

She draws comparisons with other ethnic groups and it is interesting that she does not allude to whether this is good or bad, but just that non-Arab Americans have a problem with the mode of Arab assimilation. She continues:

> I mean, it just goes into that whole like white privilege thing, you know, the fact that all other countries and cultures know America; they know the American language; they know American movies; they know America media, but how much do Americans really know about other cultures, you know? And I think that this idea is very prevalent in Iraq, but if you ask anyone where would you go live in the world, they would say, "America." (AA, 2)

We now detect the friction (pressure to assimilate on one hand, amidst desire to hold to their culture of origin) and a critique of mainstream America's staying within the comfort zone. On one hand, there is an expression of positive aspects of retaining Arab culture. On another hand, there is an acknowledgement that, perhaps, if Americans were more open, understanding, and curious about their Arab culture (countering America-centrism), it would be more desirable to assimilate more fully. The final irony is that, despite the friction and the difficulties, people continue to choose America. This speaks of the prevailing influence of

globalization and perhaps to positive draw of some of America's core and shared values.

Some women in the group gravitated more to their religion as the mainstay of their identity rather than their country of origin. This woman explains how pleased she would be if her child takes the path of being Muslim—especially while living in the U.S. where there are so many choices available. Her feeling is the availability of many options makes the ultimate choice more meaningful:

> You know, for me again it's not um, I don't care about you know, being Egyptian or . . . I love my country and everything, I really love it but for me the most important thing is you know, being a good Muslim. So, I would be, I would feel really bad if [her child] just decided one day to just you know, leave everything behind. . . . I mean I would love that in my, my children if they choose to be, they choose to take this path of being a Muslim and this is how they view their life, it's, because that's how I see it, as a lifestyle. (AA, 1)

The following woman spoke about the need for the Arab American identity to coalesce to a greater degree in America. She expressed a desire for Arab Americans to be more engaged, more active, and better represented. In this passage, she voices a hope for agency among Arab Americans:

> Arab-Americans need to be a lot more involved and active in every aspect of American life: politics, schools, and social organizations so they can impact some things for change, for equity, for equitability, for justice. So, if Arab-Americans let's say get involved with textbooks, then they can monitor that there's some truth to what's in there or to ensure that there is some mention in there. Also in the selection of books, novels and literature so that American kids can grow up reading not just about Anne Frank and the humanization of the Jews, but also the humanizing of the Arabs. We have our own stories and our own tragedies and our own culture which is worthy of sharing. Arab Americans need to get involved with city councils, local and state government, with cinema and newspapers, and every aspect of society. (AA, 6)

The prior passage speaks to a higher level of assimilation into the whole of American culture and speaks of the value of seamlessly participating in and contributing to the civil society of the U.S.

Theme two: Racism, discrimination, and Othering from the perspective of the Arab American group. The subthemes that emerged from this group were political and everyday racism in the U.S. and racism, discrimination, and Othering as fluid and multidirectional phenomena.

Political and everyday racism in the U.S. The initial construction of political racism by Samhan (1987) depicted the roots of anti-Arab attitudes and behavior as being in politics. This was more recently extended by Naber (2002) and both are useful to contemplating the findings of this study. Naber described political racism in the Arab context as "racially inferior due not only to their phenotype but due to the political meanings associated with that group in relation to U.S. foreign and domestic policies" (p. 4). Of equally great concern are smaller-scale, but insidious acts occurring day-to-day, person-to-person—acts of what could be also called everyday racism[45] (Essed, 1991). This passage from the data shows political racism of an everyday nature:

> I remember once with my little son [going] to Dollar Tree, the store. And then he was playing with this, and I didn't really notice what he was playing with, but I heard the woman telling him, "Do you want to be a terrorist when you grow up? Is that why you're playing with this toy?" And so it was kind of a sword or something. . . . So, I thought that was like really mean, and I didn't really want to say anything to her, and I just got here, so yeah. And I'm sure she didn't say this until she knew that I was his mom. I don't know, but like if he was a Mexican or something, she wouldn't say something like this to him. But I thought she said this because she saw me with him. (AA,3)

Another example of everyday political racism:

> It irritates me sometimes just being in class, and just hearing the absolute ridiculous things that Americans say about Arabs, about Islam. It frustrates me, but I'm just like whatever, you know? That's their own ignorance, they don't know. Just saying things like, "Oh, you know, all Arabs or Muslims are terrorists, or Islam just preaches violence to people." (AA, 2)

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[45] The concept of everyday racism qualifies how ordinary situations become racist situations (Essed, 2002).

This woman alludes to a distinction between ignorance and "something else," a more intentional and deliberate sort of racism:

> But when I have a brief encounter with people on the street, I am the "Other." I wish I can spend time with them to explain. I do believe that not all people have an agenda. In most cases it's purely, ignorance, and not something else. (AA, 5)

Another participant uses the Klu Klux Klan as an analogy:

> It's like when September 11th happens, like oh, all Arabs and Muslims are terrorists, and I'm like, "Well what about the KKK?" Like everything they do is in the name of Christianity, you know? People in the whole world don't say, "Oh, all Americans or all Christians are racists, or terrorists." (AA, 2)

The data illuminate examples where Arab women (especially those who wear the hejab) are approached in the U.S. by non-Arabs for all manner of engagement—such as curiosity, political discussion, Othering, and threats. Due to the relatively small number of Arab women as compared to the population at large, these contacts may be quite frequent and, hence, invasive. This woman voiced her feelings about being the Other and we can sense the tedium of being singled out:

> Being the Other is the thing that I'm not comfortable with, but again, it's only because of the hejab. I know if [husband's name] was by himself, the guy would not have approached us. I don't want to say that this makes me upset all the time. No. I know that people sometimes approach me, because they're curious, and perhaps interested in knowing more about me. When I am teaching, I know that students will finish the class with a perspective different from the one they had before, and that's what happens. (AA, 5)

Another Arab American woman spoke about her experience with racism and discrimination she has encountered in the U.S. A main point in the narrative she relayed was, in addition to everything else, she has, at times, felt physically vulnerable due to not being able to find housing for herself and her children (an ultimately serious human security issue). She was evicted from her home (due to racism, she feels). Once you are evicted it is much more difficult to obtain other accommodation. Here, she recounts part of her conversation with a lawyer:

Like the lawyer here also asked me; she said, "Well, if that judge ask you where are you going to live after a week? What will—your answer would be?" And I said, "Well, of course my car." I mean I do have friends, but like I lived in a society [Saudi Arabia] where it's like really, really bad if you go and live with your friends. That means that you're not taking control of your life, and I'm here like a single mom with like two kids. (AA, 3)

The findings also showed impacts of racism, discrimination, and Othering on children. For me, a mother myself of young children, this was some of the hardest material to hear and to contemplate. Adults can use historical knowledge and perspective in dealing with racism, discrimination, and Othering. While they may have defense mechanisms and some understanding of how these issues have evolved, both close to home and globally, children do not have this perspective. While they are in the process of forming their ideas from an early age they do not have the tools to fully grapple with these sensitive issues. The absorption and internalization by children of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent global war on terror and related aftermath is a serious concern. One Arab American participant talked about her concern for her mother (who covers) during the immediate time after 9/11 (AA, 2). Another spoke of the concern her children had for her, "Mom are they going to do something to you?" (AA, 4) In reflecting on this she says:

What a thing for a kid to feel, because if a kid feels that the parents provide security, and here she is in a situation, where she feels that her parents lives could be threatened, or something could happen to them, or I mean, she doesn't really know what it is, but she knows that they're portrayed as bad, you know? (AA, 4)

The prior passage illustrates the link between the themes of discrimination and security. A child's early learning that her parents (and her ethnic group at large) are being discriminated against with the potential psychological security implications is profound. I found the degree to which racism, discrimination, and Othering affects the quality of life of these Arab American

women and their families quite disturbing. Their narratives pull on the social conscience and

disrupt tendencies to position oneself as a bystander. I will say more about this in chapter 6.

     Multidirectional racism, discrimination, and the fluidity of Othering. Findings in this

sub-theme illustrate perceptions and stereotypes are fluid and can change, before and after,

moving to the U.S. (e.g., with the gathering of first hand experiences of people and culture).

     One woman's perception of what the prevailing narratives that Americans have about

Arabs:

> I mean, just going off the stereotypes that already exist that [Arab] men are aggressive,
> dominating, have beards, control the women, control all aspects, and women are
> stupid, subservient, uneducated, just listen to what they're told. I mean, that's—I think
> that's the narrative of Arabs that exists in most Americans' minds, you know? I'm
> thinking about Americans in Middle America in the square states who have probably
> never seen an Arab before, other than what they see in the media. (AA, 2)

> The same woman perceives Iraqi narratives about Americans this way:

> Well, I mean, like Iraqis think all Americans are—they think they're educated; they
> think Americans are open-minded, and that Americans sort of have this ideal lifestyle,
> but at the same time, they see Americans as selfish, and maybe not really willing to
> learn about Iraqis. (AA, 2)

     I asked about the women's pre and post conceptions of the U.S., before and after coming

to the U.S. One woman described the role the media played and expressed her personal

discovery of the differences between the U.S. government and the American people:

> I would say that it was a picture taken from the media, you know, the American policies,
> the American foreign policies and I didn't know much about the internal policies but the
> foreign policies that I don't know I would say it's more negative I can say, the foreign
> policies is that it, it's a country that wants to control. (AA, 1)

     Upon coming to the U.S., she described how much a difference it made to get to know

the people and to experience what she sees as a big distinction between the government and the

people.

Maybe we're still hoping for more actions; but at least you know, the saying that, the saying that Guantanamo Bay will be closed, that the Iraq War will be, will end, and the respect to most of the Arab countries. . . . But also, you know, before coming the people were telling me oh, you know you're going there and that's how you're wearing and everybody will be . . . you can have people yelling at you [because of the way she dressed/covered]. . . . Because that's what, also the media shows. They don't show people acting nicely to Muslims. . . .

Sometimes they [people] are actually, I feel that they are extra nice to me than to others, because they know that . . . that's my feeling, I don't know but that's how I feel sometimes that the people would be extra nice to me than normally just because they want to show that they're you know, we respect you and we. (AA, 1)

When I asked if and how her positive experience in the U.S. has influenced her family back home, she responded, "It's kind of, it's an interesting thing for them to know and they're like okay . . . you know, they're excited about it I could say. So at least they're less worried about me" (AA, 1).

Theme three: Media from the perspective of the Arab American group. The overt political agenda of some news sources, the phenomenon of embedded reporting, and a willingness by some media sources to use provoking terminology all culminate to create a new sense of media sensationalism. As one participant sees it:

All I notice in the media is they don't report anymore, it's all editorializing. And, it's all loaded words. You know, when they talk about Israel it's always alleged; when they talk about Arabs it's they're the terrorists. Freedom fighters become terrorists. So, it's just the words that they use that are so loaded and then this opinion, this editorializing. (AA, 6)

One Arab American woman commented on her experience of the Egyptian media tending to see the "evil stuff as the interesting stuff" and the notion that "maybe that's what the people want to watch" (AA, 1).

Identity and representation. The entertainment media agenda and its encompassing impact on Arab/American relations were raised by several women. As one women states:

I just feel like the media, and movies, like isn't contributing to Arabs, and Americans getting closer, and for Americans to sort of get a better picture of who Arabs are, and what they're about, and what their values are. (AA, 2)

This woman reflects on the role of the movies and Hollywood:

I think there's a gap, and I feel like the gap is getting bigger and bigger, and after 9/11— and I'm thinking about the media right now—after 9/11, as far as like movies go, there were never really Arabs in movies or entertainment, and now it's like every movie has an Arab—some sort of Arab in it, whether it's—and usually they're caricatures of some sort, but it's like every movie—and I know it's just Hollywood, and it's media and is not real, but all the stuff gets instilled in the average American's mind. It's like every movie has a terrorist Arab; they're always terrorists; they're always shown looking dirty with a long beard, you know, wearing really dirty old clothing, and it's like that's the—pretty much the general perception that people have of Arabs, you know? (AA, 2)

Another woman spoke about the work of Jack Shaheen, an Arab American, who did a

documentary called *Reel Bad Arabs*:

And boy, it is so right on. So, I mean I'm not saying that some of it isn't deserved, I mean 9/11 it's obvious who perpetrated it . . . I mean, other people commit crimes. But it seems like any crimes and misdemeanors committed by Middle Easterners are always picked up on and highlighted. That is very hurtful. Some people out there want us to look bad. (AA, 6)

In the prior passage, we sense her frustration about what she sees as a selective fixation on

crimes perpetrated by Middle Easterners.

This woman emphasizes the haste with which the media seems to incriminate Muslims:

The media plays a very important role and yes, it's at the center of this gap. It's really unfortunate that the media is not fair and balanced when it covers news about the Middle East. If a Middle Eastern is behind an attack, the media rushes to present information which in most cases is incorrect about the people involved. The portrayal is always biased and supports its political agenda. It puts all Muslims and Arabs under one category. The media should not only focus on the negative and should not be hasty in its coverage of sensitive information and issues that involves Muslims and Arabs. (AA, 5)

This passage speaks compellingly of the internalization of negative stereotypes—how

views are created of a group and the perpetuating impact this may have on the groups self-

concept:

The more push there is to make Islam or Arabism look bad, the more you're going to have young people trying to do bad things. You're going to think I'm bad? Okay, I'm going to be bad. But actually, you're the bad people because you don't know me and you are not trying to know me, so I'm going to do some bad things. And, it worries me because I see some young people, even educated young people becoming really extremist. You know, it's a reaction to how people view them. I'm no psychiatrist but I think you would find that that happens often where you see somebody as bad, they're going to act bad. (AA, 6)

Manipulation of trust. These participants articulate their loss of trust in U.S. Media:

The United States is just like—I feel in the last 10 years also that journalists do not have ownership of their profession. Unfortunately, I don't know why. I hope that they are not—they haven't been forced into showing one thing versus another. (AA, 4)

This woman reflects on how one-sided and untrustworthy news influences the

misunderstandings and she is concerned that people tend to lump all Arabs and Muslims as the

same:

The gap is definitely there; there is a big gap. There is no doubt about it. Is it shrinking? Well, it depends. If we are talking about people who listen to fair and balanced news, who have exposure to the Arab world and Arab culture, exposed to people from the Arab world, we can say the gap is shrinking. But people who hear only one-sided news and who have not been exposed to real people from the Arab world are definitely not getting the whole picture. This, of course, increases the gap. (AA, 5)

She talks about the questions she gets that indicate that people are not really informed

about Arab culture or Islam:

Students also think that all Arabs are Muslims and all Muslims are Arabs. When something happens in the Middle East, people here expect you to know the reasons behind this or expect you to know the answers. They think all Arabs or Muslims are the same and have the same culture. There is no one culture in the Arab world. You can say that Arabs are united by one language, which is Arabic, but culture? It's different from one Arab country into another. So, the gap shrinks with more exposure and awareness about the issues and about what's going on in the Arab world. (AA, 5)

Another woman spoke about how textbooks in public schools do not cover the Middle

East in a comprehensive or balanced way. The implications of the politics of textbook creation

are ultimately about our trust in information and are significant to the relations between Arabs

and non-Arabs. In a sense, our early experiences with text books help create our mental

templates for later media conditioning. The following woman describes it in this way:

> I don't know who compiles the text books. All I know is that textbooks fair and
> equitable to the Middle East are just not available. Nobody has said okay we're going to
> write a new textbook for let's say, high school level, and we'd like to really include
> more or more detail about the Middle East, less slanted aspect on it, or, give credit to
> inventors, scientists, astronomers, poets and writers from that part of the world. Even
> though some teachers may be willing to teach about the Middle East in a more
> comprehensive way, they just can't find it in their texts. (AA, 6)

Theme four: Human security from the perspective of the Arab American group.

The subthemes raised by the Arab American group in the area of human security included the

experience of 9/11, post-9/11 human security, the Iraq War, and history and its impact on the

relative nature of security.

Direct experiences of 9/11. The events of 9/11 had a profound impact on the sense of

security of the Arab American women in this study. This will be explored in the following

passages.

> We were scared [after 9/11]. Like we didn't leave our home that often. . . . I remember
> one day we went to buy something from the store, and then when we went—when
> we—back to our house, it was broken; the door was broken, everything—like almost
> everything in the house was damaged. . . . So, we were like really, really scared, and
> we thought we'll just go back [to Saudi Arabia] for like some times, until things get
> settled. (AA, 3)

The prior incident happened and, within two weeks, this family had moved back to

Saudi Arabia. The woman said they "didn't want to get involved with the police or anything"

(AA, 3) and so they did not seek assistance regarding the break-in.

> Another woman expressed concern for her mother who covers:

> I remember I was junior in high school [during the time of 9/11]. I didn't—I mean,
> just—the only one who really experienced anything was my mom. I mean, just like
> driving with her, and people like—you know, flipping her the middle finger, and just I
> remember going . . . just going to the park and these dumb teenage boys like throwing
> rocks at her, and stuff like that, and just yelling out, "Go back to your country," and

stuff. That—I wasn't worried about myself. I was worried about my mom, more."
(AA, 2)

This woman talks about 9/11 and how it affected her sense of personal security:

Well, I was at school, teaching, and of course it was horrendous. Everyone turned on their televisions and just sat watching. My first reaction was dear God, I sure hope it wasn't the Palestinians because that's what everybody was saying, that the Palestinians did it. I'm thinking no we're too busy defending ourselves from occupation to go and harm somebody else and anyway we're not angry at America. . . . I do remember that the Superintendent came to see me to make sure I was okay, which I thought was very, very considerate. He just wanted to ascertain that I wasn't experiencing any backlash from staff or students. That was very considerate. (AA, 6)

Regarding her sense of personal security that day she said:

You know, just I never thought of it in terms of me. I thought of it in terms of Palestinians in general but never in terms of me. So, I really can't tell you that I felt threatened, at risk, or anything personally. (AA, 6)

On further recollection she said, "I have to admit there were some students that I did feel could cause harm. Yeah, I think I did get a few phone calls, anonymous of course" (AA, 6).

In the following passage, this woman articulates the complexities of navigating 9/11 and its aftermath with her children. We sense her struggle to protect her children and her difficulty in doing this. She spoke about her concern for her oldest because of her darker skin, "I was concerned about her, and because she can look Mexican, Spanish, Italian, Arabic, anything. And usually in situations like that people just see your color, and boom" (AA, 6). She went on to describe how her daughter was concerned for her mom's safety and her difficulty navigating her daughters concerns, "mom are they going to do something to you?" She said, "my daughter she just—she wanted me to sleep in her bed that night. So, as a parent I couldn't protect her, but she wanted to protect me" (AA, 6). She continues:

And you know, what a thing for a kid to feel, because if a kid feels that the parents provide security, and here she is in a situation, where she feels that her parents lives could be threatened, or something could happen to them, or I mean, she doesn't really know what it is, but she knows that they're portrayed as bad, you know? (AA, 4)

This prior poignant narrative shows the wrenching nature of a child's concern for the security of their parent and a seven-year-old's coming of age to some very difficult realities. Ironically this child's mother (the participant in this study) lived though the Six-Day War in Jerusalem at this same age. Eleven of the 18 women in the study had children. This could be another strong basis for dialogue on issues of Arab/American relations. See Bayoumi (2008), Cainkar (2009), and Maira (2009) for more on the topic of Arab children and youth, in post-9/11 America.

Post-9/11 human security and the role of events. For Arab Americans, the aftermath of 9/11 in terms of perceptions about the ongoing string of negative events involving or allegedly involving Arab perpetrators has been very difficult and results in a ongoing jepordization of a sense of human security. In doing the situational analysis, it was Clarke's (2005a) attention to temporal elements that urged me to contemplate the phenomenon of events as important. Events have a temporal nature (they come and they go), as does the intensity and emotion surrounding them. Some events remain in the collective memory more strongly than others and have a cumulative nature. This became important to tune into as I listened to the women and how events have impacted their lives, thoughts, and sense of security.

Arab American participants, in particular, revealed the toll that the continuous cycle of events take as they describe a phenomenon of constant retriggering, reaggravation, and cumulative effects on psyche:

> I feel like I'm just scared that anything would happen, any moment would something happen and they would suspect a Muslim, or a Muslim would have actually done it and they would, you know, everybody would accuse all the Muslims altogether again. It's like, that feeling of, you know, just waiting for what will happen, you could say. Like, you're on the top of the volcano. But then, when a long time passes without anything happening, you can say that things calm down until something happens and then you're . . . (AA, 1)

Well, things get worse and reach their peak when something happens. When a terrorist attack takes place here or in the Middle East, things get worse for us here. I panic and worry about our safety. It's difficult for Muslim women wearing the hejab because it's a visible symbol. So, I become cautious where I go. (AA, 5)

This woman worries about the cumulative effect of all of these events:

Well, it's always like oh, my gosh here it is again. I mean, it's not bad enough up till now, now we're going to add to our plate one more thing that would affect the negative view, and it's always like something has got to be done, because it always worries me that all these little incidents are going one day to . . . I don't know, to what? To lead to something big and bad. For every action, there is a reaction. And, as long as nothing is done to pacify, to change perceptions, things are going to come to a head. (AA, 6)

The situation for Arab Americans in particular produces what I termed *psychic constraints,* whereby psychological factors leave their mark on identities and ultimately impact relations. An example of this is in the following passage:

I would rather avoid going to the airport. When I go to the airport, I don't—until now— I don't want to carry anything with me. I would take the smallest purse because I don't want people to be uncomfortable. (AA, 5)

The participant implies that carrying a larger pocketbook might be misinterpreted as having the ability to conceal something dangerous. One can begin to get the sense of the self-scrutiny and self-censoring of movement and action which compounds that which is imposed externally. One of the nuggets of hope that fueled my interest in the current work was the possibility of a degree of restitution and forgiveness between Arabs and non-Arabs post-9/11. I believe embedded in these narratives a possibility for this exists (and has been expressed). Chapter 6 looks further at this, turning us collectively toward social conscience.

On the Iraq War. A number of voices about the Iraq War surfaced. One participant in the study is Iraqi and hence lends a close perspective; others question the motivation of the U.S. with this war. One woman shared her feelings as she tried to make sense of people in her community expressing support for the American military members in Iraq. It initially upset her

to see stickers on cars supporting the troops, and so on, until she became more aware of

people in the U.S. who had loved ones serving in the military. She began to see they may not

be pro-war as much as pro-support for troops who may in fact be friends or family members.

> I kind of got that sense of the other you know, perspective or the other part of the picture. It doesn't, didn't make me change my feelings against the war itself but at least I understand from the people's point of view that they felt threatened. They felt that this was the only way and that you know . . . but still I see that this was wrong, that what was done was wrong and it didn't help, and it, from both sides they lost, they lost their beloved ones and they, and it didn't solve the problem at all, just made the people's life more miserable. (AA, 1)

The prior passage shows the development of empathy and awareness on this issue while

maintaining her own self and voice.

This woman questions the objectives on the Iraq War and wonders if one aim is a

desire to bring Iraqi people to the U.S. She describes some difficulties local Iraqi's face in

assimilating, whereby they may be safe, but not necessarily secure (without job or income):

> And for what happened, of course, in Iraq, I mean, I don't know who will say, "Oh, no, it was for a good reason, like what happened in Iraq like the best thing that will happen to Iraqi's people. I mean, I don't really see anything good. I've seen so many people who came here, like now after what happened in Iraq, now we'll open the door to Iraqis to come here to the United States and give them citizenship. I mean, is that the case? Is that what you wanted from the Iraq War? It's just like bringing people from Iraq in here? I don't know if you know her, but there's an Iraqi woman who came with three kids, and she struggled a lot in here. Like they told her that you can come here, and get an asylum …and like you will get like everything that the Americans are getting. It was like really hard for her; like, she doesn't speak any English; she did not find until this point any job for her to work. She is single. Well, she's a widow. Her husband died in the war. Yeah. And she has three kids. She is in town, and she has one blind kid. He is, I guess, six-years-old now, and when I asked her like how she felt, like she said, "Well, before when like someone say, 'Well, I'm going to go to USA,' or like even if I hear, 'USA,' I'll say, 'Oh, my God, like people in USA are really lucky.' But when I came here it was really tough. (AA, 3)

One woman returned to her hometown in Iraq in late 2008, after many years, and talked

with her Iraqi relatives about the war there:

> I mean, Iraqi people aren't stupid; they know exactly the purpose of the war, which is

to get access to the oil, they know that the whole purpose of the war from the beginning. . . . I mean, and people are like, "We're fine. Like we were fine under Saddam." Like they really were; you look at things now, I mean, everyone that I did talk to was like, "We wish Saddam Hussein was here, because at least there was order; there were rules, you know?" And so people are just kind of pissed off that they—that that's just how Bush sold the war, you know? (AA, 2)

She went on to point out the inconsistencies in where the U.S. government decides to

"save the women and children" and where it does not:

But Bush was like, "Oh, we need to help save the women and children in Iraq." Women under Saddam Hussein were of the most liberated women in the Middle East. I mean, women could choose to cover or not. Women could drive or not. Women could vote. They had some of the highest positions, working in the government in science, in medicine, in all fields, so people know what the real purpose of the war was, just to gain access to the oil. And so, the U.S., couldn't do it with Saddam Hussein in the way, so they took care of that real quick. But people—I mean, people don't really have high hopes for America; they do understand the difference between Americans and the American government; they don't have anything against the American people. It's just the government, and what it's done to the people of Iraq, and you know, neighboring countries. (AA, 2)

See Abu-Lughod (2002) for more on the saving of Muslim women. She spoke at length

about the broken infrastructure in Iraq and the reaction of her Iraqi relatives to the problems is

what pained her the most:

But then seeing my family who lives there, like the electricity would go out, and all us Americans are like, "What happened? Is there a bomb or something?" But then everybody just carries on with what they're doing, and they're really used to it. And I think that's sad. I mean, that was really sad to me. That was something that really affected me, just seeing the fact that they were just so immune to everything, you know? (AA, 2)

History and the relative nature of security. The narratives of Arab American women

had an additional layer of complexity in that some their reference points for security have been

shaped by their experiences living in the Arab world; in some cases, fleeing their home

countries. The evolving political context in home countries has an effect on others and this can

have psychological impacts as well. It was, in part, due to Clarke's (2005a) situational analysis

category highlighting the relevance of history, that I more deeply contemplated the importance of historical context to the theme of human security. The history of where women are from and the relations of these countries to the U.S. and the history of how they have assimilated within the U.S. are important contextual factors for the Arab American group.

This woman spoke how her family came to the U.S. in 1991 from Iraq:

I mean, just from what I know it wasn't a choice that we just decided to up and leave; it was something we had to do, because from my understanding my father and my uncle were in Saddam's army, and things didn't pan out the way they had hoped, and so we fled our city, which is [Samallah] in the south, and then went to a city called [Saffan], which is on the Saudi/Iraq border, and so we were thinking we'd only be there for a few months. It was controlled by the U.S. Army, and so a few months turned longer, and they said, okay well, you guys can go to refugee camps in Saudi Arabia, and so we went there, indefinitely. (AA, 2)

After being in the camps for nearly two years, they were granted asylum by the U.S. and moved. With the life context of fleeing to the U.S. as a safe harbor, events like 9/11 and the aftermath present conditions for retraumatization.

Another woman explained her experience and the insecurity of Palestinians living in Israel and traveling back to the region. "They called us Israel's Arabs, we were the Arabs, never Palestinians. And the way they said 'Arabs' was the nastiest, dirtiest word you can imagine" (AA, 6). She then described an experience in the airport upon returning to Jerusalem to visit her family:

At the airport entering we were separated and questioned. [Name of husband] was strip searched for the very first time in his life. As an American, it was a real eye awakener for him! I had to remove the baby's diaper while I was standing there all undressed. I remember being asked to point to my relatives. I said I can't see them from here. . . . I believe that the goal is to make you frustrated and miserable so that you end up saying something you shouldn't say. That way they can have something against you. (AA, 6)

The emotional and psychological effects of history have lasting effects as described by this same woman:

I think I try to suppress certain feelings because I try to keep them under check. But, they're there. I have a hard time really opening up about some feelings. . . . I had a sister, actually, who had a nervous breakdown and she ended up having to see a psychiatrist, and the psychiatrist was a Jewish man, a British Jew. He shared with the family that he was not able to break through the barrier of reserve that she had built up around her. He felt that he understood that it stemmed from him being Jewish and her distrust of what the Jews had done to the Palestinians. He actually ended up leaving Israel and returning to Britain because he could not see what his people were doing to other people. He had a conscience, and he just left. (AA, 6)

The conversation turned further into trust:

I think it all stems from how we felt there [in Jerusalem], you know, when you grow up having people say be careful what you say, you never know who's listening and who's going to report what you say, you become suspicious of everyone, and that's what happened with my sister. She just couldn't trust, she just couldn't. And, you know, until this day even within our own people sometimes we're careful how we say because we don't know if they're going to report it, or . . . (AA, 6)

Still another Arab American woman recounts her vivid memories of living through the

Six Day War as child of six or seven years old. She spent the six days in a basement. She was

sent out to get bread nearby, shots were fired in the street and she raced back, unharmed and

breadless. Her narrative depicts the development of resilience at an early age. Despite (or

indeed, perhaps because of) these kinds of formative life events, she has somehow turned living

under occupation in Jerusalem into a positive thing. She talked about consciously giving herself

"permission to trust:"

Hopefully, it made me a better person, because I tried to—I tried as much as I can not to have things affect me to the point that I would just ignore things, or be de-sensitized, or even go the other direction, not to be too sensitive, and to the point that I don't trust. . . . I feel like I became more aware of a lot of thing, and at a young age, when you become aware of things, I think it exposes you earlier in life to experiences of adulthood that sometimes are not that good, but sometimes it is rewarding, because you get to know things a little bit earlier. (AA, 4)

Chapter 5 looks at the unique positioning of Arab Americans as potential bridge-

builders due to their deep experience in the U.S. and the Arab world. However, as reflected

within the great diversity of thoughts and feelings in this section, we may need to be

thoughtful about our expectations in this area. See Table 4.3 for a summary of the main

findings of the Arab American group.

Table 4.3

Summary of Main Findings for Arab American Group

Theme	Findings
Identity	9/11 and the aftermath created new complexities around representation, testing U.S. and Arab world alliances.
	There are assimilation-related issues with the non-Arab group regarding the tendencies of mainstream America to be insular and the tendencies of Arabs to remain in traditional groupings on coming to the U.S.
	There is some recognition of the need for Arab Americans to more fully integrate into mainstream America.
Racism, Discrimination, and Othering	This group has deep experience with racism, discrimination, and Othering living in the U.S., post-9/11. Preconceived stereotypes contribute to Othering of U.S./Americans, but are often reversed upon living in the U.S. for a time.
Media	The media is viewed as a major reason for lack of understanding between Arab and non-Arabs. The media is viewed as misrepresenting Arabs.
	There is a loss of trust in the U.S. media that also translates, in some ways, to the U.S. educational system.
Human Security	The events of 9/11 and the aftermath have been a time of great hardship for this group—putting their sense of human security at risk.
	Events post-9/11 create a continual state of insecurity for these Arab American women, incumbent with constant retriggering, and modes of portraying Arabs in a negative light.

> Personal history and the path these women took to the U.S. is a big determinant in how (relatively) secure they feel in the U.S. post-9/11.

Toward Common Themes: Emotion as Crosscutting

The aim of this chapter of findings was to ground the reader in the voices of the women around the key themes of identity, racism, discrimination, Othering, and human security and to begin to interpret the findings. Chapter 5, the discussion chapter, further interprets the findings, illuminates, and discusses areas of commonality between the three groups of women and areas where there is distance between groups and ultimately hones in on areas potentially ripe for meaningful dialogue. One such area has to do with emotion. Emotion is at the core of relations between peoples. "It is primitive, unlanguaged, and vital to human experience" (E. Holloway, personal communication, June 4, 2010). In the context of Arab/American relations in these times, it seems that we are globally trying to find our cultural footing—what are the appropriate emotions? Ahmed (2004) described how emotions circulate between bodies, how they stick, as well as move, and how they can open up lines of communication.

Emotionality is woven within the narratives of this study. See Figure 4.6 for a depiction of types of emotions that surfaced in the study by group.

vulnerable
comfort (regarding Obama)
reciprocal hate
paralyzing
Arabs feel pity for us
suspicious
shunning of Japanese Americans
strain
insecure
group hatred
vigilance
worry
awkwardness
creepy
trust, respect regarding Obama
discomfort
pride
distrust
fear
threatened
anger
tension
careful
frustration
healing
hurt
empathy
respect
safe

Non-Arab

trust
secure
scary
insecure
frustration about colonization
suffering of Iraq War
belief
worried
feeling lost
kindness
happy
loss
anger

Arab

embarrassed about media
respect
excitement about Obama
disgust
disappointment about Obama
pride in identity
hate
insulting
afraid
threat
sadness
insulting
intimidating
connected
outcast
disappointment
confusing
hope
lost hope
emotion around following
compassion
struggle
shock about 9/11

resentment
feeling disconnected from America
judgmental
alienation in home culture
terror
blame
sympathy
disappointment
embarrassed
stunned
Arabs feeling victimized
sadness
hatred of Americans abroad
horror about 9/11
frightening
shocked
restricted
heaviness, fear and doom
loss of courage
despair

grateful
threatened
lack of trust
nervous
sad about how immune Iraqi's seem
fear
feeling misunderstood
suppress feelings
pain
feeling of waiting for something else to happen
anger at the US
insecure
irritated
devastated upon seeing Iraq
uncomfortable
concerns of children
tiring
feeling of safety (with US citizenship)
hope
offended
feelings of guilt while innocent
pissed off
sad, going down
worried
scared
optimism about Obama
happy
hurt-hurtful
scared about 9/11
panic
horrendous (9/11)
cautious
sores that fester inside
protective feelings for children

Arab American

Figure 4.6. Schematic of findings around emotion.

The data depict a culture and climate of fear—fear of Arabs and Arabs fear of repercussions. This also takes forms of distrust and dread. Connected to this fear, participants emote a sense of the power of group reciprocal hate, the move to a retaliatory mode and the loss of reasonable voice. Voices show embarrassment and confusion about representation from Arabs and non-Arabs alike and the impacts of this on pride. Voices show frustration--about the colonizing and controlling tendencies of U.S.; frustration on all sides about the media, and frustration about not being able to explain and, thus, affect the perceptions of others. There are also the emotions of sympathy, empathy, and hopefulness. Other key emotions embedded

throughout the data include resentment, fatigue and exhaustion, alienation, shame, and vulnerability. Within the narratives of non-Arab women, there were repeated attempts put themselves into the situation of Arabs. This empathetic tendency can be groundwork for the transversal politics (espoused by Cockburn & Hunter, 1999). The data showed rooting within one's own culture coupled with a willingness to shift toward the cultures of others (Yuval-Davis, 1997).

Chapter V: Further Interpretation and Discussion

"It is through the minutiae of daily life that human beings access the political ripples and tidal waves of their times" (Andrews, 2007b, p. 2).

This study set out to understand the views of three groups of women on the factors contributing to the current status of Arab/American relations, the implications for human security, and the prospects for dialogue on these topics. The study was born out of a concern about perceived fractures between Arab and non-Arab peoples. Given the magnitude of the events of 9/11 and the aftermath, including the global war on terror and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I felt a growing concern about the short- and long-term ramifications to Arab/American relations of this difficult political context. The findings (see chapter 4) and this discussion chapter illuminate these women, 18 in all, and depict how their lives traversed this post-9/11 time of social change. In doing this study, I have come to understand some of the fears and hopes of these women and have learned, not surprisingly, global events have directly affected the lives of these women and their sense of security. The narratives show how the women navigate global events and translate them locally, in terms of their own actions, thoughts, and feelings. Taken in total, the findings of the study can help us discern the readiness for dialogue between Arabs and non-Arabs on the important work of improving the status of relations. There were general areas of perceived similarities raised in the data, such as family values, education, religion, and some more materially related areas of perceived commonality (desire for a white house with a wall around it and big cars). As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, there are many common areas of interest and concern around the specific themes raised in this study.

Andrews (2007b) further helped us to appreciate and anchor this study as she

prompted her readers to ask, "What is the wider story [people] build around the immediate

headlines of their day? Where exactly do they locate themselves in these political narratives?"

(p. 9). This chapter takes us deeper toward some answers to these questions.

Defining Dialogue

The idea of dialogue in the context of this project, draws from the work of Saunders

(1999), which best fits the prospective future dialogue between Arabs and non-Arabs I have

been envisioning. Saunders saw dialogue as a process of genuine interaction through which

human beings listen to each other deeply enough to be changed by what they learn. In dialogue,

"one's mind opens to absorb new views, enlarge perspectives, rethink assumptions, and modify

judgments" (Saunders, 1999, p. 82). Inherent in dialogue is the potential for growth, change,

movement, and direction. As individuals incorporate others' views into their pictures of a

situation, their own perspectives are enlarged. By working to get into the minds, interests, and

feelings of others, each participant changes, with the ultimate purpose to find common ground

(Saunders, 1999). Saunders reminded us:

> Dialogue is dangerous; if often involves risks. Dialogue requires participants to reveal
> to others their deepest interests, hope and fears. That can make one vulnerable.
> Dialogue sometimes requires a participant to give up important human defenses that
> define her or his own identity as it contrasts to the identity of the "other." (pp. 84-85)

Saunders (1999) also stated:

> Dialogue presents a different approach to conflict. Dialogue is not just talk; rather
> members of the dialogue groups can design together a scenario of interactive steps to be
> taken in the political arena to change perceptions and to augment the possibilities of
> working together toward objectives that meet shared needs. (pp. 81-82)

It is this type of dialogue pathway on which I recommend these three groups of women to

embark.

Readiness for Dialogue

A key purpose of this study was to explore the readiness for dialogue on Arab/American relations between Arab and non-Arab women, who all, in various ways, expressed an interest in the topics of this study. In this regard, this study has a practical purpose. This chapter aims to bring the reader into the room with the three groups to gain an appreciation of where the women may have common ground, as well as to highlight areas where dialogue may be premature or difficult. This study, then, may represent a starting point for dialogue. The value of engaging the three groups of women becomes apparent in this chapter, as this study explored both Arab and non-Arab viewpoints and concerns in the area of Arab/American relations. As I set out to begin this work, part of what motivated me was a desire to know the answer to these questions: Do women (Arab and non-Arab) care about these issues? Are they informed? Do the issues affect them day-to-day? And are women potentially part of the solution?

Freire (2003) described investigation as dialogical—affording the opportunity both to discover generative themes and to stimulate people's awareness in regard to these themes. My aim with the current study was to create a way for the women to generate the themes of most importance to themselves in a way that allowed them first, to reflect on them internally, and ultimately, to share. Hence texts (narratives) generated by the freewrites and small focus groups became the first phase of dialogue which was (a) a dialogue with the self—the act of freewriting, followed by (b) a dialogue with the researcher—through the sharing of texts, and (c) ultimately, an external dialogue as this research gets shared. All of this, then, is a precursor to a full dialogue among the groups. This full dialogue is beyond the scope of the current study, but remains to be done within a separate context.

How to Approach the Remainder of this Chapter

The balance of this chapter further interprets the findings of chapter 4 around the themes of identity, racism, discrimination, Othering, the media, and human security, taking the approach of discerning readiness for dialogue. In addition to these four themes, silences in the data are discussed as another area for dialogue. Next, is a discussion of who should make the first gesture in dialogue, followed by discussion around questions the women had of one another, which came up spontaneously during my research. This study was preparatory to actual dialogue, so hearing from the women about what specific questions they would ask each other if the study were implemented face-to-face was very enlightening. After this, I turn to look at areas of embedded perceptions for the groups and the unique positioning of Arab Americans for dialogue. In closing this chapter, I discuss the contribution of this study to the scholarly literature, the challenges and limitations of the study, and ideas for further exploration and research.

Discussion of Readiness for Dialogue by Theme

Following is an attempt to bring the reader further into the room to view the implications of the women's narratives. Where do the women meet? What are the areas of divergence or higher sensitivity and hence perhaps less readiness for dialogue? The findings of chapter 4 illustrated the fabric of interconnections between identity[46] and feelings about and experiences with racism, discrimination, and Othering. Much of the literature reviewed in chapter 2 on Arab/American relations in the context of racism, discrimination, and Othering deals with identity in a significant way (see for example Mango, 2008; Nagel, 2002; Nayak, 2006; Oswald, 2005; Said, 1979; Shakir, 1997; Sweiss, 2005; Ta, 2007; Witteborn, 2007). The links between identity and racism, discrimination, and Othering in the context of this study are well

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[46] As a building block of self, representation, and belonging.

established. My analysis extends this a step further finding identity, racism, discrimination,

and Othering are determinants of human security, with the media also playing a significant role.

Figure 5.1 is a summary of the themes found in this study.

Figure 5.1. Summary of themes.

I envision the dialogue as being between all the women of the study. While chapter 4

reported data by group, this chapter shifts and joins the women under key areas for dialogue. In

some instances, I highlight a particular commonality or divergence between groups, but my real

intent is to be inclusive. Each group will bring valuable contributions and unique views to each

area, for the benefit of all. In this way, the women within the groups can converge, diverge, and

educate one another on the areas that surfaced from within their own narratives.

Identity: Areas for dialogue. The women in this study share new complexities around

representation since 9/11 and the related aftermath. Women of all groups feel misrepresented

by the U.S. government and by the media. Arab American and non-Arab women are most

influenced by the post-9/11 U.S. identity shift from invincible and secure to vulnerable and

insecure. These women recognize the tendency of non-Arab mainstream Americans and Arab

Americans alike to stay within their comfort zones and the influence this has on

Arab/American relations. Regarding identity, the Arab group perceived globalization as a key

threat to identity and they also had concerns about identity in terms of the (mis)representation of

Islam. To this end, the Arab group expressed a unanimous and strong desire to educate people

about Islam—what it is and is not. There is a desire to both demystify and de-demonize Islam.

These themes are discussed below regarding their potential for dialogue.

As described, the identity of the U.S. as a haven appears to be shifting. The current

political context in the U.S. stirs questions of Arab Americans loyalty to the U.S. Arab

Americans feel viewed by some as collectively guilty for the actions of a few radical

fundamentalists. These prevailing winds cause pain and distance between Arabs and non-

Arabs. Since the negative events of 9/11, the U.S. identity can feel in jeopardy for Arab

Americans. There may be some common ground here for dialogue with non-Arabs who do not

feel represented correctly by a nation and government in retaliatory mode going to war—first in

Afghanistan, then Iraq, and exacerbated by the broader and amorphous war on terror. These

non-Arabs may be viewed as unpatriotic along with Arab Americans and not entirely belonging.

Ta (2007) described an aspect of this compellingly in her depiction of *compulsory patriotism*.

Further, when one's connection to the homeland becomes threatened is when narratives of

belonging become politicized (Yuval-Davis, 2006). At various points in the study, identity hurt

as depicted by Cockburn (1998) was in evidence. Ironically, perhaps, I believe there is also an

area for dialogue and common ground around the topic of shared value in aspects of the U.S.

culture. There was a refrain in the study of, despite all, a desire remains to have or obtain U.S.

citizenship. Arab Americans in this study expressed gratefulness for their status in the U.S. and

there is also recognition of the value of U.S. citizenship present from overseas Arabs in the study.

     Multiplicity of identities, immigration, and assimilation. The women in this study share a variety of identities. The non-Arab and Arab-American women in this study all immigrated from somewhere and some relatively recently. No matter where they came from (or when), they share this basic fact (with the notable exception of Native Americans). The Arab group also included a majority that immigrated to Qatar from other Arab countries and, as such, they also find themselves assimilating to a different place. While Qatar is not necessarily as diverse as the U.S., (and there is a shared Arabic language), there are real cultural differences between Arab nations. Immigration and assimilation can be a fruitful area of dialogue, including perspectives on barriers to assimilation and factors that influence assimilation. This study reinforces what is known from the literature (see Reitz, 2003; Walter, 2007)—newcomers are not always treated with open arms. Likewise, only four in 10 Americans are satisfied with the treatment of immigrants in the U.S. (Jones, 2007). The deeper issues underlying assimilation patterns such as access to wealth, political representation, power, and treatment by the mainstream of culture can be reserved for a next level of dialogue. These issues are of concern to all the women in this study.

     The main stream of culture in a country has expectations around how groups will assimilate (Roediger, 2002; Vigdor, 2008). What comprises the mainstream American culture may or may not be welcoming of groups working to assimilate at any given time. Assimilation and the perceptions surrounding it are a fundamental part of self concept and influences identity and sense of belonging. While all immigrant groups have the right to maintain a strong ethnic identity, what becomes difficult and tested is maintaining this identity while holding one's

identity as an American just as firmly. People are expected to adapt in certain ways and misunderstandings can occur when this does not transpire. Yet, there are often no explicit social rules about these expectations and the expectations may not be transparent. It can be a struggle to determine what of one's culture to retain and what to let go. Then an event like 9/11 happens, and expectations shift again. People have cause to rethink their alliances. I am reminded of the cover of a *New Yorker* magazine where a taxi driver depicted with wide eyes is wearing a turban and his taxi windows are plastered with American flags. What is a person to do? Nagel (2002) described this in terms of the politics of identity and the politics of sameness. Decisions regarding when to evoke which stance are complex, especially post-9/11 for Arab Americans. Sites of extreme alienation have been created (Baligh, 2003) and White, non-Arabs cannot know this terrain without deep and sustained interaction with those facing it, and perhaps, not even then. For someone located within this struggle, it is easy to imagine how hard it might be to reach out. That said, it is important to consider that all non-Arab women (and/or the families they descended from) immigrated as well, and have their own, variously complex identities and identity experiences. In this study, some of the non-Arab women lived for a considerable amount of time in Arab countries and have dual allegiances to these countries and the U.S. This presents another avenue for dialogue. In terms of representation issues from the Arab women in the study, there is a sense of national pride, if not nationalism. They seem to have a strong identification with their nation and government. Whereas, there is almost a sense of anti-nationalism among some non-Arab participants—a feeling of not being represented, and of not wanting to be represented by certain aspects of the U.S. government, particularly during the more recent aftermath of 9/11. The narratives illustrate that finding oneself along the

assimilation continuum and feeling adequately represented can be a source of struggle for non-Arabs and Arabs alike.

Exploring the comfort/safety zone of non-Arabs. Perhaps it is a vein of embedded arrogance in the perceived melting pot nature of the U.S. whereby the world comes to the U.S. that steers national priorities away from the need to strive to be multilingual and inhibits, to an extent, our collective reaching out to newcomers. English is the national language and newcomers are expected to adapt to the language and everything else. Questions to initiate a dialogue on this might be: Is the U.S. mainstream insular as regards the culture and language of incoming peoples? If the answer is perceived as yes, is this conscious and intentional, or more unconscious and unintentional? Are people aware of how it is perceived and what the resulting impacts to relations with incoming groups may be? Non-Arabs in this study were open about this general tendency that they have to stay within their comfort zones, linguistically and in terms of not reaching out to groups that may be culturally unfamiliar to them. This has direct implications for Arab Americans and can be an interesting area of discussion for all.

Identity and privilege. Another, more difficult, area for discussion may be the layers of privilege attached to identity. White non-Arabs have a certain anonymity. There are numerous privileges that come with being White in America (Jensen, 2005; Nelson, 1998). These issues may be harder for the groups to broach as the entwined issues of equity, racial, and social justice carry emotions and the weight of history. However, this is important terrain to cover, and may be an area for further dialogue once groundwork on areas riper for dialogue and associated trust building has happened.

Globalization. The study revealed perception of both positive aspects of globalization and westernization (U.S. educational system and critical thinking systems) and negative aspects

(rapid development, erosion of tradition). At issue is the ability to maintain self and identity

in the midst of rapid change. To an extent, globalization initiates outside of the self and,

therefore, is perhaps an easier topic to broach than some others. I can envision the groups

collectively critiquing the impact of globalization in their lives. The women could discuss how

to explore the positive and mitigate the negative impacts. It would be enlightening to learn

about how Arab Americans handle the influences of globalization they face in both the Arab

and non-Arab world. Dykstra (as cited in Livesey, 2005) reminded us "globalization has the

power to exploit and enhance women's lives" (p. 152). Findings in this study mirror this

statement.

      Racism, discrimination, and Othering: Areas for dialogue. The Arab group findings

show multifaceted experience around racism, discrimination, and Othering taking forms of

internalized oppression, Arab-Arab discrimination, and Arab-non-Arab Othering and

discrimination. Arab Americans have deep experience with racism, discrimination, and

Othering living in the U.S. post-9/11. Non-Arab women in the study also have experience with

racism, discrimination, and Othering based on their own nationalities and for some experiences

living in countries where they were in the minority.

      Hence, findings of this study show forms of racism, discrimination, and Othering are

part of the current-day fabric of relations between Arabs and non-Arabs. These phenomena and

practices impact identity and, ultimately, human security in both psychological and physical

ways. The phenomena of racism, discrimination, and Othering know no boundaries. Related

actions range from overt acts of an intentional nature to passive or everyday acts that may or

may not carry intent. Ignorance is its own perpetrator. Smith and Reynolds (2002) expressed

concern that children are getting negative cues from families and society at large and "children

are being taught racial profiling at a very young age [and] . . . even more critical is the potential for children to develop unhealthy racial attitudes towards select populations" (p. 2). Participants expressed concern for children—what they see, hear, and internalize in our post-9/11 world. Based on the findings of this study, the following three topics within the theme of racism, discrimination, and Othering would be areas ripe for dialogue and good to examine collectively.

>*Racism, discrimination, and Othering in historic context.* History presents a useful area of dialogue under this theme for the women of the current study. Of interest is the historic context for non-Arab U.S. immigrant groups and, in particular, looking collectively at the degrees and modes of Othering targeted at various other immigrant groups (Japanese Americans, Hispanic Americans, African Americans). This could provide useful perspective for further analyzing the case of Arab people in the U.S. post-9/11. A sharing of trajectories of each ethnic group represented and comparing and contrasting experiences, and reviewing lessons learned (and not learned) would be valuable. There is always value in stepping away from one's own direct context and observing the path of others. This can help bring perspective and lead to not feeling so singled out. With the exception of Native Americans, everyone living in the U.S. arrived from somewhere and, within this history, is essential knowledge and deeper knowing about identity.

>*Internalizations of racism, discrimination, and othering.* Internalizations of racism, discrimination, and Othering present another layer that is, perhaps, harder to get at and a more sensitive topic for dialogue—one requiring a deep examination of self and identity (see Livesey's, 2005, work on internalized colonizations). Along with this, it would be good to

broach the topic of the invisibility of Whiteness (Jensen, 2005; Roediger, 2002) and the

incumbent ramifications of Whiteness on the Arab/American relations dynamic.

Racism, discrimination, and Othering and the connection to human security. The

findings showed a connection between incidents or experiences of racism, discrimination, or

Othering and a corresponding lessening of overall sense of comfort and security. This reduced

sense of security can manifest psychologically, emotionally, physically, and economically. It

also can translate to children though our concerns for their security and their own concerns

about security.

It is well known there is a long history of racism and of discriminating against others in

the U.S. I would argue this context provides a cultural map both for continuing these types of

patterns and for recognizing and ending them. That these notions and practices of racism and

discrimination are alive and well means this continues to be part of the collective imagined

community in the U.S. The Arab women in this study have their own experience and cultural

practices dealing with racism. We know racism, discrimination, and Othering are present in all

cultures represented in this study. Scholarship on occidentalism and the dehumanizing of the

West shows some of the ways these ideas have originated and been transmitted (Buruma &

Margalit, 2004), as does Said's (1979) work on orientalism. Incidents of racism, discrimination,

and Othering in whatever form they take make the receiver question who they are and result in

some cases with people not taking pride in who they are which circles this discussion back to a

firm link with identity.

If we think about Arab/American relations in terms of other racial/cultural gaps—for

example, between Blacks and Whites in America, there have been huge corrective actions to

abolish slavery, enact civil rights legislation, and build protective institutions, organizations,

and legal frameworks. All of these actions are aimed at correcting past wrongs and defining very public and logical ways of helping people to move beyond entrenched ways of thinking and acting. While the degree of incivility toward Arabs may be of magnitude less than this, it is, nonetheless, important to consider the scale of investments (e.g., will, time, energy) needed to counter certain social injustice trends.

The role of the media: Areas for dialogue. There was a large degree of agreement between all the groups about the centrality of the media to Arab/American relations, the cultural gap that exists between peoples, and the role of the media in creating and maintaining that gap. Women from all groups feel misrepresented and manipulated by the media. Many talked of a lack of trust for the media and several non-Arab women discussed concerns about the social responsibility of the media.

It is, in large part, through the media that we know each other. Both understandings and misunderstandings are created by the way the media reports on and portrays people, events, and long-term conflicts. A key finding of this study is the importance of events and, in particular, how events are covered by the media. By events I refer to things that happen and can be construed as having relevance or connection to the global war on terror—events linked to the post-9/11 era of conflict. Events spike into our consciousness. They come and they go. One event is replaced by the next. They are ephemeral and we remember some of the facts surrounding the event, some of the emotion of the event sticks to us (Ahmed, 2004), some facts fall away as does some of the intensity of emotion. The events do, in some sense, accumulate and some sear into the memory (McAlister, 2005) and they help us to form our opinions and beliefs, unbidden. What is missing is often a thoughtful increase in our knowledge in the time between events. Do we take time to critique the event, the facts, the coverage, and its meaning?

Appendix D provides a listing of the events discussed by the participants in this study.
Exposure to mass media information about collective violence reinforces affects and helps to
generate an emotional climate as studies on the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the U.S. and March
11, 2008 in Spain show (Schuster et al., 2001; Silver et al., 2002). The media delivers us the
events and we are collectively, emotionally impacted by the ways events are portrayed.

The neverending news cycle prompts the repetition of images. While the three
participant groupings in the study have not and will likely not physically meet (they live across
wide geographic spaces), they do connect indirectly with regularity through the medium of
culture (TV, radio, internet, movies, print media, etc.). Hence, they have (albeit highly
mediated and often skewed) images, impressions, opinions, and knowledge of each other. The
findings in this study let us conclude the media is a highly influential force in Arab/American
relations. It is interesting that, in this research, the media was very rarely identified as a
solution—just as a problem. My view is that it is a problem and part of the solution. To start,
we cannot underestimate our need to be thoughtful, strategic consumers of media, seeking out
sources and critiquing them. It also speaks to a need for the media to meet people halfway.

A need for media critique. The media has a role in setting the stage in mainstreaming
behaviors and creating in-group/out-group dynamics. Representations created and or
perpetuated via the media have a role in identity formation resulting in highly mediated often
skewed images, impressions, opinions, and knowledge of each other (Alsultany, 2007, 2008;
McAlister, 2005; Shohat & Stam, 1994). A very ripe area for dialogue is media critique. While
all groups and nearly all participants spoke compellingly about the centrality of the media to the
status of Arab/American relations, interestingly, no one spoke about the positive potential of the
media to help improve relations. That said, I believe we can say both understanding and

misunderstanding is created by the way the media represents and reports on people, events, and long-term conflicts.

A dialogue session focused on media critique could look at these issues among others: repetition, exaggeration, political agenda of media, the phenomenon of embedded reporting, terminology use and abuse, and technological advances in delivery of news media. The women could explore the ways the media does and does not represent them. The Arab participants were so heart-felt in describing how the media misrepresents them speaking elegantly about the degree of exaggeration and the extreme embarrassment this brings them and, for some, resulting ultimately in a fear to be who one is. The event of 9/11 left some Arabs feeling a profound inability to be able shift opinions of non-Arab America. Participants in the study expressed a desire to stand up and better represent Arabs (but with no forum for doing so). Arab and Arab American women expressed frustration at being associated with Osama bin Laden, represented by and tied to his actions.

Investigating media agendas. It can be important to delve into the influence of the media on foreign relations and the status of intercultural dynamics and to discern agendas within the media—including the agendas of governments involved portrayed by the media as these lines are continually more blurred. Within the open-ended context of a global war on terror, many events are given a heightened status, traction, and relevance by the media. The media is, doubtless, a key player in times of war. We have entered an age where known terrorist entities—Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, can seek and find mainstream media outlets for their videos and their messages are uplinked globally and instantly by these outlets. At times, it in fact seems hard news and hard numbers on wars and conflicts (Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestinian) can be difficult to come by.

Even the most casual observer of the media can detect the events of 9/11 greatly

magnified an in-group/out-group dynamic between Arabs and non-Arabs. For some, it became

justified to Other Arabs as a result of 9/11 and the aftermath. When contemplating events on

such a scale as 9/11—where the continual re-airing of 9/11 around the clock instituted a global

retraumatization, a collective imprinting, a searing of image to memory—we must also

contemplate how might the media have handled this differently? My aim with this discussion is

not to simplify and depict the media as the villain, the enemy. In any case, we must ask: Who is

the media? The media has become both highly centralized (few large corporate outlets) and, at

the same time, highly decentralized as we move beyond traditional media sources of radio and

television are expanding to make room for now common modes such as blogging, Twitter, Wiki

Leak, and YouTube, that citizens can individually access and essentially go global in real time.

Media choice is increasing in some ways, constricting in others. This is further complicated by

the fact that as people, as cultures, we consume it, we watch, we seek it out.

    Social responsibility of the media. The mainstream media needs to become more

responsible and consumers of media also need to be responsible and critical consumers. There

are many available avenues for obtaining responsible media for those who seek them. For

example, the International Responsibility Task Force of the American Library Association's

Social Responsibility Roundtable is a movement to provide practical and comprehensive

alternatives on topics such as the U.S. war against terrorism. While much responsible media

can be uncovered, what is less clear is how to influence mainstream media outlets toward more

balanced and in-depth coverage . A dialogue on how the media can help and not hinder

Arab/American is in order. Answers lie, in part, within the thinking and practice of those who

work tirelessly on matters of social responsibility in the media. Campbell (2007) provoked

us to think about the possibility of roles existing within journalism. In his world, journalists are:

> Acting as mapmakers, laying out the policy—and actual terrain. They are acting as candid friends, offering honest feedback to citizens, experts, and elites. They are story-tellers, helping capture [the essence] through image and narrative. They are impresarios, inviting citizens, experts and elites to share their stories and pool their knowledge. They are mediators and facilitators of public conversation and deliberation. And they are mindful inquisitors, using photography, cartography, geographic information systems, computer animation, audio, video, and good-old text to inquire. (p. 47)

Such hopefulness about the role of journalism is something from which to take

inspiration. Using Arab/American relations as a topic to bring positive dynamism to bear would

be a valuable outcome of a dialogue process. Together, I can imagine the women reenvisioning

what the media can do to improve Arab/American relations. I am reminded of a comment by a

woman in the study regarding her sense that, in the last 10 years or so in particular, journalists

have lost ownership of their profession. While there are surely indications of that, we must also

recognize there is a vast amount of work happening in the arena of socially responsible media

acting collectively as a positive force in the world. The visionary nature of Campbell's (2007)

ideas is one example of something to strive towrad. Also see the work of Paluck (2007) who

examined the question: Can the media be used in right ways to reduce prejudice and conflict?

Human security: Areas for dialogue. The sense of background security levels have

changed dramatically for non-Arab Americans since 9/11, and a new conceptualization of

security now exists for them. Arabs feel misrepresented and insecure in how they are linked to

Osama Bin Laden through association with Islam and the Arab countries he purportedly

operates from. A key human security issue for the Arab participants in this study is the loss of

identity resulting from globalization and westernization. Arab Americans have been most

directly affected by 9/11. The events since 9/11 continue to have direct impacts on their sense

of security. Arab Americans have concerns for their security in a post-9/11 world and seek

safety, comfort, and freedom from fear. Americans, as a whole, seek security of the homeland,

personal security, and secure territory. People of the Arab world desire the same securities

mentioned above and more. The Arab group interpreted security a bit differently—as related to

identity and loss of pride and tradition. For all groups, racism, discrimination, and Othering

was tied directly to the sense of insecurity and security. The role of the media is also significant

and directly contributes to whether participants feel more or less secure.

Threats to security influence the very basis and status of relations between the U.S. and

the Arab world. How we internalize security is important. To an extent, who we are determines

our degree of ontological security—the confidence and trust we have in the world around us

(Giddens, 1990; Nobel, 2005). The Arab group expressed security concerns largely in terms of

loss of identity, pride, and tradition. This is an important area for dialogue. Globalization can

present threats to who you are—in this case Arabs are threatened by the West. Common ground

for dialogue exists in that one way to contemplate 9/11 is as a small faction of the Arab world

presenting threats to who Americans are. While these threats have been enacted in very

different ways, both represent struggles motivated by differences in ideas, values, and ways of

being. The mode of 9/11 is more overt, more acute, and more explicitly violent, while the mode

of globalization is much more diffuse, larger scale, and less explicitly violent. However, both

phenomena have serious impacts on the status of Arab/American relations. Further, the area of

bicultural identities created as a consequence of globalization is a good one for dialogue. We

can query: Who are we locally? Who are we globally? Certain sectors of non-Arabs are,

perhaps, more culturally comfortable with rapid change, having adapted to cultural influxes

since the earliest days of nation-forming. Rapid change is also part of the Arab world, with the

evolving development patterns, the advancement of the global knowledge economy, and the shared technology revolution. I can envision a fruitful dialogue delving into globalization related security issues.

The loss of innocence. Another area of common ground may be the loss of innocence, articulated by one non-Arab participant this way, "it's about time we felt like this," speaking about 9/11. This sentiment could open doors with women whose own homelands have been attacked, or have had major incidents of terrorism—Palestinians, Iraqis, Israelis, Sudanese, and so on. I can imagine a dialogue forming around the reality that "this has happened to you and to us too." Non-Arabs in the U.S. have these new insecurities and vulnerabilities, post-9/11. One of the comments of a non-Arab spoke of "getting used to being hated that much" which points to a new form of psychological insecurity. America has evolved from being a refuge to a site of acute insecurity for some. Arab Americans have these same newfound fears about safety within the U.S. as non-Arabs do, but with the added layer of feeling implicated and generalized as perpetrators. Further, along have come infractions on civil liberties that may also be an area of shared concern between Arab and non-Arab women. The sense of the U.S. as a protecting force has been shattered to an extent—it can be difficult to protect (or keep the image of being a protector) if you are vulnerable to a major attack as a nation. Also being an initiator of subsequent and even more damaging and extensive conflicts tends to tarnish the role of protector of others. Enough time has passed so that 9/11 can be an active site for dialogue.

Airports. A dramatic sense of reduced security while traveling since 9/11 translated across all groups. That said, it should be noted reduced travel security is experienced in different ways by different people with some feeling generally insecure and others feeling

individually implicated. Airports are now a jarring reminder of our collective global

insecurity. The current day airport experience can be a useful area of dialogue to collectively

deconstruct.

People who, in the past, would not have noticed the nationalities of their flying mates on

airplanes are now noticing. There is an increased sense of fear and suspicion, and a reduced

sense of security during air travel. Many non-Arabs have a generalized fear of what may

transpire on a flight. Arabs have those same general fears themselves compounded by the

concern they may be targeted or implicated as a perpetrator or feared as one. Airports are now

an area where we experience collective insecurity and play out Arab/American relations in a

very public and charged manner.

History and the relative nature of security. There are a number of basic areas of

knowledge about the history and background of the Arab world that would strengthen the basis

for dialogue. One is the relative nature of security. Some Arab women in the study have been

through intense tests to their human security in their home countries and they bring this with

them as context. Some experienced forms of retraumatization with 9/11 and subsequent events.

Increasing non-Arabs' knowledge and understanding of history and culture (including Islam) of

the Arab world would enhance the fruitfulness of dialogue. The politics of textbooks is an issue

with huge potential impact. What are our children learning about the Arab world? Is it

balanced? I can envision a significant session reviewing textbooks together to see how the

Middle East, 9/11, the Iraq War, the war on terror, racism toward Arabs, and anti-Americanism

are portrayed. What are we teaching our children? In this study, the textbook issue was

brought up in the U.S. educational context, but it would be just as significant to know in the

Arab context. What is being taught in the Arab world about U.S. history, social studies, and foreign affairs? Is it balanced?

External processes built to protect security. Nations build policies that aim to protect. In this process, there are civilities we loose in trying to maintain security. Racial profiling, the travel code color system, the use of strategic military installations (e.g., the U.S. military base in Qatar) are just a few examples. We need to ask for whom do these practices increase security and for whom do they increase insecurity? Some non-Arabs have fear of repercussions while traveling abroad. Our level of background threat has increased. There have been a steady stream of events since 9/11—recall the anthrax scares[47] that happened in the days just after 9/11 in 2001 all they way up to the more recent incident of the underpants bomber in 2009[48] and the dozens of events in the interim that have been framed in terms of Arab/American relations. All of this is important material for dialogue between the three groups. It would be useful to do an exercise on relative nature of security by group. The women could map out what makes them feel more or less secure and compare levels of security doing day-to-day activities in the U.S. or Arab world, the sense of security people have for children, security while traveling, and so on. This would be another good entry point for dialogue.

Iraq War. I can imagine a useful dialogue between the women focused on these elements: impacts of war (deaths, casualties, status of infrastructure, quality of life, psychological impacts, etc,), the reasons for the war, shared empathy for those directly involved, and the long-term nature of forgiveness. Non-Arabs in this study expressed sadness about bridges burned with Iraqi people and shame about what is being done there. I believe

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[47] While these were eventually determined to be U.S. domestic events with internal perpetrators, at the time, the anthrax scares were seen as possibly linked to 9/11 events (i.e., attacks from the outside).

[48] A Nigerian citizen attempted to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear on a Northwest Airlines flight on December 25, 2009.

there is some common ground to discuss Arab/American relations in the context of the Iraq War. While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provide impetus for an increase in occidentalist thinking (Buruma & Margalit, 2004), I think there is enough anti-war sentiment among non-Arabs to find common ground here.

   Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was articulated by some women in each group as a destabilitzing factor for Arab/American relations. "You're always going to have [terrorist] recruits as long as that Israel problem is a situation" (NA, 4) was the opinion of one woman. Another woman shared her need to "suppress certain feelings [on this topic] because I need to keep them in check," (AA, 6) when speaking about issues of Palestine. Trust issues continue to surface for her, stemming from her childhood as a Palestinian in Jerusalem. Yet another participant of Palestinian origin lived through the Six-Day War as a young girl in Jerusalem. This may be an area of greater difficulty to broach; to be saved for a later level of dialogue. High emotion on these topics require the need for adequate groundwork and trust. It can be good to jointly discuss for example, Arab perspectives on the role of Arab countries in the plight of Palestine, the root causes of the conflict, the numbers of casualties and deaths on all sides, the pivotal historical events, and the specific impacts on Arab/American relations. This is a very important area of concern to all.

   Silences in the data: Area for dialogue. One of the unique features of the situational analysis methodology used in this study is Clarke (2005a) would have us "attempt to articulate" what she terms "silences in the data" (p. 85). Below I describe several of these silences I detected in the data. Other things would occur to another researcher as I have my own blind spots as a researcher. It would be instructive to share this data with the groups of participants and collectively as part of a full dialogue have the women discuss these observed silences, as

well as identity, and discuss the silences they observe in the data. In the data, I did not hear

mention (or very little mention) of the following topics that, upon reflection, I expected to hear

more about: the men in charge, Abu Gharib prison scandal, historical ethnic conflicts, criticism

of the Bush administration and anti-Americanism, nuclear security, religious friction, poverty,

and gender consciousness. These silences are briefly discussed in turn.

  The men in charge. There was vey little mention in the data of what I will informally

term the men in charge of various aspects of Arab/American relations. By this, I mean those in

charge of various military posts, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, and people like Richard

Holbrooke—the implementer of the AF-PAC strategy that governs activity in Afghanistan and

Pakistan (all people—typically men—in pivotal formal leadership positions dealing with the

war on terror, conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, etc.) There was little direct mention of

the Qatari Emir. This may be because the study was geared towards the narratives of

individuals and, as such, was not directly focused on the larger context of institutions, political

power frameworks, and the like.

  Abu Gharib Prison scandal. There was no mention of torture or of the Abu Ghraib

prison abuse scandal. As deftly described by McAlister (2005), "the damage done by the Abu

Ghraib photographs to the reputation of the United States in the Arab world was incalculable"

(p. 299). From the outset of this study and to this day, the set of events and circumstances

surrounding the abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison are some of the most egregious and damning to

Arab/American relations, in my opinion. I am not certain why this did not come up. Perhaps

too horrific to mention? Too shameful? Or is it Abu Ghraib an event that is ephemeral and

slips out of the consciousness, unresolved and replaced in our collective consciousness by

incoming events?

Historical ethnic conflicts. The nature and role of historical ethnic conflicts were not raised by anyone. According to the UNDP (2009), observation confirms in the Arab countries, ethnic, religious, sectarian, and linguistic differences can be associated with persistent group struggles, especially role of historical ethnic conflicts were not raised by anyone. According to the UNDP (2009), observation confirms in the Arab countries, ethnic, religious, sectarian, and linguistic differences can be associated with persistent group struggles, especially in countries where the population is not homogenous. Tragically, these conflicts have engendered the largest volume of human casualties in the Arab countries.

Criticism of the Bush administration and anti-Americanism. There was very limited criticism of the recent Bush administration and very little blanket anti-Americanism. I might have expected more given the global war on terror, axis of evil, and invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan were recent constructs. However, participants seemed to have either moved beyond this or it may have been the influence of my presence and a desire to not offend me. Another explanation may be that, of the six Arab participants, three of them were affiliated with Education City—the U.S. educational complex in Qatar—which may have shifted their views to some extent. Also, the remaining three Arab participants have all recently been to the U.S. and the findings on this suggest they had a change in perceptions—viewing the U.S. much more favorably than prior to visiting.

Nuclear security. Just one person mentioned nuclear security concerns. This is interesting given the ultimate threat posed by nuclear weapons.

Role of religion. There was no direct religious friction raised in this study. It was very important to the Arab group to characterize the similarities between Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The other groups did not hone in on any specifics regarding religion as a contributor

to a gap in relations. It is possible given the fact participants knew the general themes of the study—dialogue, Arab/American relations, and the reaching out aspect—they may have steered away from some potentially contentious topics.

   Poverty. Two non-Arab participants talked about poverty as an underlying factor influencing Arab American relations. None of the Arab participants mentioned poverty. One of the Arab American participants mentioned poverty in terms of how the media wrongly characterizes all Arabs to be living in poverty. We do find the media routinely focuses on issues of poverty in Palestine, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq, for example, and also depicts the narrative of how poverty itself is highlighted as a recruitment tool for terrorist operatives. The UNDP (2009) assessed, in detail, the damage to human security that ensues from occupation and military intervention—focusing in part on the impacts of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, and Israel's continuing hold on Occupied Palestinian Territory. Further, the UNDP found one of the key outcomes of intervention and occupation is an empowering of extremist groups.

   Gender consciousness. The study aimed to illuminate women's voices. What emerged were identities of the women in the study which appeared to be less focused on gender than on other factors. For all groups, it seemed there was so much material of immediate concern to the topics of the study that the broader arena of the status of women was not often broached. My hope was to illuminate women's voices, but not to focus the conversation on gender. Rather, I let what emerged become the focus and, in so doing, the issues of race and ethnicity appeared to surface and eclipse issues of gender, seemingly creating a silence on gender. Non-Arabs were quiet on gender issues. Arab Americans share the U.S. with many fewer Arab Americans than women and, hence, they may feel issues of race more acutely than those of gender. That said, I do not think I can say that the status of women and consciousness around gender issues is any

more or less important to the women in the study—only that gender was not the focus of the

study and it did not emerge in the data as highly salient.

See Table 5.1 for a summary of the main areas for dialogue by theme.

Table 5.1

Summary of Main Areas for Dialogue by Theme

Theme	Area for Dialogue
General Identity	Areas of misunderstanding Representation by the media and the U.S. government Shared appreciation of aspects of U.S. culture Immigration and assimilation Comfort zone and boundaries Identity and privilege Globalization as opportunity and threat
Racism, Discrimination, and Othering	Historic context (assimilation trajectories) Internalized racism, discrimination, and Othering Racism, discrimination, Othering, and human security
Media	Media critique Media agenda Social responsibility and the media
Human Security	Loss of innocence Airports as sites of insecurity History and the relative nature of security Politics of textbooks Iraq War Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Silences	The men in charge Abu Gharib prison scandal Historical ethnic conflicts Criticism of the Bush administration, anti-Americanism Nuclear security Religious friction Poverty
Other	Arab/American relations from perspective of children

This study has surfaced five key thematic areas[49] that are critical to the prospect for dialogue as a means of narrowing the gap between Arabs and non-Arabs in these times. I also think the women could have a significant dialogue on the events, emotions, and human and non-human actants in the study. Further, I think discussing Arab/American relations from the perspective of children (one's own or children you love) could be a powerful point of commonality regarding this work on Arab/American relations. The talk could revolve around a desired future state for the children, the specific types of impacts they are facing and ways to mitigate these. This study shows women are not divorced from these events and foreign policy realities. They are interested and they do care. And, they are potentially part of the solution.

Who should make the first gesture for dialogue? A set of questions arose from one woman in the non-Arab group, the first group with which I worked. She asked (within a freewriting session):

> Why don't Arabs make the first gesture for dialogue between us? It seems like all post-9/11 attempts to connect people of different faiths have all been initiated by non-Muslims. If this perception is true, why? Maybe you don't want to improve relations between us? Maybe you would prefer to be left alone entirely? (NA, 5)

I selected this particular question because it seemed to get at a key area just under the surface of the study—that of who's responsibility it is to advocate for better relations between Arabs and non-Arabs? Naturally, in practice this is a negotiated arena, but I became interested in what the perceptions of the women might be on this question. As stated above, the question comes across very directly. I prefaced it saying this was the perception of one of the non-Arab women, and something she was genuinely curious about. It was the opinion of this non-Arab woman that it is non-Arabs who consistently do the reaching out. Given the relevance of this line of inquiry, I decided to pose these questions to the women of the other two groups as I

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[49] Major thematic areas are: identity, racism, discrimination, Othering, media, human security, and silences.

worked with them in subsequent months and, thereby, initiated a conversation of sorts, albeit

confined to these questions. The answers to this provocative question say something about the

ways in which we do and do not understand each other. One non-Arab woman spoke about

how the question itself showed volumes about how little we truly know one another and

understand each other's constraints, life worlds, and sensibilities. Below, I abbreviated and

generalized the responses Arab and Arab American women gave to the questions regarding the

perception that Arabs do not make the first gesture for dialogue:

- We have a feeling of awkwardness about being the initiator, used to being closed and focused on family and best friends.

- We have a fear of politics (political repercussions).

- The distant proximity of U.S. makes it hard to reach out .

- We have fears of being killed, attacked or stolen from if they did go to the U.S.

- We are raised within very protective families, making it hard to cultivate independence or to reach out.

- We have a feeling of being too different, too afraid, afraid to be thought of as a terrorist.

- We sense that it is partly how Americans tend to live when they come to Arab countries-sequestered in compounds which affects the dynamic of reaching out.

- Sometime it may just be personality issues—shyness.

That said, both the Arab and Arab American women made it known they do not prefer

to be left alone and they articulated this compellingly. Nonetheless, the evidence above shows

some of the obstacles Arabs face that are important for non-Arabs to consider. The "why aren't

you reaching out" positioning and the responses shared should give cause to think deeply about

how to more fully respect others, their realities, and ways of being. I believe there are ways

non-Arab assertiveness can be confronting. The findings show even the curiosity levels of non-

Arabs can be confronting, recall examples of friendly, but constant attention paid to Arab Americans by strangers out in public, for example. There is a need to be aware of both assumptions and counter assumptions and to realize there may well be complex reasons why someone might not reach out and, in turn, reasons why someone else might take offense or not understand. The exchange above around who should make the first gesture yields an initial sense of the depth of our unknowing about one another both from the question itself and the answers it evoked.

Questions Women Had of One Another

Toward the end of my interviews with the women, I asked them what questions, if any, they may have for one another. We could not all meet in person, so this was my attempt to bring us all into the room together by finding out what the study had stirred up for each woman. I plan to share these questions with the participants and, indeed, the full dissertation. It is evident to me, from their questions, they are interested in reaching out, knowing more—they are curious and engaged on these topics—all excellent dispositions for dialogue. Another entry point for a full formal dialogue would be the collective sharing and discussion of these questions. See Table 5.2 for questions the women had for one another, non-Arab group.

Table 5.2

Questions the Women had for One Another, Non-Arab Group

Group	Questions
Non-Arab	What is Arab American's most conflicting view of themselves? Is it hard to hold both cultures? Would they prefer to be one or another?
	How do Qatari women view American women and why do they feel that way?

How do women in other groups feel about the U.S. and the rest of the world before and after 9/11?

How has the U.S. reaction and subsequent war on Iraq affected their opinion of the U.S.?

Does Obama and his administration change their view or hopes for us and our relationships?

How do they view Bin Laden and Al Qaeda?

How do they view our U.S. domestic terrorists, Tim McVeigh, and others?

Do they view our cultures and values as being too different to reconcile or coexist peacefully?

I want to know if they understand the similarities between conservative Muslims that are Arab and conservative Christians that are American?

I want to know if they see any avenues for camaraderie between themselves and some segment of the American populace?

I want to know what they know and like about the United States/Americans?

I want to know what they think their own country should do to stop violence in the name of Islam?

I want to know what their own community should do to stop violence in the name of Islam?

What can we do to bridge the gap of understanding between the two cultures?

Would they be interested in a cultural exchange—they come to teach us about certain topics and we go there (a women's symposium on women in the Middle East)?

Why don't Arabs make the first gesture for dialogue between us?

It seems like all post-9/11 attempts to connect people of different faiths have all been initiated by non-Muslims. If this perception is true, why? Maybe you don't want to improve relations between us? Maybe you would prefer to be left alone entirely?

Overall, the non-Arab group had an more overt posture with their questions, tending toward somewhat more direct and provoking questions. Their questions edge on requests for action, often as they raise avenues of camaraderie, stopping violence, bridging misunderstandings, cultural exchange, and dialogue. They are also curious about the identity/self of Arab Americans and their ability to hold both cultures. They are interested in the views of Arab women on 9/11, President Obama, U.S. domestic terrorists, and Osama Lin Laden. See Table 5.3 for questions the women had for one another, Arab group.

Table 5.3

Questions the Women had for One Another, Arab Group

Group	Questions
Arab	Based on what, did the world decide that American rules and culture are ideal?
	Why does American culture appeal to us?
	How does it feel if you have been living in an Arab country for years and your are called an expat and a foreigner (she expressed curiosity about the boundaries and the feeling of being outcast)?
	What kind of influence does America have on Arabs (broadly) and on you (personally)?
	How did being in an American university change you as an individual?
	Are there limitations of what we can share as Arabs to Americans and same with Americans to Arabs (personal, religion, politics)?
	Are there some things that are actually better kept unsaid? I've heard that our cultures are quite the same: big cars, house with backyard, family?
	Are there differences/similarities between Arabs and Americans in terms of thoughts regarding events (9/11, etc.)?

This whole notion of marrying outside the country, is it a big deal?

What are Arab and American views of women on: jobs, status, being equal to men?

What is the impact of news: Arab to American and American to Arab?

How connected are Arab women to each other and what controls their lives?

How powerful are Arab women in their family surroundings and how much say do they have?

What/how does an Arab American feel deep inside of self?

The Arab group expressed inquisitiveness about the roles of Arab women in Arab society as compared with the roles of women in U.S. society. They are also interested (as were non-Arabs) in the internal state of Arab Americans—their sense of self and identity. They expressed some offense and anger at their perception of U.S. hegemony and westernization trends. Lastly, they are intrigued about our similarities and differences in areas of family, materialism, thoughts about 9/11, and the impact of the media. See Table 5.4 for questions the women had for one another, Arab American group.

Table 5.4

Questions the Women had for One Another, Arab American Group

Group	Questions
Arab	I'm interested to know how much they know about the Arab world, or American, even, it doesn't have to be the whole Arab world, because it's huge but at least do they have any knowledge about one of the cultures, or maybe one of the religions, because we have several religions, and really—so I'm really curious to know how much they know and then what are they doing to bridge this gap in terms of the Arab/American relations. If you really want to bridge this gap, so what are you doing? It doesn't have to be heading an

organization . . . but just at least at your level, within your family what you do with your circle of friends. I think that's the way to do it and it starts one person at a time.

I am curious what they think about anywhere we get involved (Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine). How do people think about these things, do they think that this is going in the right direction or not?

What are their honest perceptions of Arabs and Muslims post-9/11 (pre-9/11 and post-9/11)?

I'd like to ask non-Arabs be open, be receptive, and understand that differences or being different is not necessarily the Other.

What contributed to their negative perception of Arabs other than 9/11? How long has it been forming? And, are you interested in changing it?

The Arab American group was concerned and interested in how much non-Arabs know or do not know about the Arab world—a perceived education gap. With this, they also express some impatience about action, as did the non-Arab group asking "what are they (non-Arabs) doing themselves about the gap?" They expressed interest in knowing about non-Arabs views on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. Lastly, they expressed interest in reversing negative perceptions that may be held about Arabs. These questions the women had for each other constitute a collective reaching out—an admission of curiosity and a respect for knowing. The questions show, in some cases, empathy and a readiness for dialogue—all precursors to understanding.

In contemplating dialogue, I found the following passage of a participant to be profound:

I remember my husband saying September 11th was horrendous, and people were asking why, why? But you know what? Nobody really wanted to hear the answer. They're asking the why but not listening to the why. They didn't want an answer; they wanted to continue to say why. (AA, 6)

This kind of sentiment between Arabs and non-Arabs can quickly shut down the prospect for dialogue. The women in this study demonstrated something different. They demonstrated they are collectively interested in the why of 9/11 and in the status of Arab/American relations. Their questions of one another edge us toward action, which is ultimately the purpose of dialogue.

Areas of embedded perceptions and opinions. Within the narratives for each group, I found areas of embedded perception and opinion about self and others. Some of these may arise from a simple lack of understanding due to a lack of knowledge (such as the specific comment about the lack of knowledge of non-Arabs about the Arab world—see Table 5.7, AA 3 and AA 4). However, most are a result of more complex forces. Highlighting these areas is useful as a way to increase both self-awareness and awareness of other's lifeworlds. Each of these could be further interrogated and critiqued in a group setting with the aim of gaining a stronger basis for fruitful dialogue. See Table 5.5 for key areas of embedded perceptions and opinions from the non-Arab perspective.

Table 5.5

Key Areas of Embedded Perceptions and Opinions from the Non-Arab Perspective

Group	Area of Embedded Perceptions and Opinions
Non-Arab	1. No particular incentive to reach out to newcomers (other ethnic groups).
	2. Americans tendency themselves to not venture out of comfort zone (not a high priority on exploring the cultures/languages of others).
	3. U.S. is an individualistic culture in contrast to Arab collectivist culture.
	4. There is a perceived tendency in U.S. that Arabs (any ethnic group) prefer to stay within their own circles.

5. There is a perception of the Arab identity as victimized.

6. There is a sense of not knowing what the right thing to do is—a fear of offending if and when they do reach out.

7. There is discomfort with our lack of knowledge and fear of offending due to not knowing things.

8. It is difficult to take the role of defending Arabs and then come into proximity of something like honor killings. Some women find certain practices impossible to defend.

9. Differing cultural priorities on adapting to change. (American mainstream may be more adept at change while Arabs have survived by sticking to their value on tradition.)

10. Nature of U.S. as a judgmental culture/arrogance precluding understanding.

11. Misunderstandings about covering.

12. Sense that Arab Americans want to maintain their distance from mainstream America.

What stands out in the areas highlighted above are how many tie to assumptions about Arab assimilation to the U.S. coupled with misunderstandings about U.S. mainstream culture's role in perpetuating this phenomenon (see 1, 4, 10, and 12). Another significant issue raised is the fear of offending Arabs by doing or saying the wrong things, which can preclude non-Arabs from reaching out (see 6 and 7). Also interesting is the observation about cultural differences around adaptation to change   (see 9). See Table 5.6 for key areas of embedded perceptions and opinions from the Arab perspective.

Table 5.6

Key Areas of Embedded Perceptions and Opinions from the Arab Perspective

Group	Area of Embedded Perceptions and Opinions
Arab	1. Non-Arabs should understand the closed nature of Arab culture, and the tight family orientation.
	2. Arab culture is collectivist and orients to the group, not the individual. (also shared with non-Arabs)
	3. Arabs may fear from politics and have an impulse to keep a low profile during times of turmoil.
	4. Concern about crime in America may affect ability to reach out.
	5. Ongoing concern about being discriminated against.
	6. Lack of familiarity with the U.S. may preclude reaching out.
	7. Many non-Arabs can afford to be assertive and provocative as they are not under scrutiny by society and the media.
	8. Complexity and misunderstanding (even within families) exists surrounding practice of covering.
	9. Lack of understanding by non-Arabs of how privileged people from parts of the Arab world are (e.g., all are not living in poverty, many are well-off, well-read, well-educated, well-traveled).

I am most struck by how many of these points relate to identity (see 1, 2, 8, and 9) or fear of the U.S. or fear of being misrepresented (see 3, 4, 5, and 7). See Table 5.7 for key areas of embedded perceptions and opinions from the Arab American perspective.

Table 5.7

Key Areas of Embedded Perceptions and Opinions from the Arab American Perspective

Group	Area of Embedded Perceptions and Opinions
Arab American	1. Arab Americans at times feel confronted by unwanted attention. There are relatively few of them in the population and to be regularly approached due to the way they look or the way they are dressed can be confronting even if the advance is a friendly one. They often don't have anonymity or privacy in public spaces.
	2. Feel that there is some basic lack of knowledge by non-Arabs for example, about the high standard of living in some Arab countries-media focuses on poverty and less on successes.
	3. Non-Arab lack of understanding of basic words and phrases in Arabic and willingness to make negative judgments in the absence of knowledge.
	4. Non-Arabs can lack the basics of geography, Palestine is not Pakistan, for example.
	5. Lack of understanding by non-Arabs that explaining oneself and one's background endlessly can be exhausting.
	6. Arab Americans sit in a unique place with the ability to critique both America and their country of origin in the Arab world, and there is some frustration that Arabs don't talk about problems which perpetuates an image of Middle East as backwards.
	7. Covering presents a symbolic area of misunderstanding.
	8. Tendency to stay within one's own ethnic group and comfort/safety zone.

One of the things that stands out from this group is the specific picture painted of the

lack of knowledge non-Arabs have about Arabs (see 2, 3, and 4). This fits closely with non-

Arabs feeling like they will do or say the wrong thing—further evidence of a knowledge gap

(culture, language, tradition, etc). This makes it difficult, in turn, for non-Arabs to approach

Arabs with confidence and difficult for Arabs to trust their identity and culture will be understood and respected.

These short statements taken in total cover a range of areas and get to the heart of the embeddedness of perceptions. As such, participants in a workshop or dialogue session would need to be prepared for these topics. One way to do that would be to use these areas as prompts in a reflective freewriting session to allow women to contemplate the topics privately and relate them to their lives in advance of sharing. I can envision this set of findings being an excellent starting point for a long-distance dialogue between the participants in this study or as a starting point for a workshop with new participants. The session could start with discussing and interrogating these and then move into exploring additional areas of current relevance to the group.

Arab Americans: Contributors to Change

Scholars have explored the impact of 9/11 on Arab America as described in detail in chapter 2. Baligh (2003) found most disturbing has been the questioning of their loyalty to the nation and widespread sentiments that view Arab Americans as collectively guilty for the actions of a small number of radical fundamentalists. These sentiments are echoed in the narratives of the Arab Americans in this study, which, with their depth of experience in the U.S. and their respective counties of origin, provide important insights on the core themes of this study. We find the Arab American women echo some of the findings of the other groups, but also contribute a new layer of depth and insight. The security concerns of Arab Americans are many and have been exacerbated by 9/11, the aftermath, and ongoing events. Further, Arab Americans have security concerns regarding their home countries—some of a historic nature cause recurring psychological issues and some impact their freedom of movement and

connection to families in the Arab world. Arab Americans have a significant stake in Arab/American relations. September 11, 2001 and the foreign policy aftermath represent a very difficult period of history regarding Arab/American relations. The fact the U.S. was targeted so effectively on home soil opens up new narratives of human insecurity for both Arab and non-Arab Americans.

The engagement with and understanding of Arab Americans regarding both the Arab world and America with the respective complexities and allegiances gives them a source of depth. In some senses, they hold one important key to improving Arab/American relations. That said, the narratives show circumstance does not always allow Arab Americans to recognize or experience this power and potential. At times, Arab Americans find themselves in a mode of retraction, defensiveness, in a place of fear and offendedness. It is important to consider the intense pressures on Arab Americans and the influencing trust and security issues, along with an elevated need for them to cope with being misrepresented and misunderstood. Given the facility Arab Americans have regarding both the U.S. and the Arab world, there may be a temptation to make assumptions about how they may play a bridging role between cultures. However, just as important and needed for improved Arab/American relations is a mechanism where non-Arabs in the U.S. and Arabs outside of the U.S. are also working to build bridges and make a variety of substantive positive changes in a way that is thoughtful, understanding, and knowledge-based. There needs to be a collective, deep exploration of areas of common ground, with all groups (Arab, non-Arab and Arab American) discussing how they envision a better world with less oppression and more understanding between peoples.

This study lays important groundwork aiming to understand women's sense of belonging in the political world and exposes the nature of women's voices during a time of

protracted war. The study adds to the body of knowledge on relations between the East and

the West and to the literature concerning the role of political narratives in meaning-making

during times of turmoil. More specifically, it helps us understand perspectives on Arab

American relations and how these link to human security. Lastly, it uncovers our tendencies, as

humans, toward Othering. This work speaks to new understandings pointing to identity,

cultural misunderstandings, the phenomena of racism, discrimination, Othering, and the media

as having definitive impacts on our collective sense of security and, hence, on our actual human

security.

Contribution of this Study

This research fills a gap in the existing literature. The review of the literature pointed to

a disturbing degree of social incivility, insecurity, and a widening of the gap between Arab and

non-Arab peoples. The current study examined these trends qualitatively through the creation

of political narratives reflecting our current times. Very few researchers are also looking at the

opinions, feelings, and experiences of non-Arab Americans on these topics. As summarized in

chapter 2, a number of researchers are doing studies with the Arab American population. The

ones who are working with non-Arabs on these issues have used largely quantitative methods

(surveys, questionnaires) to get at fairly narrowly framed questions about discrimination and

racism (Bushman, 2004; Echebarria-Echabe, 2007; Panagopoulos, 2006). In terms of

Arab/American relations research on Arab populations, I have found mainly survey and polling

data. It could well be that studies are being done in Arabic that I have not accessed. That said,

to my knowledge, no researcher (Arab or non-Arab) is engaging non-Arabs using qualitative

methods on these topics. Further, I have not found any constructivist studies aiming to explore

relations between Arabs and non-Arabs through the eyes of the three groups—Arab, non-Arab,

and Arab Americans. This is what situates this work in a unique and important niche. I believe the results of using narrative inquiry and the methodology of freewriting show these are useful means of illuminating social problems.

In summary, I believe one of the values of this study revolves around its commitment to bring the voices of women forward on these issues-the status of Arab/American relations. Engaging women who identify as Arab, Arab American, and non-Arab, this work brings an important cross section of viewpoints into the literature. Secondly, while it has been an exercise of restraint, I believe there is value in this study first finding out whether there is a basis for dialogue in advance of jumping into the stage of enacting dialogue. This study does find, at least for the groups involved in the study, there is a basis for dialogue. Hopefully, this study will provide a stepping off place for future studies in this arena. Lastly, we now know how 18 women think and feel about identity factors, racism, discrimination, and Othering experiences that both impact identity and are impacted by identity, the media as an influencing factor, and all these as determinants of human security. We know the range of issues within these themes effect the lives of these women, their sense of the future, and their sense of human security.

Challenges and Limitations of the Study

There are recognized limitations of being interviewed in a language other than one's native language. While participants had their choice of language for the freewriting (all chose English), they were asked to interview in English. A limitation of this study may be not having the Arab participants do interviews in their language of choice. While all participants had good facility with English, I noted the nuance and complexity present in Arab and Arab American narratives could have been influenced and possibly lessened because they were not speaking in their first language. In some cases, English was not their second language, but their third. Arab

American and Arab participants acquired English between the ages of three and 30, and I recognized the later the women acquired English the more chance there is this might have created a limitation.

Another of the limitations of this study comes with its time bound nature. The findings represent a snapshot in time. Not only does our cultural context evolve, our thoughts and feelings evolve. Certainly, my own thoughts and feelings have evolved as my knowledge and sensitivities have grown, the political context has shifted, and relevant events have come and gone. In this sense, this study would be difficult (if not impossible) to replicate. The constant bombardment by new events in the media and my own shifting thoughts and understandings as a researcher in light of new information presented me with a challenge.

I would have liked to have been able to do the extended freewriting with all the Arab and non-Arab participants. For cultural reasons, I modified the method in order to adapt to the comfort levels of Arab and Arab American participants. In the end, I think the balance of some writing and some talking session worked well and yielded a similar type of preparation for later interviews, but it did introduce some variation in the way the data was collected and, hence, is noted here as a potential limitation.

The participants in this study did, perhaps, not represent the perspective of the person on the street. Rather, I was looking for participants who had grappled with issues of Arab/American relations either professionally or personally. Studies are always limited by the groups and populations not represented.

Lastly, the breadth of this study and its interdisciplinary nature while, in some ways, is a strength, it is also a limitation. The limitation stems from the impossibility of reaching complete breadth on five substantial thematic areas, within the context of a study of this scale.

However, the strength is derived from looking at the interconnections between these key themes.

Ideas for Further Exploration and Research

I see several areas worthy of further investigation. First, I think it would be worthwhile to revisit these same transcripts after letting some time pass and investigating to find new layers of meaning. In light of the ebb and flow of events, incumbent emotions, the shifting of social worlds, and the evolving situational context, a future review of these transcripts would yield a secondary level of political narrative that would benefit from some distance and digestion.

Second, I think it could be valuable to turn this study into an action research project with the 18 original participants. This could entail sharing transcripts between the three groups including the questions they had of one another. I would propose using this as background to design a full dialogue between the 18 participants in the study. The present study would provide the material upon which to base more in depth interaction and investigation with the hope of subsequent, collaboratively determined actions. I see this study as providing a strong basis for future work—a starting point for formal or informal dialogue.

Third, another angle with this data set would be to do in–depth work with the transcripts using Gilligan et al.'s (2003) listening guide, looking closely at women's voice. Fourth, it would be useful to do longitudinal work with the same women to track the evolution of their thoughts and feelings about the status of Arab/American relations, the status of human security, contributions to the gap, pivotal events, and so on. Finally, this study could act as a base for forgiveness and restitution research around 9/11 and the aftermath. Chapter 6 discusses the relevance of this study to leadership and change.

Chapter VI: Implications for Leadership and Change

Continually work out and revise your views of the *problem of history* [emphasis added throughout quote], the *problems of biography* and the *problems of social structure in which biography and history intersect*. Keep your eyes open to the *varieties of individuality* and to the modes of *epochal change*. (Mills, 1959, p. 225)

Now that we have seen and discussed the findings, I want to step back and contemplate this study with this passage from Mills (1959) in mind. The issues this study broaches are influenced by history, biography (identity), and change. The memorable events of 9/11 and the chain of (also memorable) retaliatory events continuing to follow 9/11 have, literally, given the world a new set of reference points for Arab/American relations. While these events are especially distinctive and of a scale that many, if not most, people are aware of them, I maintain any social problem one examines closely will also have a corresponding set of pivotal events and influencing factors. The issues Mills raised, then transcend the current topic under review and point us to the ubiquitous nature of unraveling social problems. To that end, I believe this study can be useful in framing and inquiry around other complex sociopolitical situations.

Brief Synopsis of Study

This study is an intercultural work aiming to bring better understanding of the status of Arab/American relations and implications for human security from the perspectives of three groups of women—Arabs living in the U.S., Arabs living in Qatar, and non-Arabs. Using a narrative inquiry methodology involving freewriting, complemented by small focus groups interactions, and followed by interviews, I was able to gain insight into the topics of the study. The findings shine light on the areas where Arabs and non-Arabs have both misunderstandings and understandings. The findings go further to identify several interrelated determinants of human security: the closely held nature of identity, patterns of racism, discrimination, Othering,

and the media. Taken collectively, we can infer from the findings a level of readiness for dialogue on these themes. This study adds a substantive contribution to the literature in that it provides a qualitative inquiry capturing both breadth and depth of Arab and non-Arab perspectives on the cauldron of complicated issues surrounding Arab/American relations.

Literature Reviewed

In the literature review, I began with the history and context that frames Arab and U.S. relations with the works of key Arab and non-Arab scholars including Ajami (2003), Anthony (2003), Coury (2005), Foukara (2007), Isacoff (2005), McAlister (2005), Nayak (2006), Pressman (2005), Reinhart (2006), and Said (1979). I then discussed the scholarship surrounding the nature of identity as I see it relating to Arab/American relations, referring to the works of Balibar (1991), Cockburn (2007), Coury (2005), Huddy (2001), Livesey (2005), Nagel (2002), Nagel and Staeheli (2005), Nelson (1998), Oswald (2005), Roediger (2002), Tajfel (1981), Turner et al. (1987), and Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler (2002). Next, I reviewed key scholarship on racism, discrimination, and Othering I found important to the Arab/American context. This included Abraham (2007), Cainkar (2008), Coryn and Borshuk (2006), Essed (1991), Haddad (2004), Jamal and Naber (2008), McAlister (2005), Naber (2002), Opotow (1987, 1993), Orfalea (2006), Salaita (2006), Staub (1987), and Ta (2007). I next reviewed key literature highlighting the role of the media in Arab/American relations including the work of Alsultany (2007, 2008), Daniela (2007), Dina (2002), Jaramillo (2009), Joseph et al. (2008), Lewis (2004), McAlister (2005), and Monje (2007). Lastly, I discussed the trend toward human security via Braig and Wolte (2002), Cockburn (2007), de Rivera and Paez (2007), Enloe (1989), Huntington (1993), Manachandra (2001), Said (2001), Smith (1999), UNEP (1994, 2009), Weber (2001), and Youngs (2006).

Relevance of Study to Leadership and Change

The balance of this chapter explores three ideas I believe have direct relevance for leadership and change. The first stems from my long-held belief that intercultural work can be thought of as an informal form of diplomacy. The second is that voice is a metaphor for leadership and voice is a precursor for action. The final idea is that a vital aspect of leadership is the envisioning of a desired future state. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

Intercultural work and diplomacy. I like to think of the intercultural work of the current study as an act of diplomacy between peoples. The act of reaching out as a researcher and being reached back to by the 18 women participants speaks to me of diplomacy. As one participant in the study put it, "if someone cares enough to ask, then I care enough to answer" (AA,2). Together, we reflected and expanded our awareness, learning something about how others experience the world in the process. The groups did not interact with each other directly, but the women took the important steps of envisioning the others, their thoughts and feelings, and posing questions of the other groups. Each woman learned something about members within her own group and each created voice on topics of importance to Arab/American relations. By agreeing to take part in this study and engaging, each woman took a step toward reflection on her own culture and greater intercultural awareness in what, I would maintain, amounts to an important diplomatic act. I believe women can act effectively as border crossers in this way.

Part of what happened in Arab/American relations (since 9/11 in particular) is what I will call a tragedy of the diplomatic commons.[50] The political and social capital of the U.S. has been depleted to the extent diplomacy is no longer a trustworthy tool. Hence, we have to do

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[50] Peter Senge has appropriated the work of Garrett Hardin, well-known population ecologist. Senge (1990) described Hardin's seminal concept, the "tragedy of the commons" where "what's right for each part is wrong for the whole" (p. 294).

careful work, person-to-person to reclaim diplomacy. These times call for us to cultivate and hone our critical thinking skills. Historically, when trust in leadership and government is strained, the importance of people and voice becomes elevated[51] (see Wolf, 2007; Zinn, 2007). Informal forms of diplomacy become increasingly utilized with people more compelled to speak, act, and otherwise exercise voice. During times of turmoil, leadership and governments mobilize public diplomacy apparatus as a way to inform the public about events, but also to cultivate particular trends in public opinion. The appearance of Barak Obama on the political leadership stage, for example, has not seemed to definitively move the opinions of the women in this study toward trust and confidence. Nearly every participant in this study spoke of a desire for more action, more quickly on issues of connection to Arab/American relations than they currently see from the Obama administration.

While we cannot generalize, I have to believe that (some) Arab women are in need of (and desire) allies. I hear this in the words of Abu-Jaber (as cited in Abraham, 2007) as she emphasized regarding these issues that she fundamentally believed we all have only to connect as humans. Abraham (2007) echoed this, "That may be our best hope for facilitating harmony, for ending all wars, right there, so simply stated: To connect. To only connect" (p. 197). The words of Joseph (2007) also compel, "I believe that any people can understand each other. Nothing, I believe, is better for cultural understanding than working together, shoulder to shoulder" (p. 1). This study gave the opportunity to participants to dispel negative or limiting stereotypes and to depict and share something of themselves as diverse, complex people. Leadership in the arena of Arab/American relations is dependent on cultivating intercultural

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[51] The 2009-2010 Tea Party movement in the U.S. was born, in part, out of government distrust and has given a previously relatively inactive group of citizens an outlet for conservative voice.

awareness, critical thinking, and reinvigorating the art of diplomacy—at times person-by-person.

Voice as a metaphor for leadership and as a precursor to action. Voice can be seen as a metaphor for leadership. The cultivation of voice can take many forms from speaking, to writing, to acting, and so on. I found the women in the study were more receptive to talking about voice rather than leadership. There was something clichéd about a direct provocation on leadership, whereas, my inquiries about voice seemed to resonate well with the women. Leadership can be one of those contestable concepts like feminism with so many modes and definitions. This is particularly problematic in an international context, whereas voice is more universally interpreted. One woman talked with me about voice in this way:

> My voice is heard, at least in this community, mainly in my classrooms. So women who are active and involved in their communities will definitely make a difference. When I bring other students who are of Arab descent, or Muslim, they also make a difference by answering questions and sharing their life experiences. (AA, 5)

I see her representation of cultivating voice (and shared voice) through teaching as leading. In an arena of complex intercultural work, such as Arab/American relations, understanding and cultivating one's voice is critical to leadership and initiating change. The more reflective we can be about the pallet of experiences and factors that influence our voice, the more success we may have in cultivating it for positive ends. I realized it was important to create an opportunity in this study for the women to share their voices in the form of questions for one another. Their questions showed a clear willingness to reach out across conflict. Some questions showed empathy. Some questions showed defensiveness or hurt. Other questions showed curiosity and interest. Most questions showed a desire for understanding and change. Ultimately, I am looking forward to sharing this study among all

the women involved and seeing what may result. There is value in creating an opportunity for the women in this study to listen to one another.

In this study, a number of interesting lenses regarding voice surfaced including: cultural aspects of voice, barriers to voice, role models for voice, motivation for voice, intergenerational voice, political voice, child rearing and voice, activism and voice, and the notion of bystanders and voice. Voice is a metaphor for leadership and a precursor for action. Time spent exploring women's individual and collective voice in the context of some of the lenses mentioned above would be time well spent.

In thinking about my own voice and ways in which this research will change my own practice, I have several observations. Leadership and reflection are intimately linked. It has been useful to me to envision the transferability and application of the Arab/American situation to other times, other contexts, and other conflicts. I am confident the learnings of this study will provide ballast and a significant point of reference for future political narrative inquiries. More specifically, my ongoing intercultural work will forever be informed by the insights and sensibilities of the 18 women of this study. Among other things, this work has caused me to undergo a deepened examination of Othering within my own life—a reflectiveness about the layers of ways we knowingly and unknowingly Other, as humans. I have also recognized new levels of the importance of identity to intercultural work. The more self-aware we are and the more we know about one another (including how we perceive ourselves), the more likely it will be that we can clasp hands. There is a lifetime of work and reflection here.

Second, this study has caused me to reflect on my own fears and to think differently about cultivating a practice of stepping out of my comfort zone. I now understand more about

the layers of privilege that come with being a White, middle class American. I have a renewed sense of the value of crossing boundaries (both actual and perceived) to collectively engage our humanness.

Third, this study caused me to deepen my realization of the role and power of the media on humans. In the haste of our time-constrained societies, we often do not take the time to be responsible consumers of media. We do not adequately question and learn from a wide enough range of sources. This can be a huge determinant on the relations between peoples. I do not believe the media is either good or bad. Rather, I believe it is our job as consumers and thinkers to make sense of what we see and hear. To that end, I vow to further deepen my practice of reflection around the media and to speak out when and if I see egregious violations—things I see to be misrepresentations.

Lastly, this study intrigued me regarding the power of political narrative inquiry to illuminate social problems and about the unique nature of dialogue as a tool for social change. I am left with a desire to further develop this methodology, particularly in conjunction with the freewriting methods used in this study.

Closing: Leadership and envisioning prospects for restitution and forgiveness.
What is to be done in the face of problems with Arab/American relations? The scholarship and practice on restitution and forgiveness give some consolation. In reviewing the literature of this area, the restorative work happening around the world uplifted me, while, at the same time, I was tempered by my reflections on what has occurred to prompt such measures. When restitution happens on a national scale, we are (to an extent) redeemed as a culture. Conventional wisdom maintains that, far enough from the events and out of context, there are no instances in which suffering will not animate sympathy or in which destruction will not be

denounced, often on both sides of a conflict (Barken, 2000). Consider, for a moment, the power of an apology. In Australia, the country gathered to sign what is known as Sorry Books as a beginning point for formal reconciliation with the Aborigines. This process allowed for a public and collective rejection of racism. Horrible things happen that can never be undone. But, they can be mitigated. Wounds can begin to heal over time. How long it can take for restitution to come along, however, is a source of frustration. This study showed me firsthand it takes time for people to trust. Time is needed to trust the sincerity of the granter of the restitution or apology. In the moment, the scars from 9/11 and the continuing aftermath may be, for example, too present for an apology to be received, to take hold, or to be granted, for that matter.

There is relevance to this study in the concept of *collective self-healing*, which can be carried out via active participation in social and political activities (Nets & Bar-Tal, 2007). There are poignant examples of collective self-healing during this time of war happening all over the U.S. For example, close to my home the following types of activities are happening: peace vigils (one group has been meeting every single day from 5:00 pm to 6:00 pm in front of the courthouse since October 7, 2001 when the first U.S. bomb struck Afghanistan); exhibits on the human and economic cost of the Iraq war; creation of nonprofit organization to help settle Iraqi (and Afghani) interpreters in the U.S.; and a university hospital has developed an Intercultural Psychiatric Program to assist refugees arriving from war zones. These examples are merely illustrative, but they speak to the intensity with which people do and are reaching out and taking initiative for collective self-healing in this arena.

How then do we move toward restitution? It is crucial to revisit history as we look forward. I believe we will look back on this post-9/11 time and see we have collectively

impacted Arab/American relations in ways that will take a very long time to repair. Minow (2002) described the importance of memory and remembering. She maintained "failing to remember hurts bystanders, too, because then they do not face their own choices about action and inaction nor redress the boundaries between groups that helped give rise to the atrocities" (p. 16). I, then, ask that we collectively remember the history prior to 9/11 that has created Arab/American relations, remember 9/11, remember the aftermath of 9/11 (including the global war on terror and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), and remember the impacts of these events and others on Arabs and non-Arabs alike.

In closing, I struggle to articulate some concept of what I will term *advance restitution*. Do we have to wait until decades past the conflict to begin to reach forward to repair bridges between peoples? I am still left with this question and also full of hope that the answer is "No, we can start now."

APPENDIX

Appendix A: Participant Comments on Freewriting Methodology

Responses to my inquiry about how the freewriting went from perspective of participants:

I think I could have done more, and talked more, and thought more about it. I could have been more immersed in it for a longer period of time, believe or not, maybe not in – I think it would have to have been in another sitting. The time is always a factor, but I think you get the good stuff when you start flowing a little bit, you know, when you're not distracted? (NA2)

I think the free write is more productive. I think it gives you an opportunity to go at your speed, as opposed to feeling like you need to come up with the answers, and I don't know. I think out loud fairly well, I mean, and I've certainly done therapy before, which is the same kind of thing. [Laughter] "And so how does that make you feel?" "Oh, let me tell you!" [Laughter] You know? It's not unlike that. But –The writing is productive in a different way. The only limitation for me is having carpal tunnel, you know? And so there would be places where I could take my hand and just kind of have to rest it, which is okay, because I think way faster than I can write, anyway, so I would refine ideas, but – yeah, no, I think it's – I think it's good to have both [writing and talking]. (NA, 2)

I thought it was very interesting but I thought it was too long because towards the end -- I mean I loved the questions but towards the end I think my brain and my hand were getting really, really tired. Maybe if we'd have broken it up into two afternoon sessions. I thought the people were very, very interesting. (NA1)

Yeah, it was good. The chronological, I thought that was really good because when I went home and I looked at it, well I think I told you about [name], but I saw in my writing how there is life after death. I was in this time period when you think you can't even put one foot ahead of the other and to see how far I've come in that distance and yeah, I thought it was very important. You remember [Name] and I were laughing because when you handed out that list of the counselor, like what's the matter, we don't need counselors and then on the way home we were like, oh my god [Name] said. She's like oh my god, I wrote about abuse and divorce and this and she said maybe we should look up a counselor. So for us it was comical but I think good. But that's how [Name] and I are but it was important because I think it kind of set it up for the activity for the next day. Without it I think it would've been a little harder to get into. (NA1)

The only thing is that I couldn't look for themes or anything by the end of it. I was tired, so if I had been able to come back and look at it again I might have been, but that's what you get to do….I did find that I had things to write about and you know, like I'm sure there were things that um, I left out or maybe things that you know, I would change my opinion about in another setting, but I liked the fact that it was just like, what comes out. You know, I liked it….I think I think about this obsessively anyway, because there's so many things about my identity that are tied up in this, and I think that's something that I realized. It's sort of I, you know, I think because I don't have a family, my whole identity is still based on my family that consists of my siblings and that whole family is based on my upbringing overseas, so a lot of this stuff is constantly rehashed in my brain; too much [Laughter]. (NA4)

I really let go. Like, I was trying to write as much as I could and not put it in any sort of um, not get stumbled on how to spell things or you know and really tried to think it through but also not think too hard. I was trying to do, trying to really pick up on what you said was not to think it through too much, and to just really get out what was the first thing on my mind. …Um, I think that's good, the free writing, because I may not have spoke up on certain topics because I don't, as you can see there are certain things that like I have no idea. I will put that down on a piece of paper for you to know that you asked this and then you asked a prompt and I was like I have no idea how to even respond to this. So, I may not have said that in a verbal. I may have just been more quiet. So, you know I think it's like journaling where you feel like you can just put down how you feel, and I felt safe so I knew I could put down whatever I want and that I wasn't going to be judged by it. And, I think that was very good for you to put that up front but you, you weren't looking for anything in particular, you really wanted to know what came out and you know, so when I went through it and I looked again and I'm like it's all emotion. It's all very feeling and how I feel about this, and senses. (NA3)

I do like to write, so it certainly didn't put me off. It was good because sometimes when you're engaged in conversation, you start to change what you're saying to either clarify, or, you're playing off what the other person is giving to you. You're reacting to what they're saying and then you're modifying it. When it's just the free writing, I'm just outputting, and I'm not making any adjustments for what I would do in a conversation. Now the negative of that, of course, is that I can't clarify things. But then, I think the thing I wished is that I could have had as much time as I wanted to write about different things. Like sometimes I felt like I stopped because the next prompt was coming up, and I felt like I could have gone on and on and on. I was very comfortable. I liked that. If there had been somebody that I didn't like in the group, that would have been a pain. But we weren't, even if there had been somebody that I didn't like, I wasn't interacting with them as much. But it was nice every once in a while for us to be able to just chitchat and stuff. The size of the groups allowed for that. If we had still been in a group, but if there had been twenty five people in there, then that would have been a different experience because we would have either had small conversations with the people around us, or we might not have talked at all. (NA5)

You know, the point, it was a little bit different with us because the group that is here, we are three friends, and each one knows about the other… So, there is not a big different between writing and a spoken thought. Talking was, I think was more fruitful because you know like, she will give one point, I will elaborate more. I will give one point, she will give her opinion about it. (A6)

I think when it came to writing, it was – sometimes it was better to write than to speak, because I'd like to express myself more when I'm speaking, but when I'm with a group of people there are things that maybe we don't want to tell each other, especially because we weren't old friends, so it was nicer just to write anything down on paper. (A5)

You know I think for, for [self-directiveness] I think it's better to write whatever thoughts in your mind, because you know it will direct you to the way to you know, to the way of to reach certain things. Maybe sometimes you are upset, this is what it may sound, but if you are upset and if you kept writing whatever thoughts are in your mind it will help you to understand yourself, and then by time it will help you to, you know to reach to a conclusion that the way of handling things. So I think the way of writing is very helpful, very, especially for someone who works in to relieve the stress. (A3)

Yeah. That worked for me. There are many things that I could write down what I feel, and things like that, but the thing I like about a group is that they – you start building up on ideas, and just talking, and like getting someone's reaction out of something that you say is really cool. But yeah, writing – I like writing because it starts you – it starts to get you winded up, and then when we started talking we had other things that we wrote just came out. (A1)

Yes. I think it's okay, because you're like speaking to yourself, and re-thinking everything that you have in mind, or happened to you, but you never really talked about, because sometimes it's not about trust, but you can't like tell around a person everything about your life. So, I think writing helps in a way, but sometimes it's like the paper intimidates you, a blank paper. It's the same thing with design, like a blank page. What should I do? That's what's intimidating, but as soon as you start, you're like you go, and go, and go, because it's just talking to yourself. (A2)

Appendix B: Situational Analysis Final Ordered Working Version

Non-Arab Group

1. **Individual Human Elements/Actors**
   Yasser Arafat
   Golda Meir
   Obama
   Ariel Sharon
   Sheikha Mozaha Bint Nasser Al Missned

2. **Collective Human Elements/Actors**
   Japanese Americans
   Al Qaeda
   Christians
   Arab Christians
   Israeli Christians
   Other Christians
   Muslims
   Jews
   All U.S. immigrant groups
   Mexican Americans
   Hispanic Americans
   Japanese Americans
   Taliban
   Pakistan
   Palestinians
   Israelis/Israel
   U.S. domestic terrorists
   Women leaders
   Hispanic Americans
   Bush administration
   U.S. Embassy in Jordan
   Media outlets
   Families

3. **Discursive Constructions of Individual and/or Collective Human Actors**
   Hatred of Americans/Anti-Americanism
   Intergenerational hatred
   Tendency to reach out by Arabs, non-Arabs
       Lack of willingness of Americans to venture out
   Discrimination/racism against Mexican Americans
   Othering, lack of understanding, fear
       Othering and distrust resulting from women covering
       Othering and cultural superiority

Human security
    Human security and situational complexity
    Human security and how U.S. imposes on Afghanistan
    Personal and family security
Fear and distrust of Arabs
Attitudes of young Arabs
Lack of cultural sensitivity
U.S., a judgmental culture
Fear as basis for reciprocal hate by the U.S.
Identity
    Who is American? (Privilege and documentation)
    Denied point of pride of ancestry
    Misrepresentation of Americans (many)
    Complexity of self-identification (safety, privilege, personal choice)
    Idea of no single America
    Identity shift toward being Muslim post-9/11
    Arab victim phenomena
Bridging out of comfort zones
Bush as catalyst to political action
Stereotyping about the U.S. (Los Angeles)
Prejudice as racism or hatred versus prejudice as prejudging, stereotyping,
    ignorance)
Cultural recoil
Jihad rhetoric
Cultural tendencies toward resisting change
Idea of war (Iraq) as a connecting point
Complexities of defending Arabs in the U.S.
Paradox and complexity facing Arab Americans living in the U.S. during
    wartime
Cultural alienation
U.S. Embassy culture and implications for diplomacy
Impact of Arab American relations within families
Connection to Jewish Plight
Arab women and activism
One way nature of dialogue between Arabs and non-Arabs
9/11 as an opportunity to engage and understand

4. <u>Political/Economic Elements</u>
9/11 and oil prices
Poverty and Palestine
Homeland security and new funding priorities
Homeland security and profiling/compromising civil liberties
U.S. foreign policy on Israel and Palestine

5. <u>Temporal Elements</u>
Afghan conflict
    (girls and acid incident)

Nuclear insecurity
U.S. policy of protection of Israel
9/11 feelings, experiences and recollections
    "It's about time we felt this"
New feelings of being hated
Reaching out after 9/11
War in Iraq
Security/discomfort during travel/flying
Change
Jordan during second Intifada
Misuse of American flag after 9/11
Pre/post-9/11
Despair and Lebanon

6. **Major Issues/Debates (Usually Contested)**
   U.S. Support of Israel
   Palestinian situation
   Idea that Bush implemented 9/11
   Role of other Arab countries in Palestinian situation
   Israel-Palestinian conflict as recruiting tool

7. **Other KeyElements**
   Voice-silence continuum
   Trust (of media, information)
   Embarrassment
   Shame
   Courage
   Motivation to connect

8. **Nonhuman Elements/Actants**
   24/7 news media cycle

9. **Implicated Silent Actors/Actants**
   Children
   Homeland security workers
   Individual members of the media
   Individual government representatives
   Airports
   Airplanes

10. **Discursive Construction of Nonhuman Actants**
    Importance of two-way education, understanding
    Gender, power reflections
    Anonymity and Othering
    On women, voice and time (kids)
    America's retaliatory mode

America's "reasonable voice"
Political voice and women
Teaching cross-culturally
Cross-cultural communication

11. **Sociocultural/Symbolic Elements**
Use of American flag after 9/11

12. **Spatial Elements**
Differences between groups of Arab students
Women covering: variation, choice and reasons
Parallels between conservatives in Country X, Y
Variable issues facing Christian Arabs versus Muslim Arab concerning immigration
Parallels between Gulf Arab countries and Palestine
Cultural divides *within* Arab countries (among Arabs from various countries)

13. **Related Discourses (Historical, Narrative and/or Visual)**
Education/U.S. apathy and U.S. monolingual nature
The media and the educational gap
Parallels with Japanese Americans during WWII
Parallels and differences between Arab immigrants and other immigrants
Palestinian young people reaching out to American young people
Arab Americans and the media
      Media and social responsibility (repetitive images of 9/11 attacks)
      The public and social responsibility (we as consumers of media)
      Media, truth and the complex politics of representation
         Representation of Arabs, post- 9/11
      Identity politics and discourses
      Ex-pat identity and cultural alienation
      U.S. immigrant identity and discourses
      9/11, and Arab parents relations with their kids ("I just want to be American")
      Putting a human face on immigration
      Collectivist and individualistic cultures and discourses
      Arab victimology
      Oral versus written cultures

14. **Key Events**
9 year old Palestinian boy shot
9/11 attacks
Onset of conflict in Afghanistan
Onset of war in Iraq
Second Intifada

Arab Group

1. <u>**Individual Human Elements/Actors**</u>
     Obama
     Osama bin Laden
     Sheikha Mozaha Bint Nasser Al Missned
     Oprah
     Tyra Banks
     Dr. Phil

2. <u>**Collective Human Elements/Actors**</u>
     U.S. domestic terrorists
     "Outliers" (in any culture)
     Americans and American families
     Relatives in the U.S.

3. <u>**Discursive Constructions of Individual and/or Collective Human Actors**</u>
     Media and portrayal of Iraqi American war
     Treatment of Arabs in the U.S.
          Fear of airports, being held, questioned
          Airport problems due to covering
     Preconceptions of U.S. before visiting
     Perceptions of U.S. after visiting
          Interaction with African American in U.S.
     Friendliness of U.S. as compared to Europe
     Racism in Qatar
          Arab to Arab
          Arab to ex-pat/foreigner
          Arab to Indians
     Love of and pride in Arabic language
     Development and identity in Doha, Qatar
          Identity and self respect
          Backlash against development and U.S. role
          Education City as example (government confiscated homes and shops to erect American university)
          Qatari government critique
          Life before development boom

     On dating an American/dating in general and personal freedom
     Loss of identity as a culture and need to bring back language and history
     Media (Iraq, exaggeration and manipulation)
     Women's impact through their children
     U.S. fighting crime with crime
     Uncertainty on Obama
     Similarities in cultures/values
     Arab tendency to follow

Similarities in religion
Paradox of U.S. universities in Qatar (at what cost?)
Violence in the name of Islam
Examples of "right way Islam" and notion that stereotyping is boundaryless
Media embarrasses Arabs
  Media and identity-afraid to be who they are
  Result is "keeping it low" (low profile)
Arabs and tendency regarding first gesture/reaching out/one-way nature of
  communication
Varied reasons Arab women cover and perceptions therein
American education and critical thinking
American education and trade-offs
Value of design
On showing our true selves to each other/or not
U.S. Military base in Qatar
  Educational or cultural base needed
Perceptions of American women/people
Constraints of Qatari culture
Faith orientation to human security
Engagement in politics and security issues
U.S. tendency to control and dominate people
Education about Islam needed
"Smart" criminals in the U.S.
Identity: benefits of being both Arab and African
Perception of security in Qatar
On existence of American culture –Americans are from all over the world-what is there
  to preserve?
American women, obesity and image issues as compared to Arab context
Distinctions between tradition and religion
Opinion and practice of covering/not covering
  Fashion, choice, family, etc.
Osama bin Laden created to perpetuate conflict?

4. **Political/Economic Elements**
    Extreme pace of development in Doha, Qatar
   U.S. military base in Qatar-Iran issue
    Qatar as a bias (neutral, apolitical) peacemaking country
   Globalization + and -
   U.S. government and misleading people
   Quiet political voice
   Disconnect between people and political issues
   Uncertainty about Obama
   Concept of terrorist governments
   Perceptual differences between Arab and non-Arab terrorists
   American colonization/Iraq
   American colonization/Sudan (oil)

Arab nations conflicts with other Arab nations

5. <u>Temporal Elements</u>
Feelings, experience, and recollections of 9/11
Israeli-Palestine conflict
Iraq War

6. <u>Major Issues/Debates (Usually Contested)</u>
Anti-U.S. intervention position
Colonization positions/colonization of Muslims
Osama bin Laden: figure created to perpetuate conflict?
Iran's nuclear program and the use of U.S. military base in Qatar to stage for conflict with Iran
America as threat to Arab culture vs America as good influence

7. <u>Other Key Elements</u>
Emotional suffering from Iraq, Palestine and Afghan wars and spread of this (collective suffering)
Media and embarrassment of Arabs

8. <u>Nonhuman Elements/Actants</u>
Physical cultural losses (buildings)
Massive scale of development changing the landscape (pollution, quality of life, etc)
24/7 news media cycle

9. <u>Implicated Silent Actors/Actants</u>
airports
airplanes
children

10. <u>Discursive Construction of Nonhuman Actants</u>
Women and voice
Women and leadership
Men and reputation
Importance of women
Freedom
Independence
Desire for freedom of expression

11. <u>Sociocultural/Symbolic Elements</u>
Airports
Symbolism of men with beards
Cleanliness and Islam
Religion as cultural symbol/similarities among religions
Freedom of dress, of expression
Symbolism of covering and the many variations of this symbolism

Qatar's apolitical stance
"Pure Arabs"

12. <u>**Spatial Elements**</u>

Long distance to U.S. affects relations
Arab conflict with other Arabs
Variation within U.S.: perceptions of various states in U.S./stereotypes

13. <u>**Related Discourses (Historical, Narrative and/or Visual)**</u>

Cyclical and generational nature of gender relations
Education as remedy to violence in name of Islam
Dubai story-bankruptcy
Education about Islam needed
Communication between Arab and non-Arabs needed
Colonization of Muslims

14. <u>**Key Events**</u>

9 year old Palestinian boy shot
Dubai development trajectory and bankruptcy
    Nude march in San Francisco

Arab American Group

1. **Individual Human Elements/Actors**
Saddam Hussein
George W. Bush
King of Saudi Arabia
      Leila Ahmed
      Osama bin Laden
      Rahm Emanuel
      Gideon Livy
      Dick Cheney

2. **Collective Human Elements/Actors**
      U.S. Media
      Egyptian media
      Guantanamo Bay
      U.S. Gaza demonstrators
      Relatives in Egypt
      Saddam Hussein's army
      Iraqi people
      Women of Saudi Arabia
      "Stupid" Taliban
      Klu Klux Klan
      Women and children of Iraq
      American government
      Terrorists
      Arab small family business owners
      Hollywood/Hollywood directors
      Middle America
      Radical Mormons
      Radical Muslims
      Saudi mission
      Saudi Embassy
      Police, courts, FBI
      Iraqi refugees
      Gaza demonstrators in U.S.
      Women in Black
      Jordanian soldiers
      Israeli soldiers
      American Embassy
      Portland Peaceful Response
      Peace and Justice Works
      Israeli government
      Journalists
      Israeli defense forces
      Israeli lobby

Haaretz newspaper
Al-Jazeera
American Israel Pac (AIPAC)
Americans United for Palestinian Human Rights (AUPHR)
Anti-Arab Discrimination Committee
Zionists
Zionist media
Capitol Hill
U.S. Marines
Convent in Jerusalem

3. **Discursive Constructions of Individual and/or Collective Human Actors**
Preconceptions about America/concerns about coming to U.S.
Ideas about America since moving here
Shrinking/growing of cultural gap
    Media at the center of the cultural gap
    Students questions evidence of cultural gap
    Status of cultural gap as seen through Palestinian lens
        Negativism perpetuated by Zionists
Subliminal messages starting in childhood that Arabs are bad (effect of)
Psychological effects of growing up (Arabs) thinking that they are bad
Role of Hollywood in Othering Arabs
Sources of hurtful stereotyping
Challenges and experiences in class with students (Arab/non-Arab, Muslim/non-Muslim)
Encouraging position changes in U.S. speech language
9/11, people asking why, why but not listening to the why
Guantanamo Bay prison closing
Family in Egypt feelings PT being in U.S.
Distinction between the U.S. government and people
Phenomenon of people being "extra nice"
Lack of education/understanding created between incidents
Misuse and misunderstanding of Arabic words/phrases
Media seeing the evil stuff as interesting
Human nature and seeing the evil stuff as interesting
Media: problem of editorializing and loaded words
Admiration for Israeli media (liberal)
Experience participating in protests/activism (voice)
Backlash experienced during protest on situation in Gaza
Knowledge needed
Misunderstanding, nuance, perceptions and dynamics surrounding covering
    Cultural, non-religious reasons for wearing scarf
    Covering and body politics
    "No hijab, no identity" and reactions to this
    Covering and expression
    Veil/hijab etc terminology different meanings

          Diversity of opinions regarding hijab

          Diversity of opinions regarding treatment of Muslim women in the Muslim world

Concern for the comfort of others as she wears hijab, carries pocketbook that could be misconstrued

On being put in position of defending wearing hijab publically to strangers

Wearing hijab "invites" questions

          Different rules regarding what Muslim men should wear

               Male and female body differences dictate difference rules under Islam

          "Where are you <u>originally</u> from"…misunderstandings and invasiveness of non-Arabs

          Wanting to be thought of as an American

          On Iraq War and coming to understand some Americans support of the U.S. troops (if not the war)

          War and neutral stance>assertive protective stance>to outright revenge for their relatives

          Identity: Muslim before Arab

          On spending two years in refugee camp in Saudi Arabia

          Growing cultural gap and role of media and Hollywood

          Lack of knowledge of Americans about Arabs

          Role of extremists in widening the gap

          Current quality of life in Iraq of family members

          Culture shock on return to Iraq

Increasing connection to Iraqi heritage

Feet in both worlds: feeling like have to defend Arabs to Americans and Americans to Arabs

Problems when generalizing entire cultures based on a few

          KKK-example of a double standard-we don't generalize to "all Christians"

Prevailing U.S. narrative on A/A relations and Arab people

Prevailing Iraqi narrative about U.S./Americans

Identity

Parallels between conservatism of the Southern U.S. and Southern Iraq

Generational strife in Arab American families

Critique of Arabs

          Arabs never talk about problems/issues

          Accepting nature of Arabs

On complexity of her own relations with Arabs here in U.S.

Arabs are the people who assimilate the least, especially Iraqi's

Terrorist-related Othering experience with child

Classroom-terrorist Othering

Saudi student shot his professor incident/concern about repercussions locally

Eviction and racism experience

Eviction and human security

Saudi society and pride ("say you're doing well")

Examples of discriminatory treatment around housing issues

Scholarships to U.S.

Domestic violence and lack of ability (for husband) to navigate Saudi vs. U.S. culture

Iraq War: more U.S./American awareness, but at what cost?

Iraqi refugees of war coming to the U.S. and difficulties they face assimilating
The U.S.: A "safe haven" but not secure
Media in Saudi Arabia and neutral tone toward U.S.
Thankful to be American/In America
American curiosity and knowledge
Intercultural curiosity and willingness to learn increasing
Experience with A/A relations: the need to explain continuously is tiring
      People's lack of knowledge is tiring/exhausting
Experience living through 6-day war in a basement in Jerusalem
Bad experience post-9/11 close friend and small child
Concerns about child post-9/11
Arab American kids concerns and fears for their parents as they see their parents portrayed badly in climate since 9/11
Post traumatic stress and retraumatization
Some good reaching out experiences post-9/11 from non-Arabs and importance of sharing these with children
Media doesn't share the good things
Good and bad people everywhere
On preparing for reaction from class upon telling them she's Palestinian American
Complexities of identification and paperwork/passport(s)
Revocation of residency in Jerusalem
Government censorship of media
Transition to U.S. media from French media is difficult
Journalists lack of ownership in their profession
Reporting from Palestine-constraints of occupation
Arab American's role in bridging gap
The knowledge gap and critical thinking
Identity: "many hyphens"
Where are you "originally" from (privacy issues)
Kindness of strangers
Othering on the street as distinguished from interactions that are/seem based more on true curiosity/interest
Curiosity>Othering continuum
Importance of teaching Arab language in U.S. universities (action/close gap)
U.S. textbooks and systemic lack of balance/historical perspective on Middle East
Abundance of resources on Israel
Palestinians busy defending themselves from occupation
Palestinians not angry at America
Threatening anonymous phone calls, post-9/11
Perceived shift towards a more religions Arab America post-9/11
Need for peace and justice in order for hype and religious fervor to dissipate
Threatening experience child had, post-9/11
Negative incidents/treatment when returning to Palestine
Insecurity in Palestine as a child
      Extreme Othering by Israelis while growing up in Palestine
Airports and feeling guilty even though you're not

Good treatment by Americans during occupation in Jerusalem after 1948 war began
America not culpable for situation with Israelis
      Struggles over passports and access to Jerusalem
Current situation for Palestinians in Jerusalem
Humanize Arabs as we humanize Jews

   4. <u>Political/Economic Elements</u>
      On Obama
      Complexities of relations between Middle Eastern countries
      U.S. unconditional support of Israel
      6-day war
      History of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
      Iraqi's granted asylum to U.S.
      Post 9/11 impact on family business/livelihood
      Iraq/oil
      On U.S. domestic terrorism
      Participation in demonstration about Gaza situation
      Constraints on activism in Saudi Arabia
      Fear of repercussions of protesting in U.S.
      Anti-war activism
      Iraq War
      Afghanistan
      1948 Jerusalem first occupied
      9/11 not a religious driven thing-a politically driven thing

   5. <u>Temporal Elements</u>
      Iraq War
      Experience of 9/11
          Post 9/11 impact on family business/livelihood
      "Top of volcano feeling"/waiting for next incident/event to happen
      where a Muslim/Arab is or may be suspected.
          Lack of education/understanding created between incidents
      Complexities of relations between Middle Eastern countries
      Feelings about Iraq War after recent visit back to Iraq
      Applying/getting/retaining scholarships to study in U.S.
      Experience of 9/11 and having to leave the U.S., go back to Saudi Arabia
      Living under occupation in Jerusalem
      Variations between Arab countries/cultures

   6. <u>Major Issues/Debates (Usually Contested)</u>
      The U.S.: A country that wants to control
      U.S. unconditional support of Israel
      U.S. hypocrisy about "concern" for Iraq and nature of comparisons to Saudi Arabia

7. <u>Other Key Elements</u>
Fear of repercussions of protesting in U.S.
Building trust person to person
Hopes for coming generation, passing of values
Cultural voice-trust-sharing issues
Resilience of Arabs and Iraqis
On trust and retaining permission to trust
Resilience
Optimism
Exhaustion
Proud to be an American
Thankful to be in America
Anger/emotion about Israel, "sores that fester inside"
Americans don't deserve hate and anger
Feelings of frustration and misery
Suppressed feelings and difficulty being open
Emotional breakdown of sister (related to 6-day war post traumatic stress)
Trust> suspicion continuum
        Fear of Israeli surveillance
Liberalism
Pacifism

8. <u>Nonhuman Elements/Actants</u>
Guantanamo Bay prison
Koran/Qur'an
Refugee camps
Political asylum
Media
Hijab
Movies
Broken infrastructure of Iraq
Oil
Heritage (quest for)
Scholarships
White privilege
Conservatism
Cultural peer pressure
Brainwashing
American citizenship
Access to U.S./visas
Change
Passport (s)
Arabic language
Lack of infrastructure in Palestine

Textbooks
Televisions
Airports

9. **Implicated Silent Actors/Actants**
Children (the future)
The ornaments of the body
Saudi wealth
White privilege
God
Lack of infrastructure in Palestine

10. **Discursive Construction of Nonhuman Actants**
Importance of voice in everyday situations
U.S. vs. Middle East issues of women and voice
Voice women, power and position
Women's unique perspective on war
Teaching and Voice
Difference as enriching, source of growth

11. **Sociocultural/Symbolic Elements**
Muslim religion and being Arab
Being a good Muslim
Body as a sexual symbol/body as private
American citizenship (safety, security and respect)
Hijab as a visible symbol

12. **Spatial Elements**
Middle America
Differences between Americans and Saudis

13. **Related Discourses (Historical, Narrative and/or Visual)**
Women depicted as victims
Patriarchical culture and impact on women
Middle East depicted as backward
Selective nature of gender relations and religion
Patriarchal societies
Diversity of opinions regarding treatment of Muslim women in the Muslim world
Escalation of safety/security concerns when an event happens
Caretaking of parents (cultural and religious aspects)

14. **Events**
Saudi student shot his professor incident
Fort Hood, Texas incident
Eviction from home

Experience living through 6-day war in a basement in Jerusalem
Second Gulf War
       1948 Jerusalem first occupied
       Sahali White House incident
Threatening anonymous phone calls, post-9/11
Student finding out that "she's one of them"
Negative incidents/treatment when returning to Palestine
Family member jailed in Jerusalem

Appendix C: Framing Questions for Politically Sensitive Research

Framing Questions for Politically Sensitive Research

What are the needs and fears of the target population?

What do people what they want from the research at the outset and keep checking in. What can it do for them? For us?

Consider issues of gatekeepers and the importance of networking—building 'nets' of trust.

In thinking about building trust between cultures, what are the measures/indicators? How do you begin to know you've done it?

Get ongoing feedback about the mechanics of the study (methods, etc). Tailor study accordingly.

Think about the importance of how the research is initially framed. (For example, for research on domestic violence, the question that has dominated this area of inquiry for more than two decades has been this: "Why do battered women stay with partners who abuse them? In short, asking why do battered women stay?—rather than" what factors make battering possible or even permissible in our society and others?"—creates a scientific and popular milieu for blaming the victim" (Renzetti and Lee, 1993, p.28).

Consider notions of conforming, rebelling, loyalty, disobedience and the cultural context of these.

Consider constructions of leadership, change and diplomacy in cultural context.

Think carefully about how to present myself as lead researcher, how much to share and when.

Smith identifies the questions that she feels need to be asked in a cross-cultural context:
    Who defined the research problem?
    For whom is this study worthy and relevant? Who says so?
    What knowledge will the community gain from this study?
    What knowledge will the researcher gain from this study?
    What are some likely positive outcomes from this study?
    What are some possible negative outcomes?
    How can the negative outcomes be eliminated?
    To whom is the researcher accountable?
    What processes are in place to support the research, the researched and the researcher? (Smith, 1999, p.173)

What are influencing factors of Qatari culture that will impact this study and in what ways?

When thinking about ethics, consider, who are the people involved in and affected by the ethical dilemma raised in the research? What is the context for the dilemma in terms of the specific topic of the research and the issues it raises personally and socially for those involved?

What are the specific social and personal locations of the people involved in relation to each other?

What are the needs of those involved and how are they inter-related?

Who am I identifying with, who am I posing as other, and why?

What is the balance of personal and social power between those involved?

How will those involved understand our actions and are these in balance with our own judgment about our own practice?

How can we best communicate the ethical dilemmas to those involved, give them room to raise their views and negotiate with and between them?

How will our actions affect relationships between the people involved?

Appendix D: Situational Analysis Findings—Events

Non-Arab Group

9 year old Palestinian boy shot
9/11 attacks
Onset of conflict in Afghanistan
Onset of war in Iraq
Second Intifada
Afghan conflict (school girls, Taliban acid incident)

Arab Group

Massive scale of Qatar's development
Resulting changing landscape (pollution, quality of life, etc)
9 year old Palestinian boy shot
Dubai development trajectory and bankruptcy
Nude march in San Francisco
Israeli-Palestine conflict
Iraq War

Arab American Group

On spending two years in refugee camp in Saudi Arabia
Saudi student shot his professor incident/concern about repercussions locally
Eviction and racism experience
Experience living through 6-day war in a basement in Jerusalem
On preparing for reaction from class upon telling them she's Palestinian American
Good treatment by Americans during occupation in Jerusalem after 1948 war began
Experience of 9/11 and having to leave the U.S., go back to Saudi Arabia
Saudi student shot his professor incident
Fort Hood, Texas incident
Experience living through 6-day war in a basement in Jerusalem
Second Gulf War
1948 Jerusalem first occupied
Sahali White House incident
Threatening anonymous phone calls, post-9/11
Student finding out that "she's one of them"
Negative incidents/treatment when returning to Palestine
Family member jailed in Jerusalem

Appendix E: Situational Analysis Findings—Human Actors/Actants

Non-Arab Group
    Yassar Arafat
    Golda Mier
    Obama
    Ariel Sharon
    Sheika Mosa
    non-Arab study participants
    Al Qaeda
    Christians (Arab, Israeli, other)
    Muslims
    Jews
    U.S. immigrant groups (Mexican, Hispanic, Japanese Americans)
    Taliban
    Pakistan
    Palestinians
    Israelis/Israel
    U.S. domestic terrorists
    Women leaders
    Hispanic Americans
    Bush administration
    U.S. Embassy in Jordan
    Media outlets
    Families

Arab Group
Obama
Osama bin Laden
Sheikha Mozaha Bint Nasser Al Missned
Oprah
Tyra Banks
Dr. Phil
U.S. domestic terrorists
"Outliers" (in any culture)
Americans and American families
Relatives in the U.S.

Arab American Group
    Saddam Hussein
George W. Bush
King of Saudi Arabia
    Leila Ahmed
    Osama bin Laden
    Rahm Emanuel

Gideon Livy
Dick Cheney
U.S. Media
Egyptian media
Guantanamo Bay
U.S. Gaza demonstrators
Relatives in Egypt
Saddam Hussein's army
Iraqi people
Women of Saudi Arabia
"Stupid" Taliban
Klu Klux Klan
Women and children of Iraq
American government
Terrorists
Arab small family business owners
Hollywood/Hollywood directors
Middle America
Radical Mormons
Radical Muslims
Saudi mission
Saudi Embassy
Police, courts, FBI
Iraqi refugees
Gaza demonstrators in U.S.
Women in Black
Jordanian soldiers
Israeli soldiers
American Embassy
Portland Peaceful Response
Peace and Justice Works
Israeli government
Journalists
Israeli defense forces
Israeli lobby
Haaretz newspaper
Al-Jazeera
American Israel Pac (AIPAC)
Americans United for Palestinian Human Rights (AUPHR)
Anti-Arab Discrimination Committee
Zionists
Zionist media
Capitol Hill
U.S. Marines
Convent in Jerusalem

Appendix F: Situational Analysis Findings—Non-Human and Implicated Silent

Actors/Actants

Non-Arab Group
      Children
      Homeland security workers
      Individual members of the media
      Individual government representatives
      Airports
      Airplanes

Arab Group

      airports
      airplanes
      children

Arab American Group
      Guantanamo Bay prison
      Koran/Qur'an
      Refugee camps
      Political asylum
      Media
      Hijab
      Movies
      Broken infrastructure of Iraq
      Oil
      Heritage (quest for)
      Scholarships
      White privilege
      Conservatism
      Cultural peer pressure
      Brainwashing
      American citizenship
      Access to U.S./visas
      Change
      Passport (s)
      Arabic language
      Lack of infrastructure in Palestine
      Textbooks
      Televisions
      Airports
      Children (the future)
      The ornaments of the body

Saudi wealth
White privilege
God
Lack of infrastructure in Palestine

Appendix G: Situational Analysis Findings—Broad Situational Factors

Non-Arab Group
        9/11 and oil prices
        Poverty and Palestine
        Homeland security and new funding priorities
        Homeland security and profiling/compromising civil liberties
        U.S. foreign policy on Israel and Palestine
        George [W] Bush (and policies) as catalyst for political action
        Afghanistan conflict
        Nuclear insecurity
        U.S. policy of protection of Israel
        War in Iraq
            Iraq War as a connecting point between Arab and non-Arabs
        Pre/post-9/11
            9/11 as an opportunity to engage and understand
        Despair and Lebanon
        U.S. Support of Israel

        Palestinian situation
        Conspiracy theories (idea that Bush implemented 9/11)
        Role of other Arab countries in Palestinian situation
        Israel-Palestinian conflict as recruiting tool
         U.S. Embassy culture and implications for diplomacy

Arab Group
Uncertainty about Obama
        U.S. Military base in Qatar/strategic
        Osama bin Laden figure created to perpetuate conflict?
        Extreme pace of development in Doha, Qatar
        Qatar as a bias (neutral, apolitical) peacemaking country
        Globalization + and -
        U.S. government misleading people
        Disconnect between people and political issues
        Concept of terrorist governments
        People's perceptual differences between Arab and non-Arab terrorists
        American colonization/Iraq
        American colonization/Sudan (oil)
        Arab nations conflicts with other Arab nations
Anti-U.S. intervention position
Colonization positions/colonization of Muslims
        Iran's nuclear program and the use of U.S. military base in Qatar to stage for conflict
        with Iran
Massive scale of development changing the landscape (pollution, quality of life, etc)

Arab American Group

       Guantanamo Bay prison closing
       Distinction between the U.S. government and people
       Current quality of life in Iraq of family members
Iraq War: more U.S./American awareness, but at what cost?
Iraqi refugees of war coming to the U.S. and difficulties they face assimilating
Palestinians busy defending themselves from occupation
Current situation for Palestinians in Jerusalem
       On Obama
       Complexities of relations between Middle Eastern countries
       U.S. unconditional support of Israel
       6-day war
       History of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
       Iraqi's granted asylum to U.S.
       Post 9/11 impact on family business/livelihood
       Iraq/oil
       On U.S. domestic terrorism
       Participation in demonstration about Gaza situation
       Constraints on activism in Saudi Arabia
       Fear of repercussions of protesting in U.S.
       Anti-war activism
       Iraq War
       Afghanistan
       1948 Jerusalem first occupied
       9/11 not a religious driven thing-a politically driven thing
       Iraq War
       Living under occupation in Jerusalem
       The U.S.: A country that wants to control
       U.S. unconditional support of Israel
       U.S. hypocrisy about "concern" for Iraq and nature of comparisons to Saudi Arabia
Women depicted as victims
Patriarchical culture and impact on women
       Middle East depicted as backward
       Selective nature of gender relations and religion
       Patriarchal societies
       Diversity of opinions regarding treatment of Muslim women in the Muslim world
       Escalation of safety/security concerns when an event happens
       Caretaking of parents (cultural and religious aspects)

Appendix H: Ethics Committee Institutional Review Board Approval

September 30, 2009

Dear Charlotte Moats-Gallagher

As Chair of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Leadership and Organizational Change, Antioch University, I am granting you approval to conduct your Dissertation titled Arab/American relations and Human Security, Post 9/11: A Political Narrative Inquiry. Your study is approved based on the information presented in your Ethics Application, including submitted attachments. -Select-, IRB member, has been assigned to your case and will be your contact person for the duration of your project. Please consult with this IRB member if you have any questions regarding the Ethics of your project.

Your study is approved from September 30, 2009 to September 29, 2010. If your data collection should extend beyond this time period, you are required to submit a Request for Extension Application to the IRB.

Your study will be overseen by Dr. Philomena Essed, Chair of your Dissertation Committee. Any variation in procedure in the treatment of the participants must be reported to Dr. Philomena Essed and subsequently approved by the IRB through your submission of a revised Ethics Application.

Sincerely,
Dr. Carolyn Kenny
Chair, IRB Committee
Leadership and Change Program
Antioch University

Appendix I: Participant Consent Form

Participant Consent to a Study about Arab/American Relations

You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Charlotte Moats-Gallagher a doctoral candidate in the Leadership and Organizational Change program at Antioch University, Yellow Springs, Ohio. Part of this study will occur with a group of women living in Qatar, where I have a co-investigator assisting me. This person will be asked to sign a consent form which will include a confidentiality clause to ensure that your privacy is protected.

The central purpose of this study is to explore women's views and experiences in the arena of Arab—American relations within this post-9/11 space we all inhabit. The study will add to the body of knowledge on East/West understanding. I wish to conduct this study with 6 participants from each of three demographic groups: Arab American, non-Arab, and Arab (living in Qatar).

The study involves, a freewriting session that will be held during one evening and the following day, which will be followed within 1-3 weeks by one conversational interview which will be arranged at your convenience and which is expected to last between 1-2 hours. The interview will be taped and a transcript prepared from it.

Your name will be kept confidential, unless and only if you give express permission for me to use your name in my report. You will have the opportunity to remove any quotations from the transcribed interview. In addition, the tapes and all related research materials including the Informed Consent Forms will be kept in a secure file cabinet during the completion of my study and possible publications emerging from the study. The results from these interviews will be incorporated into my doctoral dissertation and I may wish to use the data in future scholarly presentations and publications. If the results of this project are published your identity will not be made public.

I hope that through this writing and subsequent interview you may develop a greater personal awareness of your own experience as a result of your participation in this research. The risks to you are considered minimal. However, your participation may trigger emotions. I will make a list of counselors available to you at the outset of the study, as a resource. In addition, you may withdraw from this study at any time (either during or after the interview) without negative consequences. Should you withdraw, your data will be eliminated from the study.

There is no financial remuneration for participating in this study.
If you have any questions about any aspect of this study or your involvement, please contact:
Charlotte Moats-Gallagher, 541.737.6406, char.moats-gallagher@oregonstate.edu

If you have any questions about the ethical considerations of this study, please contact:
Carolyn Kenny, Ph.D.
Chair, Antioch University Ph.D. in Leadership & Change Institutional Review Board

ckenny@phd.antioch.edu, 805-565-7535

Two copies of this informed consent form have been provided. Please sign both, indicating that you have read, understood and agreed to participate in this research. Return one to me and keep the other for yourself.

_____
Name of researcher (please print)

_____
Signature of researcher

_____
Date

_____
Name of participant (please print)

_____
Signature of participant

_____
Date

Appendix J: Research Project Summary Used for Participant Recruitment

Research Project Summary
Charlotte Moats-Gallagher, Doctoral Candidate, Antioch University

Arab/American Relations: Perspectives on Intercultural Understanding

This narrative inquiry study is an exploration of women's views and experiences in the arena of Arab—American relations. The study revolves around three groups of women: 1) Arab women in Qatar, 2) Arab American women in the U.S., and 3) Non-Arab women in the U.S.. The study will add to the knowledge on East/West understanding and the literature concerning the role of political narratives in meaning-making during times of turmoil. This work looks at women's sense of belonging and voice in the political world.

There will be six participants in each of the above three groups who will be asked to take part in a ½ day session that involves a technique called freewriting and at a later date take part in an individual interview (approximately 1hour).

Charlotte Moats-Gallagher has worked with the Oregon State University (OSU) International Programs Office for ten years. Her initial position was as Director of the Women in International Development Program. She then served as Co-Director of the Office of International Research and Development for several years, and currently works in the Office of the Associate Provost for International Programs as Chair of the OSU Asia Initiative and Internationalization Liaison. Her responsibility includes providing strategic support to the university's international agenda. Her work has included directing and participating in U.S. State Department exchange programs dealing with varied issues in: Ukraine, Russia Far East, Macedonia, and Central Asia. Charlotte previously worked with the Oregon Department of Water Resources where she was the Administrator for a division comprised of diverse technical, policy and planning staff responsible for statewide stewardship and water conservation programs. She holds a Masters degree from the Institute for Environmental Studies at University of Wisconsin-Madison and is nearing completion of her doctorate with the Antioch University *Leadership and Change Program*. Her research interests include: international exchange, cross-cultural dialogue, Arab/American relations and women's diplomacy.

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